

**Ministry of Higher Education and Scientific Research
University Mouloud Mammeri of Tizi-Ouzou
Faculty of Letters and Languages
Department of English**



**Dissertation Submitted in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree
of Magister**

Specialism: English
Option: Cultural Studies

Submitted by:

Mrs. Souad SMAILI

Supervised by:

Pr. Amar GUENDOUZI

Subject:

**The Clash of Civilizations Rhetoric in
George W. Bush's Speeches**

Panel of Examiners:

ZERAR Sabrina	Professor	Mouloud Mammeri University.....Chair
GUENDOUZI Amar	Professor	Mouloud Mammeri University.....Supervisor
RICHE Bouteldja	Professor	Mouloud Mammeri University.....Examiner
SIDI-SAID Fadhila	MCA	Mouloud Mammeri University.....Examiner

Acknowledgements

*First of all, I would like to express my special thanks to **Professor Bouteldja Riche** and **Professor Sabrina Zerar** for launching the Magister Studies. These studies gave me a great opportunity to discover and explore the field of Cultural Studies. This Magister opened to me the gate of higher education, it also taught me a countless life lessons, which will be very useful in my professional career. In short, without this Magister I would not be the person who I am right now. Truly thank you Professors.*

*I am definitely grateful for my supervisor **Professor Amar GUENDOUZI**, without whom the achievement of this dissertation would not have been possible. I have been extremely lucky to have him as a teacher and supervisor. I have benefited a great deal from his enthusiasm and patience in reading my work and the enlightening feedbacks I got in return. I am sincerely thankful to him for everything he had done to me.*

*I would like also to express my gratitude and indebtedness once more to **Professor Bouteldja RICHE** who taught me treasured lessons. I wish also salute his continuous encouragements during my first steps as a novice researcher.*

*My further thanks go to **Professor Sabrina ZERAR**, and **Doctor Fadhila SIDI-SAID** to whom I am indebted for their helpful and illuminating advice and support. I, also, address my thanks to **Doctor Tewfik HAMEL** from Paul Valéry University of Montpellier for providing me with all the documentation I needed.*

*To my beloved mother Dehlia LAGUEL, father Ahmed
SMAILI, my siblings Mouloud and Souhila and my
husband Bélaïd RAHMANI.*

ABSTRACT:

The present dissertation demonstrates how the utilization of language is always manipulated to convey the purposes of the speaker in order to have an effect on the listener. Politicians, in particular, comprehend the power of words to explicate and justify acts, as well as to persuade people to support them, even if this support implies a risk to their lives. Based on this understanding, I have analyzed the selected speeches and declarations of former President of the United States, George W. Bush, starting from September 11, 2001 leading up to the 2003 attack on Iraq, with special emphasis on the way he makes use of metaphors. The aim of the analysis is to reveal the real and essential motivation for Bush's thoughts and actions. Samuel P. Huntington's idea of *The Clash of Civilizations* (1993) seems likely to be his foremost (hidden) motivation. Furthermore, I suggest that Orientalism is the most significant ideology standing behind Bush-Cheney's War on Terror rhetoric. To demonstrate that, I have devoted a considerable attention to metaphors and cognitive metaphor theory developed by George Lakoff and Mark Johnson (1980), metaphor criticism as presented by Lakoff (1991-2003) and Jonathan Charteris-Black (2005-2011). Metaphors are a very efficient means of presenting acts and actions in a manner that engages the audience and wins its sympathy, as they allow the speaker to identify himself/herself with the right and the good, and the enemy with the wrong and the evil. With the help of metaphors George W. Bush has succeeded in presented the events preceding the Iraqi war in a vague and often distorted value terms where assaults became preemptive defense, military invasion change of regime, war becomes peace, and occupation becomes humanitarian intervention.

CONTENTS:

Acknowledgements.....	I
Dedications.....	II
Abstract.....	III
General Introduction.....	01
Review of the Literature.....	04
Issue and Working Hypothesis	07
Method and Materials.....	08
Methodological Outline.	12
 CHAPTER ONE: The U.S. Foreign Policy After The Cold War And Context of The Clash Of Civilizations Theory	
Introduction.....	13
SECTION ONE: The Cold War/ Post Cold War And The U.S. Foreign Policy:	
1. The US Diplomacy During and after the Cold War	14
2. George W. Bush's War On Terror.....	27
SECTION TWO: The Origins Of The Clash Of Civilizations Theory: A Review of Major Theses	
1. Bernard Lewis's " <i>Roots Of Muslim Rage</i> " (1990).....	29
2. Francis Fukuyam's " <i>The End of History</i> "(1992).....	30
3. Samuel P. Huntington's " <i>The Clash of Civilizations?</i> " (1993).....	32
Conclusion.....	35
 CHAPTER TWO: Bush's Rhetorical Construction of War on Terror	
Introduction.....	37
SECTION ONE: Rhetoric and Political Persuasion	
1. Aristotelian Artistic Proofs.....	38
2. Jonathan Charteris-Black's Rhetoric Figure	41
3. Aristotle's Rhetorical Appeals Applied to Speech of George W. Bush's Address to the Nation on September 11, 2006.....	44

SECTION TWO: Lakoffian Conceptual Metaphor Theory

1. Defining Metaphor.....	52
2. The Conceptual Metaphor Vs. Metaphorical Linguistic Expression.....	54
3. Categories of Metaphors.....	55
4. “Highlighting and Hiding”	57
5. “Metaphor, Truth, and Power”	58
6. Applying Metaphor Theory to Bush’s selected speeches.....	59
a) Metaphors influence on Establishing integrity (Ethos).....	60
b) Metaphors Influence on Heightening pathos.....	61
c) Metaphors influence on communicating political arguments (Logos).61	
d) Communication of Ideology by Political Myth.....	62

SECTION THREE: George W. Bush’s Personification Metaphors in Selected Speeches

1. “State as Person”	63
2. “The Fairy Tale Of The Just War” (All America as a Hero).....	72
a) “The Rescue Story”	74
b) “The Self Defense Story”	77
3. Conflict Metaphors.....	78
<i>Conclusion</i>	79

CHAPTER THREE: The War On Terror: A Disguised Clash of Civilizations

Introduction	81
---------------------------	----

SECTION ONE: Orientalism And The Clash Of Civilizations

1. The Orientalist Thoughts In Huntington’s Clash Of Civilizations Thesis.....	81
2. “The West Vs. The Rest”	85
3. The Impact of The Clashing Civilizations On The War On Terror.....	86

SECTION TWO: Metaphor and George W. Bush’s War On Terror: Analysis of Selected Speeches

1. Conceptualizing The Other Via Metaphor.....	92
2. The Orientalist Framework (Us Versus Them).....	95
A. Civilization Vs. Barbarism.....	97
B. Power Vs. Weakness/ Maturity Vs. Immaturity.....	99
C. Rationality Vs. Irrationality.....	101
3. Frames Of Self Presentation Vs. Frames of Other-Representation.....	103
 <i>Conclusion</i>	 104
 General Conclusion	 105
Bibliography	111
Résumé	118

List of Figures:

- **Figure(1):** Rhetorical Means for Persuasion in Political Communication.....**40**
- **Figure (2):** Metaphors Influence on Political Persuasion.....**58**

List of Tables:

- **Table (1):** George W. Bush’s Personifications of The “State As Person” In Selected Speeches.....**65**
- **Table (2):** Bush’s Personifications of the “State as Person: Friendly States” In Selected Speeches.....**67**
- **Table (3):** Demonization of the Enemy.....**75**
- **Table (4):** Orientalist Frames.....**97**

APPENDIX: FULL TEXTS OF PRESIDENT GEORGE W. BUSH REGARDING THE WAR ON TERROR

1. The President's Address to the Nation on the Terrorist Attacks, September 11, 2001.....	01
2. Address to the Nation Announcing Strikes Against Al Qaida Training Camps and Taliban Military Installations in Afghanistan, October 7, 2001.....	02
3. The President's News Conference, October 11, 2001.....	03
4. Address to the Nation From Ellis Island, New York, on the Anniversary of the Terrorist Attacks of September 11, September 11, 2002.....	13
5. Address to the Nation on the War on Terror, September 11, 2006.....	14
6. Remarks to Police, Firemen, and Rescue workers at the World Trade Center Site in New York City , September 14, 2001.....	18
7. Address to the Nation on the War on Terror, September 7, 2003.....	18
8. Remarks at a Reenlistment Ceremony on the 30th Anniversary of the All-Volunteer Force, July 1, 2003.....	22
9. Remarks to the Troops at Camp As Sayliyah, Qatar, June 5, 2003.....	25
10. Address Before a Joint Session of the Congress on the United States Response to the Terrorist Attacks of September 11, September 20, 2001.....	27
11. The President's Address to the Nation on Iraq, March 19, 2003.....	31
12. Address Before a Joint Session of the Congress on the United States Response to the Terrorist Attacks of September 11, September 20, 2001.....	32
13. Address to the Nation on Iraq, March 17, 2003.....	37
14. Address to the Nation on Iraq From Cincinnati, Ohio, October 7, 2002.....	40
15. Remarks to Employees of the Cecil I. Walker Machinery Company in Belle, January 22, 2002.....	45
16. Remarks on the Anniversary of Operation Iraqi Freedom, March 19, 2004.....	51
17. George W. Bush's Commencement Address at the United States Military Academy in West Point, New York, June 1, 2002	54
18. Address to the Nation on Iraq From the U.S.S. Abraham Lincoln, May 1, 2003.....	59
19. Address to the Nation Announcing Strikes Against Al Qaida Training Camps and Taliban Military Installations in Afghanistan, October 7, 2001.....	62
20. Address to the United Nations General Assembly in New York City, September 12, 2002.....	64
21. Address to the Nation on Iraq From Cincinnati, Ohio, October 7, 2002.....	69

22. Address to the Nation on Iraq, March 17, 2003.....	75
23. Address to the Nation From Ellis Island, New York, on the Anniversary of the Terrorist Attacks of September 11, September 11, 2002.....	78
24. Address Before a Joint Session of the Congress on the United States Response to the Terrorist Attacks of September 11, September 20, 2001.....	79
25. Remarks at the Department of Defense Service of Remembrance in Arlington, Virginia, October 11, 2001.....	84
26. Address to the Nation on the War on Terror, September 7, 2003.....	86
27. Address Before a Joint Session of the Congress on the State of the Union, January 29, 2002.....	89
28. Remarks Announcing the Most Wanted Terrorists List, October 10, 2001.....	95
29. Remarks on Arrival at the White House and an Exchange With Reporters, September 16, 2001.....	96
30. The President's News Conference With Prime Minister Tony Blair of the United Kingdom in London, November 20, 2003.....	99
31. Remarks on the Iraqi Regime's Noncompliance With United Nations Resolutions, February 6, 2003.....	107
32. Remarks to the American Medical Association National Conference, March 4, 2003.....	108
33. Remarks at the Port of Philadelphia in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, March 31, 2003.....	114
34. Address Before a Joint Session of the Congress on the State of the Union, January 28, 2003.....	118
35. Remarks at the Pentagon in Arlington, Virginia, March 25, 2003.....	126
36. Remarks to Military Personnel at Fort Carson, Colorado, November 24, 2003.....	127
37. Remarks on the Six-Month Anniversary of the September 11th Attacks, March 11, 2002.....	131
38. The President's Radio Address, November 23, 2002.....	133
39. Remarks on Signing the Authorization for Use of Military Force Against Iraq Resolution of 2002, October 16, 2002	134

General Introduction

INTRODUCTION:

The collapse of communism removed a common enemy of **the West and Islam** and left each the perceived major threat to the other.¹

This struggle has been called **a clash of civilizations**. In truth, it is a struggle for civilization. We are fighting to maintain the way of life enjoyed by free nations. And we're fighting for the possibility that good and decent people across the Middle East can raise up societies based on freedom and tolerance and personal dignity.² (**bolds** are mine).

Following the 9/11 attacks former U.S. President, George Walker Bush, projected a worldview of extremes, leaving no middle ground. He assumed that his citizens and other nations are either with his administration on the side of "good" or with the enemy on the side of "evil."³ As a result, his rhetoric has divided the world into two camps, in Samuel Huntington's words, two conflicting blocks "The West and the Rest."⁴

In spite of his efforts to deny and conceal his belief in the clashing civilizations thesis,⁵ the rhetoric he utilized all along his "War on Terror" accentuated a clash of the United States of America, which is considered as 'the heart and soul'⁶ of the Western civilization 'believing

¹ Samuel P. Huntington, *The Clash of Civilizations: And the Remaking of World Order* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1996), 236.

² George W. Bush, "Address to the Nation on the War on Terror," September 11, 2006. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=73962> (accessed April 19th, 2014).

³ George W. Bush, "Address Before a Joint Session of the Congress on the United States Response to the Terrorist Attacks of September 11," September 20, 2001. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=64731> (accessed April 19th, 2014).

⁴ Samuel P. Huntington, *The Clash of Civilizations: And the Remaking of World Order* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1996), 183.

⁵ George W. Bush "Commencement Address at the United States Military Academy in West Point, New York," June 1, 2002. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=62730> (accessed April 19th, 2014).

George W. Bush, "Commencement Address at the University of South Carolina in Columbia, South Carolina," May 9, 2003. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=407> (accessed April 19th, 2014).

George W. Bush, "Remarks to the United Nations General Assembly in New York City," September 21, 2004. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=72758> (accessed April 19th, 2014).

⁶ George W. Bush, "The President's News Conference," October 11, 2001. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=73426> (accessed April 19th, 2014).

in democracy, freedom, and peace,'¹ against an “evil civilization” intending to obliterate all that.

The “clash of civilizations” thesis is, indeed, omnipresent in the language of the “War on Terror.” Bush addressed the American nation with a high amount of affirmation and both decisive and imperative tones associating ‘terrorism’ with every nation that harbors terrorism declaring: ‘we will make no distinction between the terrorists who committed these acts and those who harbor them.’²

The term “civilization” is a Western coinage which represents for some people ‘the epitome of human achievement, the end result of modern progress,’ and for others ‘a dehumanizing, external threat, bringing with it a mechanization of life and a challenge to “traditional” beliefs.’³ It has frequently carried a colossal weight in American official rhetoric. Historically speaking, ‘since its emergence as a concept in the late-eighteenth century in Western Europe, acts of extraordinary violence and brutality have been committed in the name of civilization.’⁴ In his critique of Huntington’s the Clash of Civilizations thesis, Edward Said explains that:

Throughout history, occupying, expansionist powers have always invented theories to justify such practices. The U.S had the theory of Manifest Destiny in the 1800s: such ‘redeeming ideas’ dignify the practice of competition and clash whose real purpose is self-aggrandizement, power and unrestrained self-pride.⁵

¹ Memoona Sajjad, “A ‘Non Western’ Reading Of The ‘Clash Of Civilizations’ Theory: Through the Eyes of ‘The Rest,’” *International Journal of Political Science and Development* Vol. 1(2) (October 2013).

² George W. Bush, “Address to the Nation on the Terrorist Attacks,” September 11, 2001. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=58057> (accessed April 19th, 2014).

³ Bruce Mazlish, *Civilization and Its Contents* (California: Stanford University Press, 2004), x.

⁴ Maureen Montgomery, “Savage Civility: September 11 And The Rhetoric Of ‘Civilization,’” *Australasian Journal of American Studies* Vol. 21, no. No. 2 (December 2002), 56.

⁵ Edward Said, *The Myth of the Clash of Civilizations*, (University of Massachusetts - Amherst, United States of America, 1998). <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=aPS-pONIEG8> (Accessed September 20, 2014).

As a matter of fact, since September 11, 'Civilization' has been evoked to justify the revenge on both the Al Qaeda network and those who harbored it in Afghanistan. Identifying terrorism as the enemy of civilization 'provides an enormous scope for US intervention overseas as well as sanctioning the Federal Government's curtailment of civil liberties at home.'¹ Furthermore, Bush put the attacks of 9/11 both in religious terms, when he declared 'this crusade, this war on terrorism is going to take a while'² and in civilizational ones: 'this is civilization's fight.'³

It is obvious that during America's "War on Terror," President Bush carefully and masterfully used figurative language, including metaphors and personifications, to express things that cannot be described in a realist way. In fact, it is argued that metaphor is having a great power in political rhetoric and 'great rhetoric is primarily metaphorical,'⁴ because metaphor is essential to persuasion and possesses the ability to communicate ideologies.⁵ Moreover, metaphor influences how a specific subject is seen and how it is being interpreted. It possesses, thus, a great impact on how our thinking is structured.⁶ This influence also structures our sympathies in a given circumstance. For example, a metaphor can describe one part of a conflict in a way that creates sympathy for that part, even if, in reality, it is the culpable

¹ Maureen Montgomery, "Savage Civility: September 11 And The Rhetoric Of 'Civilization,'" *Australasian Journal of American Studies* Vol. 21, no. No. 2 (December 2002), 57.

² George W. Bush, *Today We Mourned, Tomorrow We Work*, a.k.a. "This Crusade ... Is Going to Take a While" September 16, 2001, Appendix P94 <http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/09/20010916-2.html>, (April 19th, 2013).

³ _____, "Address Before a Joint Session of the Congress on the United States Response to the Terrorist Attacks of September 11," September 20, 2001. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, The American Presidency Project, <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=647311> , (April 19th, 2013).

⁴ Nicholas Jackson O'Shaughnessy, *Politics and Propaganda: Weapons of Mass Seduction* (Manchester, UK: Manchester University Press, 2004), 70.

⁵ George Lakoff and Mark Johnson, *Metaphors We Live by*, 2nd ed. (2003), (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1980).

⁶ Ibid.

part. Generally, metaphors affect our thinking and also our emotional response to any received message.¹

The Review of the Literature:

Several researches have been done to analyze the US political speeches, especially those of George W. Bush, from diverse perspectives. Since the events of 9/11 a great number of intellectuals and academic writers related Bush's "War on Terror" to Samuel P. Huntington's thesis (1993) 'The Clash of Civilizations,' and produced numerous publications on it. For my review of the literature I have selected the most representative and the closest works to my subject. In general, the fields concerned with such themes are Cultural Studies, Political Science, Communication Studies and Rhetoric Studies. In the following reviews I will be focusing on conclusions of each field.

To commence with, Douglas Kellner (2007) proclaims that the Bush administration, assisted and encouraged by US corporate media, adopted a politics of fear through 'the PATRIOT Act,² massive changes in the legal system, a dramatic expansion of the US military, and US led military intervention in Afghanistan and Iraq.'³ In his article, Kellner put under scrutiny the rhetoric of the Bush-Cheney administration in the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks until the declaration of war on Iraq. He finds that Bush's speeches are highly filled with 'Orwellian features of doublespeak,' such as 'war against Iraq is for peace', 'the occupation of Iraq is its liberation' and 'destroying its food and water supplies enables 'humanitarian actions.'

⁴ For Kellner, Bush's rhetoric signified 'the politics of lying' which brought enormous dangers

¹ George Lakoff and Mark Johnson, *Metaphors We Live by*, 2nd ed. (2003), (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1980).

² The USA PATRIOT Act is an Act of Congress that was signed into law by President George W. Bush on October 26, 2001. With its ten-letter abbreviation (USA PATRIOT) expanded, the full title is "Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001".

³ Douglas Kellner, "Bushspeak and the Politics of Lying: Presidential Rhetoric in the 'war on terror'," *Presidential Studies Quarterly* 37, no. 4 (December 2007)

⁴Ibid.

to the United States including the invasion of Iraq. It is not surprising that what helped the spread of this politics of lying is the U.S. media: 'bold lies are repeated over and over until they take on the ring of truth, at least for the Bush base and those who cannot think critically about politics and the media.'¹

The post 9/11 period is seen by many writers and analysts as another bloody and violent period, dominated by the Neoconservative foreign policy experiment. A new way of thinking was on the rise when the Neoconservatives and their influence over the U.S. foreign policy. *The Bush Doctrine and Presidential Rhetoric: Change and Continuity in US Foreign Policy* (2013) by Kim Quarantello analyzes the presidential rhetoric used to transmit the Bush Doctrine objectives and intentions to the American citizens. The materials consist of collected foreign policy speeches that President Bush delivered from September 11, 2001, to March 19, 2003 (the eve of Iraqi war). To comprehend the impact of presidential rhetoric on American public opinion, Quarantello included some surveys dated from March 2003.

Quarantello demonstrates that the Bush doctrine exemplifies continuity in US grand strategy. However, a change in the policies implemented to achieve foreign policy goals strategic interests were predominant in President Bush's foreign policy. The surveys conducted in March 2003 show that the Bush Administration enjoyed high public approval ratings, indicating that President Bush's use of ideological rhetoric to justify strategic objectives successfully assembled domestic support for *the Bush Doctrine*.

Debra Merskin's *The Construction of Arabs as Enemies: Post-September 11 Discourse of George W. Bush*, examines Bush's rhetoric built on "stereotypical" words and images addressed to the American nation on several occasions. The author argues that the portrayal of

¹Douglas Kellner, "Bushspeak and the Politics of Lying: Presidential Rhetoric in the 'war on terror'," *Presidential Studies Quarterly* 37, no. 4 (December 2007).

Arabs as ‘evil’, ‘bloodthirsty’, ‘animalistic terrorists’ is not Bush’s creation, but that of media that fixed it upon Arabs since more than 20 years. Debra concludes that Bush’s speeches accommodated and reflected in his public statements to give acceptance to his aggressive policies.¹

In his *Rhetoric goes to war: The Evolution of the United States of America’s Narrative of the “War on Terror”* (2012), Cezar M. Ornatowski stresses the necessity of putting the issues of war and conflict under scrutiny by rhetoric scholars. He provides two main reasons for this: one, [war and conflict] have been central to the human experience;² two, ‘ the relationship between rhetoric and conflict or war.’³ Furthering the second point, Ornatowski asserts that rhetoric which is ‘the art of persuasion and argument’⁴ that has by tradition been opposed to cruel war, shifted in meaning since the Bush-Cheney administration used it as a tool to engage in war.

Among the studies investigating the role of metaphor in political rhetoric based on Lakoff’s and Johnson’s ideas is Jonathan Charteris-Black’s *Politicians And Rhetoric: The Persuasive Power Of Metaphor* (2005), which examines “the persuasive power of metaphor” in speeches of British and US heads of state and noticeable public speakers from Winston Churchill and Martin Luther King to Margaret Thatcher, Bill Clinton, Tony Blair and George Bush Sr. and Jr. with the intention of showing “how linguistic analysis provides a very clear insight into the nature of how power is gained and maintained in democracies.”⁵

¹ Debra Merskin, "The Construction of Arabs as Enemies: Post-September 11 Discourse of George W. Bush," *Mass Communication and Society* 7, no. 2 (May 2004): 157–175.

² Ornatowski Cezar M., "Rhetoric Goes to War : The Evolution of the United States of America’s Narrative of the ‘War On Terror’," *African Yearbook of Rhetoric : Diplomatic rhetoric in the South*, Vol 3, no. Issue 3 (2012): 65.

³ Ibid., 65-74.

⁴ Ibid.

⁵ Jonathan Charteris-Black, *Politicians and Rhetoric: the Persuasive Power of Metaphor* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004), xii.

Charteris-Black identifies persuasion, rhetoric, metaphor, ideology, and myth as key concepts in his study. The link between metaphor, ideology and myth is that “they share a common discourse function of persuasion and the expressive potential for cognitive and emotional engagement.”¹ The writer sees metaphor, ideology and myth as elements of rhetoric that can be used to achieve a successful outcome of persuasion, and his interest in persuasions lies in examining how political persuasion is used to shape, create and maintain perceptions of reality. Charteris-Black has used cognitive metaphor theory to perform a discourse analytic investigation of political discourse in the speeches of Western heads of state.

Issue and Working Hypothesis:

From the review of the literature above, we notice that numerous studies have already analyzed American political rhetoric. Therefore, my dissertation will be a completion of these previous works, by applying the metaphor paradigm developed by many rhetoricians on selected speeches of George W. Bush. Indeed, building on Lakoff’s and Johnson’s (1980) study on metaphors and later publications of Lakoff and his followers on the study of metaphors in politics, my aim is to show how president Bush addressed people and conveyed messages through conceptual metaphors mainly personification and conflict ones. The focus of my analysis will be on the idea of “Clash of Civilizations” involving the concepts of “clash” and “civilization” worded in the expressional policy.

As my research is based on the belief that the metaphor ‘is infiltrated in the daily life, not only in the language but also in the thought and the action,’² I will try to show how

¹ George Lakoff and Mark Johnson, *Metaphors We Live by*, 2nd ed. (2003), (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1980), 13.

² *Ibid*, 45.

metaphors permeate the speeches of President Bush, and how his hegemonic ideology can be inferred from his use of language for rhetorical purposes, especially during the post 9/11 period.

Conceptual metaphors will, therefore, be studied and analyzed in this dissertation for two reasons. The high significance they have on Bush's "war on terror" rhetoric and their possession of the ability to transmit policies and ideology. This understanding of metaphors enables a possibility to analyze targeted metaphors within the speeches of the former U.S. president, and connecting these metaphors to the foreign and domestic policies they are intended to implement.

Metaphors are always regarded as part of the persuasive strategies contained in a text. They are an important part of the persuasive communication because they combine the cognitive function with an emotional one.¹ The two dimensions are found in most of George W. Bush's speeches as the latter intend to win support for a policy of conflict and war that has outraged most peace activists in the world.

Method and Materials:

As my purpose is to study and explore how former U.S. President George W. Bush, uses rhetorical devices, such as metaphors, when addressing American citizens and the rest of the world, speeches by the President on different occasions constitute the materials of this study. They all concern the wars on Afghanistan, Iraq and worldwide terrorism and also the issue of peace in the Middle East. The speeches have been collected from the White House homepage. President Bush's chief speechwriter, Michael Gerson, has supervised them all.

With the support of George Lakoff and Mark Johnson's (1980) study on metaphors, this dissertation analyzes the ways in which political discourse is metaphorized, especially in

¹ George Lakoff and Mark Johnson, *Metaphors We Live by*, 2nd ed. (2003), (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1980).

relation to topics of the “Clash of Civilizations” which formed the most important conceptual frame vindication and furtherance of the neoconservative international agenda.

❖ **Method:**

Cognitive metaphor theory is first and foremost associated with the work of Lakoff and Johnson (1980). In *Metaphors We Live By* (1980) George Lakoff, a linguist, and Mark Johnson, a philosopher, maintain that conceptual metaphors make our thoughts more vivid and interesting and shape our understanding and perceptions. In their words, ‘our ordinary conceptual system, in terms of which we both think and act, is fundamentally metaphorical in nature.’¹ Ever since ancient times, metaphor was treated as a literary device used by authors in order to enhance the quality of their work.² However, all this changed when Lakoff and Johnson proclaimed that metaphors have to be considered as a conceptual phenomenon rather than simply a literary or linguistic device.³ In fact, according to them, metaphors are responsible for our way of thinking, they govern our cognition and also they are omnipresent in our speech.⁴ This view on metaphor has become the cornerstone of cognitive metaphor theory and forms the basis of the views on metaphors presented in this dissertation as well.

‘The essence of metaphor is understanding and experiencing one kind of thing in terms of another.’⁵ In other words, a metaphor is a means of accessing one event, situation, concept etc. in terms of structures and patterns typically associated with another. The conceptual domain that is understood through the metaphor is called “the target domain”, and the domain that is used is called “the source domain.” The target is usually abstract in nature, while the source usually comes from the concrete or physical domain.

¹George Lakoff and Mark Johnson, *Metaphors We Live by*, 2nd ed. (2003), (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1980), 03.

² Ibid, 25.

³ Ibid.

⁴ Ibid.

⁵ George Lakoff and Mark Johnson, *Metaphors We Live by*, 2nd ed. (2003), (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1980), 13-4.

Metaphor is often an attempt at understanding an abstract concept by explaining it through a concrete or physical thing, a way of taking something intangible and making it more accessible through the use of phenomena from “the real world” that people recognize and understand.

Lakoff and Johnson (1980) in their work classify metaphors into three types: the ontological metaphor, the orientational metaphor, and the structural metaphor. Ontological metaphors are based on the notion of a CONTAINER. Something can be IN or OUT of the container. It can be overflowing or be empty. All these states are used in such expressions such as “to be IN love,” “to be OUT of sight” etc. One can immediately see the frequency of use of these expressions.¹

The orientational metaphor is called so since it has ‘to do with spatial orientation: up-down, in-out, front-back, on-off, deep-shallow, central-peripheral.’² This kind of metaphor is inserted in culture, for example, in the western culture, the direction of right is associated with good. It is often reflected in their language when they say: something is right they mean it is correct. A similar situation can be observed with the up – down dimensions. ‘Happy is up, sad is down; health and life are up; sickness and death are down; having control or force is up, being subject to control or force is down.’³

The last type of metaphor that Lakoff and Johnson (1980) introduced in their work is the structural metaphor. According to the authors, it is the most complex of the three types. The concept of domains is introduced. In a structural metaphor, for example, “LOVE IS A JOURNEY,” or “ARGUMENT IS WAR”⁴ we have two domains. There are target and source domains. In the example mentioned, the target domain of love is described by the source domain

¹ George Lakoff and Mark Johnson, *Metaphors We Live by*, 2nd ed. (2003), (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1980), 22-3.

² Ibid, 22.

³ Ibid.

⁴ Ibid.

of a journey. Likewise, the target domain of argument is described by means of the source domain of war. In the former example, love is compared to a journey. Like every journey, it has got hardships, uphill and downhill etc. The whole abstract concept of love is seen here as a travel. In the latter example of war, it is compared to an argument. According to Lakoff and Johnson, ‘we talk about arguments that way because we conceive of them that way and we act according to the way we conceive things.’¹ Thus we say about defending our arguments, attacking the positions of the opponent etc. Metaphors make it easier for us to visualize and apprehend the concept of arguing.

❖ **Materials:**

This study analyzes thirty-nine speeches of former US. President George W. Bush, which makes a total of one hundred thirty-seven pages that cover the War on Terror in four stages: the period of 9/11 events and its aftermath (attacks on Afghanistan and the dislocation of the Taliban), the period representing the preparations and negotiations for war on Iraq (August 2002-February 2003), the events during the war (March 2003- April 2003), and the aftermath beginning from the fall of Saddam until his capture (May 2003- December, 2003).

Most of the speeches were retrieved from the archives of US’s Government online database. They were collected in two phases: first, the keywords “terrorists” and “clash of civilizations.” The second phase “Tyrant” “Evil” “Iraq” and “War” with the dates between August 2002 and December 15, 2003, were used to retrieve all the speeches that cover the Iraqi war in 2003.

¹ George Lakoff and Mark Johnson, *Metaphors We Live by*, 2nd ed. (2003), (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1980), 05.

Methodological Outline:

In pursuit of the aim mentioned previously, the first chapter of the dissertation investigates the history of the U.S Foreign Policy, during and Post the Cold War (1947-1991), as it has been helpful to understand the causes that led to the War on Terror which is considered to be an indirect confirmation of Samuel Huntington's predictions on the clash between the "West and Islam." The second chapter outlines the method of metaphor analysis. It is divided into two sections. The first one deals with rhetoric and the second is devoted to the practical aspect of metaphors. That is, examples from the speeches are discussed and categorized according to the topic. The final chapter (3) entitled 'The War on Terror: The Disguised Clash of Civilizations' is composed of two sections. Section one demonstrates the prevalence of the Orientalist thoughts in Huntington's Clash of Civilizations, his "West versus the Rest" and emphasizes, also, the impact of this clashing civilizations idea on Bush's War on Terror. Concerning the second section of this last chapter, it deals with the metaphorical conceptualization of the "Other," highlighting the Orientalist framework in the analyzed speeches meaning the "Us vs. Them" rhetoric, and the frames of Self-presentation Vs. frames of Other-representation. Finally, in the general conclusion I have given a brief overview of the content and key conclusions drawn from this research.

CHAPTER ONE:

The U.S. Foreign Policy after the Cold War and Context of *the Clash of Civilizations* Theory

INTRODUCTION:

After the collapse of the Soviet Union, the world was broadly considered as unipolar, with the United States as the only superpower.¹ This shift in power pushed several political scientists and analysts to speculate and construct theses and theories based on new changes. Therefore, a number of new world order paradigms emerged. This redefinition of world order after the Cold War led to what has been seen as the proliferation of “contending images of world politics.”²

The two theses which were, probably, the most significant and interesting for the amount of attention and discussions they received worldwide were Francis Fukuyama’s *The End of History* (1992), soon followed after by Samuel P. Huntington’s *Clash of Civilizations* (1993).³ These works, mainly the latter, had a similar influence on succeeding international affairs to that of George F. Kennan’s *X Article* (1947) published in the *Foreign Affairs* journal which described the ‘Containment Policy’ of the United States vis-à-vis the Soviet Union.⁴

To understand the U.S. approach to world affairs after the Cold War, it is important to go back to the historical background of the U.S. Foreign policy during the 1990s. This policy changed over the course of time reflecting each time the change in national interests. The following background chapter attempts to document the different foreign policies fostered by the successive American Presidents, between the first and the second Gulf Wars, in order to understand how the “crusade” launched by George W. Bush after 9/11 was no less than a war

¹ Kenneth N. Waltz, “Structural Realism After the Cold War,” *International Security* 25, no. 1 (2000), 27, http://www.columbia.edu/itc/sipa/U6800/readings-sm/Waltz_Structural%20Realism.pdf. (accessed October 25, 2016).

² Greg Fry and Jacinta O’Hagan, *Contending Images of World Politics* (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2001).

³ Maryam Sakeenah, *Us Versus Them and Beyond: An Oriental-Islamic Rejoinder to the Clash of Civilizations Theory* (Kuala Lumpur: The Other Press, 2010), 01.

⁴ Quoted in Samuel P. Huntington, *The Clash of Civilizations: And the Remaking of World Order* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1996), 01.

of civilizations based on an aggressive doctrine borrowed from the western centered theory of Samuel P. Huntington, which is dealt with, extensively, in the last chapter of this dissertation.

For this, this chapter is divided to two sections. The first one provides a summary of key historical moments in contemporary American history and the second traces back the origins of the clash of civilizations theory.

SECTION ONE: THE COLD WAR/ POST-COLD WAR AND THE US DIPLOMACY:

1. The U.S. Diplomacy During and After the Cold-War:

Throughout most of the second half of the twentieth century, the two world superpowers were the United States of America (formed in 1783) and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (formed in 1917).¹ Faced with the threat of growing Japanese, German and Italian fascism and fearing a world war, the Western Allies, and the Soviet Union made an alliance of necessity during World War Two.² As ‘the two nations had long been at odds’³ the alliance between the USA and USSR was short-lived. All what gathered them was, simply, a common enemy and, in reality, the two countries had never confidence in one another.⁴ After the defeat of the Axis (Germany and its key allies (Italy and Japan)), these two world powers became highly suspicious of each other due to their extremely different ideologies.⁵

In defiance, Joseph Stalin established the so-called *Iron Curtain*, a metaphor which not only describes the physical border between the two blocs, the West led by the United States , and the East led by the Soviet Union, but also the ideological separation.⁶ In this respect,

¹ Fraser Cameron, *US Foreign Policy After the Cold War: Global Hegemon or Reluctant Sheriff?*, 2nd ed. (New York: Routledge, 2005), 07.

² Thomas C. Reeves, *Twentieth-Century America: A Brief History* (New York: Oxford University Press, USA, 1999), 141.

³ Ibid.

⁴ Ibid.

⁵ Ibid.

⁶ Stephen E. Ambrose and Douglas G Brinkley, *Rise to Globalism: American Foreign Policy Since 1938*, Ninth Revised Edition, 9th ed. (New York: Penguin (Non-Classics), 2011), 81.

Winston Churchill, in a speech in Fulton, Missouri (1946), declared ‘from Stettin in the Baltic to Trieste in the Adriatic, an iron curtain has descended across the [European] Continent.’¹ These words officially marked the beginning of the Cold War. This struggle, known as the Cold War, lasted from about 1946 to 1991, beginning with the second Red Scare and ending with the August Coup when the Soviet Union collapsed.

At the beginning of the Cold War the U.S., under the presidency of Harry Truman (1945-1953), adopted the Containment policy which ‘meant steady, firm resistance to communist expansion.’² By the means of this policy, the United States tried to control Soviet influence abroad in order to halt any further expansion of Communism. As a matter of fact, President Truman gave financial support to the free nations fighting Communism.³ In 1947, with the consent of the Congress, he pledged \$400 million to fighting Communist revolutionaries in Greece and Turkey.⁴ Two years later, Truman succeeded to persuade the Western European powers to join the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in order to assemble and strengthen their forces to confront the soviet assaults. Feeling the imminent threat, in 1955 the USSR funded a similar treaty known as the Warsaw Pact.⁵

The Containment Policy shaped the U.S. foreign policy for many decades between the late 1940s and the end of the 1980s. Leaders of the two American parties (Democrats and Republicans) adopted and maintained the containment strategy.⁶ They saw it as U.S.’ last resort to lead the world.⁷ President John F. Kennedy, at his inauguration in January 1961, declared that in order to seize and eliminate Communism his nation ‘would pay any price and bear any

¹Stephen E. Ambrose and Douglas G Brinkley, *Rise to Globalism: American Foreign Policy Since 1938*, Ninth Revised Edition, 9th ed. (New York: Penguin (Non-Classics), 2011), 81.

²Thomas C. Reeves, *Twentieth-Century America: A Brief History* (New York: Oxford University Press, USA, 1999), 142.

³ Ibid.

⁴ Ibid.

⁵ Ibid, 142-4.

⁶ Ibid.

⁷ Ibid.

burden, meet any hardship, support any friend, oppose any foes.’¹ In his turn, President Jimmy Carter, the 39th U.S. President, considered his country as ‘a beacon for nations who search for peace, freedom, individual liberty and basic human rights.’² Not far from his predecessor’s vision, Ronald Reagan, argued that the U.S. had not by choice but rather by destiny the role of ‘the watchman on the walls of world freedom.’³

Speeding up the events, the Post-Cold War period marked the collapse of the Soviet Union, a moment called by Reagan’s successor, George H. W. Bush ‘a unique and extraordinary moment.’⁴ The aftermath of the Cold War was widely considered as unipolar, with the United States the world premier power.

Before the Second of August 1990 peace seemed reigned and dominated the sphere.⁵ However, in Iraq, Saddam Hussein broke that peace when he attacked and invaded Kuwait. President George H. W. Bush responded quickly and organized a coalition of allied and Middle Eastern powers, which took the name of ‘Operation Desert Storm.’⁶ The latter was a successful operation, since a few days from its launching (January 16th - February 28th 1991) it pushed back the invading forces away from Kuwait.⁷

In the wake of this quick and decisive victory, President Bush was optimistic about a ‘new world order.’⁸ He asserted that the world was on the verge of a new era. In January 1991 he delivered a speech proclaiming:

¹ Quoted in Fraser Cameron, *US Foreign Policy After the Cold War: Global Hegemon or Reluctant Sheriff?*, 2nd ed. (New York: Routledge, 2005), 09.

² Quoted in Ibid.

³ Fraser Cameron, *US Foreign Policy After the Cold War: Global Hegemon or Reluctant Sheriff?*, 2nd ed. (New York: Routledge, 2005), 09.

⁴ Quoted in Don Oberdorfer, *From the Cold War to a New Era: The United States and the Soviet Union, 1983-1991* (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1998), 353.

⁵ Ibid.

⁶ Thomas C. Reeves, *Twentieth-Century America: A Brief History* (New York: Oxford University Press, USA, 1999), 263.

⁷ Fraser Cameron, *US Foreign Policy After the Cold War: Global Hegemon or Reluctant Sheriff?*, 2nd ed. (New York: Routledge, 2005), 16.

⁸ Ibid.

That there was the very real prospect of a new world order in which the principles of justice and fair play protect the weak against the strong [...] a world in which freedom and respect for human rights find a home among all nations [...] a world in which the United Nations freed from Cold War stalemate is poised to fulfill the historic vision of its founders.¹

However, Bush optimism was short-lived as the U.S. struggled to deal with conflicts in the Balkans and elsewhere.² Bush rejected the idea that the U.S. should become the world's policeman. He argued that the U.S.' previous intervention (in Iraq) was for two major reasons, first, it was out of their duty since they were 'the only remaining superpower' and second because it was their only 'opportunity to lead.'³

Notwithstanding the victory in the Gulf War (1990-1), which asserted the supremacy of the U.S. in the world, President Bush hesitated in becoming involved in the ethnic conflicts in the Balkans (1991 to 1999).⁴ Because he was highly criticized by his Democratic rival, William Jefferson Clinton, during 1992 election for spending too much time on foreign policy (75 percent of his time).⁵ Despite the fact that Bush's preoccupation with foreign policy may have cost him re-election, his loss in 1992 eventually led to his son entering the White House eight years later.⁶

Unlike George W. H. Bush, Bill Clinton being a former governor had no foreign policy experience when he took office in January 1993.⁷ This led him to focus more on domestic policy whereas for the foreign policy affairs he appointed a team of specialists, including Anthony

¹ Fraser Cameron, *US Foreign Policy After the Cold War: Global Hegemon or Reluctant Sheriff?*, 2nd ed. (New York: Routledge, 2005), 16.

² Ibid.

³ Ibid.

⁴ Ibid.

⁵ David R. Gergen, *Eyewitness to Power: The Essence of Leadership: Nixon to Clinton* (New York: Simon & Schuster Adult Publishing Group, 2001).

⁶ Ibid.

⁷ Fraser Cameron, *US Foreign Policy After the Cold War: Global Hegemon or Reluctant Sheriff?*, 2nd ed. (New York: Routledge, 2005), 39.

Lake as his national security adviser and Warren Christopher as Secretary of State.¹ President Clinton hoped to increase the number of free market democracies in the world, sometimes referred to as the policy of “Enlargement,”² and advocated open trade, including the passage of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and the establishment of the World Trade Organization (WTO).³ When Clinton assumed office, however, the U.S. faced no serious threats and there was no domestic pressure on the new President to take a more active role in foreign policy.⁴ Undoubtedly the Balkans, Somalia, and Tahiti were the most serious foreign policy problems the Clinton administration inherited in 1992.⁵

The former Yugoslavia had crumbled into ethnic conflict zones over which three parties were fighting: Serbs (Eastern Orthodox), Croats (Catholic), and Bosnians (Muslims). Clinton administration considered the Balkans ‘as a European problem, and at first, Europeans seemed to agree.’⁶ The Clinton administration did not intervene to stop Serbia’s brutal “ethnic cleansing”⁷ of Croats and Muslims; ‘we don’t have a dog in that fight,’⁸ stated former Secretary of State James A. Baker. The latter admitted in 1992 that Bosnia had become a “humanitarian nightmare,”⁹ but the administration did nothing except a modest assistance in relief efforts and a verbal support to hesitant and indecisive European peace efforts.¹⁰

¹ George C. Herring, *From Colony to Superpower: U. S. Foreign Relations Since 1776* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2008), 925.

² Stephen E. Ambrose and Douglas G Brinkley, *Rise to Globalism: American Foreign Policy Since 1938*, Ninth Revised Edition, 9th ed. (New York: Penguin (Non-Classics), 2011), 384.

³ Fraser Cameron, *US Foreign Policy After the Cold War: Global Hegemon or Reluctant Sheriff?*, 2nd ed. (New York: Routledge, 2005), 22.

⁴ George C. Herring, *From Colony to Superpower: U. S. Foreign Relations Since 1776* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2008), 926.

⁵ Stephen E. Ambrose and Douglas G Brinkley, *Rise to Globalism: American Foreign Policy Since 1938*, Ninth Revised Edition, 9th ed. (New York: Penguin (Non-Classics), 2011), 396.

⁶ *Ibid*, 924.

⁷ *Ibid*.

⁸ *Ibid*.

⁹ *Ibid*.

¹⁰ Klaus Larres, "Bloody as Hell: Bush, Clinton, and the Abdication of American Leadership in the Former Yugoslavia, 1990–1995," *Journal of European Integration History* 10 (2004): 192.

Regarding the refusal to become involved in the intervention in the Balkans, some political analysts commented that the U.S. was guilty of all the damages and massacres that happened there.¹ They added that ‘the U.S. was only ready to act quickly and decisively when it comes to the protection of its oil interests, but never otherwise.’² In this respect, UN correspondent Stanley Meisler commented on the Clinton administration saying that ‘the Clinton administration has chosen to berate the organization as unwise (in Somalia), cowardly (in Bosnia), and inept (in its bureaucracy).’³

However, as the situation in Bosnia escalated to genocide, Clinton orchestrated a NATO bombing campaign in 1995 to bring the factions to the negotiating table. The Dayton Accords outlined a fragile peace, and around four thousand U.S. peacekeeping troops tried to uphold it.⁴ But by 1998, there was a fresh conflict in the region. A new bombing campaign, lasting 77 days, forced Serbia’s leader, Slobodan Milosevic, to capitulate, ending the violence.⁵

Just weeks before Clinton took office, President George H. W. Bush, in his televised speech December 5th, 1992, announced the U.S. participation in “Operation Restore Hope” in Somalia. ⁶ To quote him:

I have given the order to Secretary Cheney to move a substantial American force into Somalia [...] American forces, will assist in Operation Restore Hope[...]First, we will create a secure environment [...] so that food can move from ships overland to the people in the countryside [...]And second, once we have created that secure environment, we will withdraw our troops. Our mission has a limited objective, to open the supply routes, to get the food moving, and to prepare the way for a UN peacekeeping force to keep it moving. This

¹ Fraser Cameron, *US Foreign Policy After the Cold War: Global Hegemon or Reluctant Sheriff?*, 2nd ed. (New York: Routledge, 2005), 38.

² Ibid.

³ Stephen E. Ambrose and Douglas G Brinkley, *Rise to Globalism: American Foreign Policy Since 1938*, Ninth Revised Edition, 9th ed. (New York: Penguin (Non-Classics), 2011), 402.

⁴ Ibid, 405.

⁵ George C. Herring, *From Colony to Superpower: U. S. Foreign Relations Since 1776* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2008), 924-30.

⁶ Stephen E. Ambrose and Douglas G Brinkley, *Rise to Globalism: American Foreign Policy Since 1938*, Ninth Revised Edition, 9th ed. (New York: Penguin (Non-Classics), 2011), 383.

operation is not open-ended. We will not stay longer than is absolutely necessary.¹

President Bush clearly stated that he had dispatched American troops to Somalia to guard and distribute food supplies to millions of people suffering, starving and dying as a result of civil war.² The soldiers had been prepared for a “humanitarian mission,” and they were sent “to redress” worsening humanitarian situations. President Clinton was reluctant to send more military troops to this ignited zone. Nevertheless, things did not go exactly as planned; the situation quickly escalated.³

In August 1993 U.S. soldiers faced fire from armed clans and two Black Hawk helicopters were shot down. As a response, President Clinton augmented American troop presence, in an attempt to keep peace and track down a warlord (Mohamed Farah Aideed) the first responsible for the chaos.⁴ This decision resulted in the killing of 18 soldiers in the Battle of Mogadishu, dozens wounded, and the bodies of the dead desecrated in the streets.⁵ The mission rapidly lost popularity with the American people. In the face of significant political opposition, Clinton finally withdrew all U.S. forces in March 1994. This fruitless intervention was at the heart of the Clinton administration’s refusal to act in Rwanda the following month in its bloody civil war.⁶

Another basic dilemma Clinton faced was whether or not the U.S. should intervene militarily in Tahiti to “restore democracy.”⁷ Back in September 1991, a military coup in Haiti

¹ George W. H. Bush, "MISSION TO SOMALIA; Transcript of President's Address on Somalia," *World* (AP), December 5, 1992, <http://www.nytimes.com/1992/12/05/world/mission-to-somalia-transcript-of-president-s-address-on-somalia.html>

² Ibid.

³ Stephen E. Ambrose and Douglas G. Brinkley, *Rise to Globalism: American Foreign Policy Since 1938*, Ninth Revised Edition, 9th ed. (New York: Penguin (Non-Classics), 2011), 382.

⁴ Ibid.

⁵ Fraser Cameron, *US Foreign Policy After the Cold War: Global Hegemon or Reluctant Sheriff?*, 2nd ed. (New York: Routledge, 2005), 21.

⁶ Ibid.

⁷ Thomas C. Reeves, *Twentieth-Century America: A Brief History* (New York: Oxford University Press, USA, 1999), 274.

overthrew that nation's first democratically-elected president Jean-Bertrand Aristide by General Raoul Cedras. President Bush had supported a series of economic sanctions against that regime, a policy which Clinton continued. By 1993, Clinton was trying to pressure the rebels to relinquish power, but when diplomacy failed, Clinton planned a larger invasion.¹

For U.S. officials there was no significant American interests in Haiti, all that prompted President Clinton to intervene was the prospect of thousands of refugees seeking shelter and a permanent home in the U.S. as a result of the violence on the island.² The Clinton administration continued President Bush's policy of returning Haitian refugees to their land. In October 1994 Operation Uphold Democracy commenced, as 21,000 troops and two aircraft carriers embarked for Haiti, and President Clinton sent a delegation led by former President Jimmy Carter to urge C  dras to step down and leave the country.³ Soon after, the military government surrendered and President Aristide's original government was restored.⁴

Before getting out from the Tahiti issue, President Clinton faced a persistent increase in "terrorist" attacks, both at home and abroad.⁵ In fact, in February 1993, a car bomb exploded under the World Trade Center killing six persons and wounding thousands. The Clinton administration dealt with the event as a criminal act and pursued suspects through the judicial system.⁶ In the same manner, two car bombs targeting U.S. forces in Saudi Arabia in 1995 and 1996, claimed the lives of hundreds and received the same reaction from the Clinton administration.⁷ The 1995 bombing of a federal building in Oklahoma City was widely assumed to be the work of a similar group of foreign Muslim "terrorists." But, an exhaustive

¹ Thomas C. Reeves, *Twentieth-Century America: A Brief History* (New York: Oxford University Press, USA, 1999), 274.

² Ibid.

³ Ibid.

⁴ Ibid.

⁵ George C. Herring, *From Colony to Superpower: U. S. Foreign Relations Since 1776* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2008), 936.

⁶ Thomas C. Reeves, *Twentieth-Century America: A Brief History* (New York: Oxford University Press, USA, 1999), 274.

⁷ Ibid.

FBI investigation revealed that the terrorist attack, which killed 168 people, was actually perpetrated by Americans.¹

In 1998, car bombs at the U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania exploded at the same time, killing 301 people and injuring more than 5,000. The attacks were linked to Osama Bin Laden who later was associated with 9/11. But this time, the administration responded militarily with missile strikes against 'terrorists' training camps in Afghanistan.²

During the presidential election of 2000 George W. Bush, criticizing Bill Clinton's decisions on Somalia and Tahiti, promised to use American military force only to eliminate a potential threat to United States security. He declared:

(Somalia) started off as a humanitarian mission and it changed into a nation-building mission, and that's where the mission went wrong. The mission was changed. And as a result, our nation paid a price. And so I don't think our troops ought to be used for what's called nation-building. I think our troops ought to be used to fight and win war. I think our troops ought to be used to help overthrow the dictator when it's in our best interests. But in this case, it was a nation-building exercise and same with Haiti. I wouldn't have supported either.³

Furthermore, a few months after his election as a president, Bush announced the rejection of a number of foreign policy decisions taken by the previous administrations. He started by the breakup and suspension of the talks with North Korea.⁴ He moved to the Middle East peace process which Clinton supported and affirmed that the U.S. would be no longer

¹ Thomas C. Reeves, *Twentieth-Century America: A Brief History* (New York: Oxford University Press, USA, 1999), 274.

² George C. Herring, *From Colony to Superpower: U. S. Foreign Relations Since 1776* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2008), 936.

³ Bush, George W. and Al Gore. "CPD: October 11, 2000, Debate Transcript." n.d. Accessed January 5, 2014. <http://www.debates.org/index.php?page=october-11-2000-debate-transcript>

⁴ George C. Herring, *From Colony to Superpower: U. S. Foreign Relations Since 1776* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2008), 939.

engaged in it.¹ He also declared that regarding the Balkans' conflict there would be no new troops sent there and those already on site must leave as soon as possible.²

Bush and his administration continued in the same rhythm asserting that the U.S. would carry on with national missile defense irrespective of the views of others; an act which violated treaties with the former Soviet Union.³ Moreover, he decided that the Kyoto Protocol on climate change had reached its dead end.⁴ Many critics and observers viewed this approach to foreign policy as being "a new isolationism."⁵ In this respect, the Senate majority leader, the Democrat Tom Daschle, criticized the Bush administration's adoption of "Unilateralism policy," saying that 'we are isolating ourselves and in so doing we are minimizing ourselves.'⁶

Although the Clinton administration had already highlighted the terrorist threat and devoted considerable resources to tackling terrorism, the USA did nothing to prevent the 9/11 events from happening.⁷ President Clinton declared in 1998 that the U.S. was engaged 'in a long, ongoing struggle between freedom and fanaticism, between the rule of law and terrorism''⁸ and later told the UN that 'terrorism was at the top of America's agenda and should be top of the world's agenda.'⁹ The U.S. top officials did not consider terrorism or radical Islamism a high priority.¹⁰

In the morning of September 11, 2001, the orchestrator of many earlier attacks on the U.S. interests, including the Kenya and Tanzania embassies explosions and the Cole, Osama Bin Laden hit again the United States in New York. Bin Laden, with the help of nineteen

¹ George C. Herring, *From Colony to Superpower: U. S. Foreign Relations Since 1776* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2008), 936.

² Ibid.

³ Ibid.

⁴ George C. Herring, *From Colony to Superpower: U. S. Foreign Relations Since 1776* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2008), 939.

⁵ Ibid.

⁶ Fraser Cameron, *US Foreign Policy After the Cold War: Global Hegemon or Reluctant Sheriff?*, 2nd ed. (New York: Routledge, 2005), 31.

⁷ Ibid.

⁸ Ibid, 138.

⁹ Ibid.

¹⁰ Ibid.

followers, hijacked four commercial airliners and carried out suicide attacks against targets in New York's World Trade Center and the Pentagon. Two of the planes were flown into the twin towers of the World Trade Center in New York City, a third plane hit the Pentagon just outside Washington, D.C., and the fourth plane crashed in a field in Pennsylvania.¹ After a few hours, Manhattan's landmark twin towers toppled resulting in extensive death and destruction, 2,603 people were killed, and the city was completely full with heavy dust and smoke.² The attack on the Pentagon resulted in the killing of 125 people.³

Contrary to what Bush promised in the 2000 presidential election campaign, after the 9/11 attacks together with his neocon administration he adopted the idea that American military power could resolve any foreign policy problem. The invasion of Afghanistan and the Iraq war were a mere example of this. For Bush senior 9/11 ranks with Pearl Harbor, in a speech at Boston on 14 September 2001 he sent a message to his son where he invited him to end unilateralism,⁴ in his message he said:

Just as Pearl Harbor awakened this country from the notion that we could somehow avoid the call to duty and defend freedom in Europe and Asia in World War II, so, too, should this most recent surprise attack erase the concept in some quarters that America can somehow go it alone in the fight against terrorism or in anything else for that matter.⁵

Even though there was no noticeable retreat in the decisions taken previously (the rejection of many treaties and protocols), this piece of advice from an ex-president experienced in foreign policy seemed to be taken into consideration by Bush and his foreign policy advisers.

¹ George C. Herring, *From Colony to Superpower: U. S. Foreign Relations Since 1776* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2008), 940.

² Ibid.

³ Ibid.

⁴ Unilateralism (unilateral policy): is a policy of taking a unilateral action regardless of outside support or reciprocity.

⁵ Fraser Cameron, *US Foreign Policy After the Cold War: Global Hegemon or Reluctant Sheriff?*, 2nd ed. (New York: Routledge, 2005), 31.

Consequently, President Bush and his Secretary of State Colin Powell prepared to assemble an international coalition to fight terrorism instead of facing it alone without any help.¹

In the immediate aftermath of the hijackings, several countries pledged support for any U.S. response to the terror.² Significantly, this would lead the U.S. into having, simultaneously, new and strange alliances. Pakistan, a sanctioned country for its nuclear tests and a previous supporter of the Taliban regime in Afghanistan, became overnight a key ally in the search for Osama bin Laden, the leader of Al Qaeda.³ Another important diplomatic change was the involvement of Uzbekistan in the war on terrorism. Uzbekistan was highly criticized by the United States for its poor record on human rights. It is worthy to mention that the U.S. also took advantage of the attacks to strengthen ties with Russia, China, Turkey, Sudan, Libya and other countries.⁴ It was so far clear that Bush's foreign policy would be conducted through a new method. The USA used the "us vs. them" dichotomy, henceforth, it would treat each country on the basis of whether it was with it in fighting international terrorism or against it, i.e. with the enemy.⁵

Regarding the case of Iraq, following the first Gulf War and regardless of the heavy sanctions against Saddam's regime, the neo-conservatives were not satisfied. Donald Rumsfeld, Paul Wolfowitz, and Richard Perle, among others, sent a letter to President Clinton in 1998 where they urged him for military action to overthrow the 'dictator' regime in Iraq. They wrote:

The only acceptable strategy is one that eliminates the possibility that Iraq will be able to use or threaten to use WMD. In the near term, this means a willingness to undertake military action as diplomacy is clearly failing. In the longer term,

¹ George C. Herring, *From Colony to Superpower: U. S. Foreign Relations Since 1776* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2008), 942.

² Ibid.

³ George C. Herring, *From Colony to Superpower: U. S. Foreign Relations Since 1776* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2008), 942.

⁴ Ibid, 139.

⁵ Fraser Cameron, *US Foreign Policy After the Cold War: Global Hegemon or Reluctant Sheriff?*, 2nd ed. (New York: Routledge, 2005), 32.

it means removing Saddam Hussein and his regime from power. That now needs to become the aim of American foreign policy.¹

This attempt was in vain, in fact, Clinton preferred to carry on the Containment policy.² During the year 2002, however, under the presidency of Bush the neocons tried to declare a war against Saddam Hussein. This time, there were many reasons, first, his possession of WMD (Weapons of Mass Destruction), second, his direct link to Al Qaeda and the third reason was his involvement in the 9/11 attacks.³

To approve the US's appeal for the immediate invasion of Iraq, in 2002, the United Nations Security Council called for Iraq to cooperate with UN weapons inspectors to verify whether it has WMD or not. After the inspection The United Nations Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC) found no evidence as it is asserted by Top United Nations weapons inspector Hans Blix:

No evidence had so far been found of weapons of mass destruction being moved around by truck, of mobile production units for biological weapons or of underground facilities for chemical or biological production or storage, as claimed by intelligence authorities.⁴

Although some degraded remnants of abandoned chemical weapons from before 1991 were found, they were not the weapons which had been the main arguments for invasion of Iraq.⁵ The failure to find any WMD embarrassed Bush; this led him to change the reason of the invasion 'to emphasize human rights and promotion of democracy.'⁶ Despite the rejection and the strong

¹ Quoted in Fraser Cameron, *US Foreign Policy After the Cold War: Global Hegemon or Reluctant Sheriff?*, 2nd ed. (New York: Routledge, 2005), 150.

² Ibid.

³ Fraser Cameron, *US Foreign Policy After the Cold War: Global Hegemon or Reluctant Sheriff?*, 2nd ed. (New York: Routledge, 2005), 150.

⁴ Blix, Hans. "UN News - Blix Welcomes Accelerated Cooperation by Iraq, but Says Unresolved Issues Remain." March 7, 2003. Accessed January 5, 2014. <http://www.Un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=6383&Cr=iraq&Cr1=inspect.html>

⁵ Fraser Cameron, *US Foreign Policy After the Cold War: Global Hegemon or Reluctant Sheriff?*, 2nd ed. (New York: Routledge, 2005), 151.

⁶ Fraser Cameron, *US Foreign Policy After the Cold War: Global Hegemon or Reluctant Sheriff?*, 2nd ed. (New York: Routledge, 2005), 151.

disagreement from several of its allies, the U.S. went ahead in early March 2003 with the invasion of Iraq. That war of choice quickly became very expensive.¹

2. George W. Bush's War On Terror:

George W. Bush had followed the case-by-case foreign policy that he had inherited from the two former presidents, before the events at 9/11.² The events that occurred on the 11th of September sound to have affected George W. Bush's foreign policy. In fact, Bush commenced the creation of a new foreign policy by establishing new commitments for USA's overseas involvement.³ He changed the American foreign policy 'to a more unilateralist position.'⁴ The latter can be demonstrated in his decision to attack Iraq in 2003 without a United Nations mandate.⁵

After 9/11 George W. Bush adopted a policy that focused on using military force against what he considered as "terrorism" wherever it existed.⁶ And the focus of this military force would also be on foreign governments that harbor and support it, i.e. "terrorism." This was what have been called "the Bush Doctrine."⁷ For his policy following the 9/11 attacks Bush gained a considerable support from the American public. He also enjoyed a noticeable support in Congress during that period, to the point that Congress moved fast in order to provide him support for "the war against terror." The decision to attack Afghanistan in late 2001 and Iraq in 2003 was an important part of "the war against terror."⁸

¹ Fraser Cameron, *US Foreign Policy After the Cold War: Global Hegemon or Reluctant Sheriff?*, 2nd ed. (New York: Routledge, 2005), 32.

² Tom Lansford, Robert P. Watson, and Jack Covarrubias, *America's War on Terror* (United Kingdom: Ashgate Publishing, 2009), 45.

³ *Ibid*, 38.

⁴ *Ibid*, 45.

⁵ *Ibid*.

⁶ *Ibid*.

⁷ *Ibid*.

⁸ Tom Lansford, Robert P. Watson, and Jack Covarrubias, *America's War on Terror* (United Kingdom: Ashgate Publishing, 2009), 10-1.

As previously mentioned, “the war on terror” was at the center of the Bush policy during his presidency. Accordingly, having a look at the definition of terrorism is imposing itself, so what is it meant by the term “terrorism”? There is no single definition of terrorism. Diplomats and governments have often given divergent descriptions.¹ And there are also multiple other different definitions of terror and terrorism. Several dictionaries offer a general definition, that is as following:

The unlawful use or threatened use of force or violence by a person or an organized group against people or property with the intention of intimidating or coercing societies or governments, often for ideological purposes.²

This definition outlines that the actions within terrorism are contradicting the law. The key component of the definition of terrorism is that the people who are being targeted are civilians. However, the U.S. official definition of the same term is somehow slightly different. Soon after the attacks of the 11th of September took place on the America soil, a new definition of “terrorism” was set by President Bush and his administration.³ He defined terrorism with these words:

The term “terrorism” means premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against noncombatant targets by sub-national groups or clandestine agents, usually intended to influence an audience ... and involving citizens or the territory of more than one country.⁴

This U.S. definition of “terrorism” outlines that the violent actions are done generally by sub-national groups or clandestine agents, which excludes violent actions from official states and

¹ Tom Lansford, Robert P. Watson, and Jack Covarrubias, *America’s War on Terror* (United Kingdom: Ashgate Publishing, 2009), 03.

²Quoted in Tom Lansford, Robert P. Watson, and Jack Covarrubias, *America’s War on Terror* (United Kingdom: Ashgate Publishing, 2009), 04.

³ Tom Lansford, Robert P. Watson, and Jack Covarrubias, *America’s War on Terror* (United Kingdom: Ashgate Publishing, 2009), 04.

⁴ Ibid, 04 -5.

governments to be terror. By this, the USA is, therefore, excluding the attacks on Afghanistan in 2001 and Iraq in 2003 from being acts of terrorism.¹

SECTION TWO: ORIGINS OF THE CLASH OF CIVILIZATIONS THEORY:

1. Bernard Lewis's 'Roots of Muslim Rage' (1990):

This is no less than a *clash of civilizations* the perhaps irrational but surely historic reaction of an ancient rival against our Judeo-Christian heritage, our secular present, and the worldwide expansion of both. It is crucially important that we on our side should not be provoked into an equally historic but also equally irrational reaction against that rival.²

Bernard Lewis (1916- Present) was the one who initially coined the term, 'clash of civilizations,' in his influential article "*Roots of Muslim Rage: Why So Many Muslims Deeply Resent the West, and Why Their Bitterness Will Not Be Easily Mollified*," published in The Atlantic Monthly, September 1990. This article appeared after the fall of the Berlin Wall and the beginning of identifying the new enemy of the United States of America.

Being an expert on the Middle East and one of the West's leading scholars of that region, Lewis has been frequently sought by policymakers for advice, especially by the Bush administration. In his article, he rejects all the obvious failures of American foreign policy he, thus, elucidates and gives other reasons for hostility against the U.S. and the West in the Muslim world. The major reasons, according to Lewis, apart from the rage and fury over the secular West's advancement and progress as opposed to the Muslim world, that is struggling with underdevelopment, illiteracy, poverty, overpopulation, and autocracy, is the violent

¹ Tom Lansford, Robert P. Watson, and Jack Covarrubias, *America's War on Terror* (United Kingdom: Ashgate Publishing, 2009), 04.

² Bernard Lewis, "The Roots of Muslim Rage: Why So Many Muslims Deeply Resent the West, and Why Their Bitterness Will Not Be Easily Mollified," *The Atlantic Monthly* 266, no. 3 (September 1990), 47–58.

interpretation of Islamic texts in the Muslims world.¹ In his words, ‘Islam, like other religions, has also known periods when it inspired in some of its followers a mood of hatred and violence [...] that hatred is directed against us.’²

Lewis questions the Muslims’ hate directed to the United States, despite the fact that the U.S. had never ‘ruled any Muslim population.’³ He speaks about a ‘surge of hatred’ rising from the Islamic world that ‘becomes a rejection of Western civilization as such.’⁴

2. Francis Fukuyama’s ‘End of History’ (1992):

What we may be witnessing is not just the end of the Cold War, or the passing of a particular period of post-war history, but the end of history as such: that is, the end point of mankind’s ideological evolution and the universalization of Western liberal democracy as the final form of human government.⁵

Fukuyama’s (1989) controversial essay “*The End of History?*”, which was expanded into a book under the title of *The End of History and the Last Man* (1992), is a useful resource for me in my quest for the starting point of the clash of civilizations thesis. As it concerns the rise and fall of major ideologies such as “*absolutism*,” “*fascism*,” and “*communism*.” It is worthy to mention that, in his widely read book, Fukuyama sides with Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel and contradicts Karl Marx who suggested that communism would displace capitalism and be the ultimate form of human government.⁶

According to Fukuyama human history is seen as a battle of ideologies and since the west had won the great battle which is the ideological battle and there was nothing else to do

¹Bernard Lewis, "The Roots of Muslim Rage: Why So Many Muslims Deeply Resent the West, and Why Their Bitterness Will Not Be Easily Mollified," *The Atlantic Monthly* 266, no. 3 (September 1990), 56-7.

² Ibid, 48.

³ Bernard Lewis, "The Roots of Muslim Rage: Why So Many Muslims Deeply Resent the West, and Why Their Bitterness Will Not Be Easily Mollified," *The Atlantic Monthly* 266, no. 3 (September 1990), 48.

⁴ Ibid.

⁵ Francis Fukuyama, "The End of History and the Last Man," *The National Interest* 16 (1989), 4- 18.

⁶ Francis Fukuyama, *The End of History and the Last Man* (New York: Maxwell Macmillan International, 1992),xii.

that is why it is the end of human history. According to him, the advent of Western liberal democracy may signal the endpoint of this human history. He delightedly declared the victory of secular- liberal democracy when he stated that, ‘liberal democracy may constitute the “end point of mankind’s ideological evolution” and the “final form of human government,” and as such constituted the “end of history.”’¹

Fukuyama derives his idea from the Hegelian dialectic of the evolution of history. The achievement of liberal democracy was the synthesis effectively putting an end to man’s old struggle for the perfect system.² Fukuyama thinks history is “directional and universal.”³ He argues that ‘there is a fundamental process at work that dictates a common evolutionary pattern for all human societies, in short something like a Universal History of mankind in the direction of liberal democracy.’⁴ All what remained to be done is to universalize this system (the western system), which too was naturally predetermined owing to its intrinsic superiority over all other values and systems.⁵

Fukuyama holds an unflinching belief in the superiority and ultimately predestined dominance of Western values of liberalism and democracy. Fukuyama’s argument is that owing to its superior values, the Western civilization had in fact triumphed above other civilizations.⁶ His suggestion is that “liberal democracy,” which ‘was first developed in the cradle of Western civilization, is a universally an acceptable concept, and that the world is now moving decisively towards embracing it.’⁷

Fukuyama recognizes that resistance to this universal establishment of Western democracy could appear from resistant nations and peoples ‘rejecting values fundamental to

¹ Francis Fukuyama, *The End of History and the Last Man* (New York: Maxwell Macmillan International, 1992), xi.

² Ibid, xii.

³ Ibid, 50-69.

⁴ Ibid, 48.

⁵ Ibid, xii.

⁶ Francis Fukuyama, "The End of History and the Last Man," *The National Interest* 16 (1989), 01.

⁷ Maryam Sakeenah, *Us Versus Them and Beyond: An Oriental-Islamic Rejoinder to the Clash of Civilizations Theory* (Kuala Lumpur: The Other Press, 2010), 03.

democracy.’¹ Therefore, ‘this had to be effectively countered by sponsoring a universal democratic crusade in defense of Western values.’²

Unfortunately for Fukuyama the rise of ethnic conflict in Bosnia (1992-95) with its massive human casualties and the inaction of the Western powers ‘raised serious doubts whether this really was the ‘end of history.’’³ In the same sense, Ahmet Davutoglu argues that ‘the lack of consensus among European countries over Bosnia became the end of the premature slogans, as the basic principles of international law had been defeated in Bosnia by a wanton pragmatism and by the medieval prejudices of Europe.’⁴ In this respect, with no wonder, Edward Said comments that Fukuyama’s “End of History” ‘nobody talks about, so the end of Fukuyama really.’⁵

3. Samuel P. Huntington’s ‘Clash of Civilizations’ (1993):

Fukuyama’s notion of the ‘End of History’ inevitably prompted a response from US intellectuals. This emerged in the form of Samuel P. Huntington’s 1993 article “*The Clash of Civilizations?*” which was published in the pages of Foreign Affairs. Three years later the article grew into a national bestseller with a longer and more ominous title: *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order* (1996). A professor at Harvard University, former director of security planning for the National Security Council in the 1970s, the founder of the rightwing journal Foreign Policy, and an esteemed scholar of political science, Huntington was in the perfect position to answer back Fukuyama and question his declaration of “the end of history.”

¹ Memoona Sajjad, “A ‘Non Western’ Reading Of The ‘Clash Of Civilizations’ Theory: Through the Eyes of ‘The Rest,’” *International Journal of Political Science and Development* Vol. 1(2) (October 2013).

² Ibid.

³ Maryam Sakeenah, *Us Versus Them and Beyond: An Oriental-Islamic Rejoinder to the Clash of Civilizations Theory* (Kuala Lumpur: The Other Press, 2010), 04.

⁴ Ahmet Davutoglu, “The Clash of Interests: An Explanation of World Disorder,” *Journal of Foreign Affairs* II, no. 04 (1997), 05.

⁵ Edward W. Said, *The Myth of the Clash of Civilizations*, (University of Massachusetts, Amherst, 1998).

This publication is a good beginning to look at the issue of clash of civilizations with the knowledge we have today (twenty-three years later). In his thesis Huntington analyzes contemporary and projected conflicts, suggesting that wars in the future will no longer take place between states and countries but they will be fought between cultures and civilizations.¹ To quote him:

It is my hypothesis that the fundamental source of conflict in this new world will not be primarily ideological or primarily economic. The great divisions among humankind and the dominating source of conflict will be cultural. Nation states will remain the most powerful actors in world affairs, but the principal conflicts of global politics will occur between nations and groups of different civilizations. The clash of civilizations will dominate global politics. The fault lines between civilizations will be the battle lines of the future.²

Huntington has identified “seven or eight” major contemporary civilizations: ‘Western, Confucian, Japanese, Islamic, Hindu, Slavic-Orthodox, Latin American and possibly African civilization.’³ Huntington’s theory principally revolves around the civilizations of ‘the West’ and ‘Islam.’ in fact, he argues that civilizational conflicts are ‘particularly prevalent between Muslims and non-Muslims’⁴ recognizing the ‘bloody borders’ between Islamic and non-Islamic civilizations.⁵

Huntington goes on to warn the West, the USA particularly, about a set of dangerous problems that face the western society among which ‘the moral decline, cultural suicide, and political disunity.’⁶ He sees that the main sources of these problems are the ‘immigrants from other civilizations who reject assimilation’⁷ as well as ‘the weakening of its [(Western

¹ Samuel P. Huntington, "The Clash of Civilizations?," *Foreign Affairs* 72, no. 3 (1993).

² Ibid.

³ Samuel P. Huntington, *The Clash of Civilizations: And the Remaking of World Order* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1996), 377.

⁴ Ibid, 208.

⁵ Ibid, 258.

⁶ Samuel P. Huntington, *The Clash of Civilizations: And the Remaking of World Order* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1996), 350.

⁷ Ibid, 304.

civilization's) central component, Christianity.'¹ According to Huntington, the basic foundation of the United States as set forth by the Founding Fathers, apparently, is being eroded.² To quote him:

In the late twentieth century, both components of American identity have come under concentrated and sustained onslaught from a small but influential number of intellectuals and publicists. In the name of multiculturalism they have attacked the identification of the United States with Western civilization, denied the existence of a common American culture, and promoted racial, ethnic, and other subnational cultural identities and groupings.³

The continuation of the West, as stated in Huntington's book, relies on a great deal on Americans. The latter have to restore and reaffirm their pure Western identity and Westerners in their turn should accept 'their civilization as unique not universal and uniting to renew and preserve it against challenges from non-Western societies.'⁴ He adds that the 'avoidance of a global war of civilizations depends on world leaders accepting and cooperating to maintain the multi-civilizational character of global politics.'⁵

CONCLUSION:

In this background chapter I have reviewed taken a glimpse at the United States' foreign policy during and after the Cold War. As we have seen, it has changed over the course of time reflecting the change in its national interests. Throughout the years of the Cold War the U.S. foreign policy was characterized by the Containment policy, a strategy pursued by the United States of America to prevent the spread of Communism.

¹ Samuel P. Huntington, *The Clash of Civilizations: And the Remaking of World Order* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1996), 305.

² *Ibid.*

³ *Ibid.*

⁴ *Ibid.*, 21.

⁵ *Ibid.*

After some forty-five years of political combat, including some secondary military battles, the Cold War did indeed come to a final end. It did end in the victory of one side and in the defeat of the other as it is the case of any war that comes to its end. However, the big question after the war was how the world's only remaining superpower (the USA) would conduct its external relations in the twenty-first century.

Following the dissolution of the old bipolar world, many political scientists speculated on the future of the international relations and started to put forward theses. Francis Fukuyama and Samuel Huntington are two of the most talked about thinkers on the "new world order." Fukuyama's book, *The End of History and the Last Man* (1992), and Huntington's book, *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order* (1996), offer two very conflicting theories on international relations after the Cold War.

Bernard Lewis is also one of the most divisive figures in the world of foreign affairs. Thanks to his analysis and interpretation of the Muslim world he became a reference to policymakers and political pundits. He was the first to speak about the clash between "the West and Islam" in his 1990 issue of *The Atlantic Monthly* entitled '*The Roots of Muslim Rage*.' Samuel Huntington, therefore, had just borrowed his idea and explained it thoroughly.

The 9/11 attacks were considered to be somehow a confirmation of Huntington's predictions which first appeared in his 1993 article. The U.S. administration in place at that time responded quickly and unilaterally by performing a series of raids on el-Qaeda camps in Afghanistan. On several occasions, President Bush declared that he considers any nation that harbours "terrorists" as a "hostile regime." In fact, he meant what he said. Along with his Vice President, Dick Cheney, he went further in what came to be known as the global "war on terror." As a matter of fact, in 2003 they decided to invade Iraq and dismiss its President, Saddam Hussein, who was suspected of having links to el-Qaeda and the 9/11 events. This global "war on terror" marked the Bush approach to foreign policy for the rest of his presidency.

CHAPTER TWO:

Bush's Rhetorical Construction of the "War on Terror"

*"In war time, truth is so precious that she should
always be attended by a bodyguard of lies."*

*Winston Churchill, British Prime
Minister during WWII.*

INTRODUCTION:

Since 1980, the year when George Lakoff and Mark Johnson published their book *Metaphors We Live By*, conceptual metaphor theory has gained ground in critical discourse analysis. Indeed, several critical discourse analysts have been particularly interested in metaphor as a powerful rhetorical strategy in political discourse (Charteris-Black, 2004, 2011, 2014, Chilton, 2004; Lakoff, 1992, 1995, 2002).

In this chapter, I assume that Bush's speeches are based on metaphors. As a result, the aim of this chapter is to demonstrate how metaphors can be used subconsciously and deliberately at once, sometimes to hide certain sensitive issues, and at others, to construct some cognitive connotations in the listener's mind in an attempt to shape and manipulate its perception of reality. Moreover, it is also shown how metaphors can change the way of thinking of persons.

This chapter is divided into three sections. In the first section, I give a brief account of Aristotle's rhetoric. In the second section, I put emphasis on the theoretical perspectives the American cognitive linguist George Lakoff and Mark Johnson advanced in the importance of the conceptual metaphor in framing, shaping, and persuading the public. This study forms the inspiration for the discourse analytic investigation of political discourse (the Clash of Civilizations discourse) in the speeches of George W. Bush which will be developed in details in Chapter Three. Finally, in the third section, I borrow Lakoff's personification metaphors of "State as Person", "The Fairy Tale of the Just War", "The Rescue Story", "The Self Defense Story", and "Conflict Metaphors" and study them with reference to a selection of George W. Bush speeches.

SECTION ONE: RHETORIC AND POLITICAL PERSUASION:

It is extremely important to understand the history of rhetoric in order to comprehend the rhetorical device (metaphor) that will be investigated in this chapter. The art of rhetoric was created by the Greeks around 400 C.B. It was defined as ‘ars bene dicendi, the art of speaking well in public.’¹ The well-known Greek philosopher, Aristotle, is often credited with developing the basics of ‘the dynamics of public speaking.’² His work *The Rhetoric* (*Ars Rhetorica*) consists of three books. In the first book, Aristotle presents the purposes of rhetoric and a working definition, and he introduces the three types of rhetoric: deliberative, forensic, and epideictic rhetoric; the second focuses mainly on the audience, and the third is about the speech itself.³

Classically, a speech consists of three elements: the speaker, the subject that is treated in the speech and the listener or the audience to whom the speech is addressed.⁴ It seems that this is why Aristotle suggests that there are only three artistic proofs that an orator can use to persuade an audience. These modes of persuasion are as following: Logos, Ethos, and Pathos.⁵ What is remarkable about the Aristotelian artistic proofs is that they have survived the test of time and they are still today the same as they were in the days of Aristotle.

1. Aristotelian “Artistic Proofs”:

Logos is persuasion through appealing to logic and rationality. Facts, data, and numbers are means of logos which provide more weight to one’s arguments.⁶ This does not, however,

¹ Jonathan Charteris-Black, *Politicians and Rhetoric: The Persuasive Power of Metaphor* (United Kingdom: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011), 07.

² Richard L. West and Lynn H. Turner, *Introducing Communication Theory: Analysis and Application* (Mountain View, CA: Mayfield Publishing Co ,U.S., 2000), 311.

³ Ibid.

⁴ "Book I - Chapter 3: Aristotle’s Rhetoric," accessed January 6, 2014, <http://rhetoric.eserver.org/aristotle/rhet1-3.html>

⁵ Richard L. West and Lynn H. Turner, *Introducing Communication Theory: Analysis and Application* (Mountain View, CA: Mayfield Publishing Co ,U.S., 2000), 313-14.

⁶ Ibid, 314.

mean that political logos are always reasonable and rationale, or even that they are in any way true. In politics, logos is independent of truth. In short, logos is ‘the logical proof that speakers employ; their arguments and rationalizations.’¹

For Aristotle, there are two species of arguments or ‘dialectical arguments: inductions and syllogisms (deductions). Induction is defined as the proceeding from particulars up to universal.² A syllogism is ‘a set of propositions that are related to one another and draw a conclusion from the major and minor premises.’³

Ethos is ‘the perceived character, intelligence, and goodwill of a speaker.’ In other words, it is persuasion by dint of a person’s integrity, credibility, and reputation.⁴ The ethos of the speaker has to be demonstrated in performing the speech; that is to say, his good intentions, character, and reliability should be evident in the speech.⁵

Pathos is persuasion by appealing to the emotions. It encompasses all emotional appeals in order to make an audience more receptive to the conclusion.⁶ The success of the persuasiveness of any given speech depends on the emotional dispositions of the audience; for we do not judge in the same way when we celebrate and grieve or when we are hostile and friendly. As a consequence, the orator has to arouse emotions simply because emotions have the power to manipulate our perception of facts and, therefore, affect our decisions.⁷

The act of persuasion is achieved by character whenever the speech is delivered in such a way as to render the speaker trustworthy. In case the speaker seems to be reliable, the audience

¹ Richard L. West and Lynn H. Turner, *Introducing Communication Theory: Analysis and Application* (Mountain View, CA: Mayfield Publishing Co, U.S., 2000), 313-14.

² G. R. G Mure, trans., *Posterior Analytics* by Aristotle (United States: Kessinger Publishing Co, 2004), 01.

³ Richard L. West and Lynn H. Turner, *Introducing Communication Theory: Analysis and Application* (Mountain View, CA: Mayfield Publishing Co, U.S., 2000), 315.

⁴ *Ibid*, 314.

⁵ *Ibid*.

⁶ *Ibid*.

⁷ *Ibid*.

is more likely not to have a room for doubt and believe him easily. According to Aristotle, in order to appear a credible person, the speaker must display three qualities which are: a 'good sense, good moral character, and goodwill.'¹ Aristotle concludes that if an orator showed all these good qualities, the audience would trust him and have no doubt that he is able to give good advice.²

Although rhetoric is described to be 'the range of methods for persuading others,'³ persuasion and rhetoric are not the same.⁴ Actually, what is meant by persuasion is the use of language by one part aiming to convince another to accept a given point of view.⁵ The two are, however, closely linked, as the successful outcome of efficient rhetoric is, in fact, persuasion. The difference between rhetoric and persuasion is defined as following: 'the term "rhetoric" is used when we want to focus on how persuasion is undertaken: it refers specifically to the methods that the speaker uses to persuade, rather than to the whole gestalt of intention, action, and effect.'⁶

Ever since the birth of rhetoric, there has been a discussion whether it is morally right to teach people how to purposefully convince others because it is, indeed, true that a good orator can convince people with untrue information. Some rhetorical scholars have even denounced persuasion as a mechanism of 'control and domination.'⁷

At the present time, politicians employ classical rhetoric in their speeches for the sake of persuading their audiences. According to Noam Chomsky, an American philosopher, linguist

¹ "Book II - Chapter 1: Aristotle's Rhetoric," accessed November 6, 2016, <http://rhetoric.eserver.org/aristotle/rhet2-1.html#1378a>

² Ibid.

³ Jonathan Charteris-Black, *Politicians and Rhetoric: The Persuasive Power of Metaphor* (United Kingdom: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011), 13.

⁴ Ibid.

⁵ Ibid.

⁶ Ibid.

⁷ Sonja K. Foss and Cindy L. Griffin, "Beyond Persuasion: A Proposal for an Invitational Rhetoric," *Communication Monographs* 62, no. 1 (March 1995): 2, doi:10.1080/03637759509376345.

and political commentator, politicians not only use rhetorical devices in their speeches, but they abuse, misuse and deform language to impose their ideological purposes.¹ He claims that in the second half of the twentieth century and in order to conceal facts, Americans changed many terminologies several times. Terms like *the national interest*² and *the free world* and so on are half-truth. He argues that such expressions are constructed very carefully and intentionally, to mislead and block audience's understanding and thought.³

2. Jonathan Charteris-Black's Rhetoric Figure (1):

The following figure shows the influence that rhetorical means (ethos, logos, pathos) have on persuasion in political communication. A description of each box in the model and their connection is followed on the next page.




Figure (1): *Rhetorical Means for Persuasion in Political Communication.*⁴

¹ Noam Chomsky, "Language in the Service of Propaganda" in *Chronicles of Dissent* (Monroe, Me: Common Courage Press, 1992).

² LeighaCohen, "Noam Chomsky (2014): What Does National Interests Actually Mean?," YouTube, May 11, 2014, posted November 5, 2016, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=tbVhz5SUmtw>.

³ Chomsky, op. cit., 1-3.

⁴ Jonathan Charteris-Black, *Politicians and Rhetoric: The Persuasive Power of Metaphor* (United Kingdom: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011), 14.

a. Establishing Integrity (Ethos) “Having The Right Intentions”:

Ethos is set by persuading a given audience that the speaker has “the right intentions” and motivations for its audience. Establishing one’s ethical integrity by ethos is a basis for being able to be convincing to a given audience.¹ If the audience is no longer trusting or even listening to the speech it means that the speaker has failed in establishing his integrity.² In this case, corruption scandals, for example, might be the origin of such failure, since it can have a disastrous effect on politicians.³ In politics, this kind of scandals indicates that the politician has the wrong motives and intentions.⁴ In fact, it signifies that the politician is mostly concerned with his own interests rather than with the interest of the group he is representing.⁵

In short, ethos is mainly based on the trust of the audience to the speaker. The audience will be easily persuaded by the arguments advanced by speaker only if he gained their confidence.⁶ To establish one’s integrity he has to watch his language and his behavior as well.⁷ The image that the speaker has already in the minds of his listeners, therefore, plays an essential role in his ability to persuade them.⁸

b. Communicating Political Arguments (Logos) “Thinking Right”:

Logos or “thinking right” is another rhetorical means for persuading an audience. It signifies that the arguments of the speaker are based on rationality and logic (Logos).⁹ In other words,

¹ Jonathan Charteris-Black, *Politicians and Rhetoric: The Persuasive Power of Metaphor* (United Kingdom: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011), 14.

² Ibid.

³ Ibid.

⁴ Ibid, 14-15.

⁵ Ibid.

⁶ Ibid.

⁷ Ibid, 15.

⁸ Jonathan Charteris-Black, *Analyzing Political Speeches: Rhetoric, Discourse and Metaphor* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014), 09.

⁹ Charteris-Black, op. cit., 15.

since arguments are based on rationality it means that they are ‘reasonable and inherently persuasive.’¹

c. Heightening Emotional Impact (Pathos) “Sounding Right”:

In addition to having the right intentions (Ethos) and thinking right (Logos), the speaker has to arouse the feelings (Pathos) of his audience in order to achieve a successful rhetoric.² “Sounding right” or pathos is ‘the ability to engage emotionally with an audience through empathy, humour or arousing feelings such as fear or hate.’³ It refers to persuasion by heightening the emotional impact of a given message.⁴ The use of rhetoric that arouses the feelings can ‘therefore contribute to creating the right emotional climate for persuasion to occur.’⁵ Being believed as having the right intentions and thinking right are essential parts of the rhetorical means for persuasion, but the successful rhetoric should also be able to arouse the feelings (Pathos).⁶

d. Mental Representations: Frames and Schemata, “Telling The Right Story”:

A story, which is considered as a right story, is explained to be a story that provides a frame that makes political arguments and actions comprehensible.⁷ This is done by providing a story, which has an explanation that lies within audience’s experiences and assumptions about the world.⁸

¹ Jonathan Charteris-Black, *Politicians and Rhetoric: The Persuasive Power of Metaphor* (United Kingdom: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011), 15.

² Ibid.

³ Ibid, 15.

⁴ Ibid.

⁵ Ibid.

⁶ Ibid, 07.

⁷ Ibid, 15.

⁸ Jonathan Charteris-Black, *Politicians and Rhetoric: The Persuasive Power of Metaphor* (United Kingdom: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011), 15.

A story that cannot make a political argument and political action comprehensible is not able to convince the audience of the rightness of a given political argument and actions. The given story should also lay within a given audience's experiences and assumptions about how the world works.¹ It is, therefore, essential to tell the right story in order persuade and convince any given audience.²

e. Persuasion "Being Right":

The aspects of ethos, logos, and pathos, which were explained previously in (a, b and c) are all influential and essential to persuading any given audience. An audience is persuaded if the given audience is convinced that an argument is 'right'. Establishing ethos is, therefore, a central basis for being right. It is defined that successful rhetoric, that one which is able to persuade others, should be able to include all three artistic proofs in a speech. Choosing 'the right story' to tell is also significant and plays an important role in persuading the audience.

3. Aristotle's Rhetorical Appeals Applied to Speech of George W. Bush's Address to the Nation on the War on Terror, *September 11, 2006*.³

Although Aristotle set his model for rhetorical analysis nearly 2500 years ago, the same model can be applied to political speeches in the modern time. In the following pages, I will try to apply it on Bush's Address to the Nation on the War on Terror, September 11, 2006.

Before the 9/11 attacks, George W. Bush has become notorious for being a poor orator. Many of his critics have bashed him for his verbal mistakes and for his choice of words. They even went further criticizing him for not addressing his citizens soon after the attacks on September 11. However, five years after those events, Bush gave a powerful speech addressing

¹ Jonathan Charteris-Black, *Politicians and Rhetoric: The Persuasive Power of Metaphor* (United Kingdom: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011), 15.

² Ibid.

³ George W. Bush, "Address to the Nation on the War on Terror," September 11, 2006. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=73962> (accessed April 19th, 2014).

the world, in general, and his people, in particular. The language he utilized to convey the message of a strong leader, was simple, yet authoritative. The tone he used was one which brought feelings of wrath and sympathy to his audience he says that “for many of our citizens, the wounds of that morning are still fresh. I’ve met firefighters and police officers who choke up at the memory of fallen comrades.”¹

Bush has, masterfully, utilized rhetorical devices to craft an effective speech. He used an instructive and demanding tone, and he, also, made an appeal to logos and pathos. Bush’s goal was to persuade Americans to feel comforted with the light of effort being put forth in resolving the aftermath of the attacks. President Bush had to present a speech that mastered various techniques of rhetoric to win the public’s support again. He had to persuade his audience of the logic lying behind his actions. In addition, he applies logos throughout his speech so as to prove to the Americans that he is the right person in the right place to take control of the issues at hand and maintain a his “strong country.”

❖ Ethos ‘Having the Right Intentions’:

It is agreed that when the speaker is seen as knowledgeable, trustworthy, and interested in the audience, the latter is more likely to consider what he says as true and then put its trust in him. Ethos, therefore, refers to the trustworthiness and integrity of the writer or speaker. According to Aristotle, this proof is potentially the most persuasive. As it can be affected by the writer’s/speaker’s reputation. The impact of ethos is often called the argument’s ‘ethical appeal’ or the ‘appeal from credibility.’²

¹ George W. Bush, Address to the Nation on the War on Terror, September 11, 2006. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=73962&st> (accessed May 21, 2013).

² June Johnson, John D Ramage, and John C Bean, *Writing Arguments: A Rhetoric with Readings, Concise Edition (4th Edition)*, 4th ed. (New York: Pearson Longman, 2007), 81-82.

Bush's display of ethos during this speech is ubiquitous. That Address to the Nation was delivered at a time when his approval ratings progressively declined as the Iraq war launched by his administration was continuing.¹ In fact, by early 2006, his average rating was close to 40%² after it reached the 80-90% about four months after the 9/11 attacks.³ Therefore, he has to show that he is in a position to protect his nation and eliminate any threat that might occur in the future. To remind Americans that they have a chief who is resolute, devoted, and entirely dedicated to defending America and its population he declares that 'in the first days after the 9/11 attacks, I promised to use every element of national power to fight the terrorists, wherever we find them.'⁴

Moreover, his character excelled when he confidently stated, 'on September the 11th, we resolved that we would go on the offense against our enemies, and we would not distinguish between the terrorists and those who harbor or support them'⁵ and 'our message to them [our enemies] is clear, no matter how long it takes, America will find you, and we will bring you to justice.'⁶ Bush, here, was trying to persuade his citizens that the United States is in safe hands and ensures them that he will punish whoever did those terrible acts, whatever the cost will be and whatever time it will take. It is worthy to note that this Oval Office Address concluded a day in which the president and senior officials participated in ceremonies at each of the three sites attacked on the 11th September. As a matter of fact, being present at those places in a remembrance day permitted to his character and personhood to be seen as that of a conscientious

¹ "Bush: Job Ratings," accessed January 6, 2014, <http://www.pollingreport.com/BushJob.htm>(accessed April 24th, 2015).

² Ibid.

³ USATODAY.com, (USA TODAY), n.d., <http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/polls/tables/live/01132003.htm> (accessed April 24th, 2015).

⁴ George W. Bush, Address to the Nation on the War on Terror, September 11, 2006. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, The American Presidency Project. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=73962>. (accessed April 19th, 2014).

⁵ Ibid.

⁶ Ibid.

and concerned person. To show that he is in touch with 9/11's victims' families and comrades, he says:

I've met firefighters and police officers who choke up at the memory of fallen comrades. I've stood with families gathered on a grassy field in Pennsylvania who take bittersweet pride in loved ones who refused to be victims and gave America our first victory in the war on terror. I've sat beside young mothers with children who are now 5 years old and still long for the daddies who will never cradle them in their arms. Out of this suffering, we resolve to honor every man and woman lost, and we seek their lasting memorial in a safer and more hopeful world.¹

❖ *Pathos 'Sounding Right':*

Pathos refers to the emotional appeals and the fact of 'putting the audience in the right frame of mind.'² This emotional side of the speech usually influences the listeners' beliefs and has the potential to influence their actions, as well.³ According to Aristotle, pathos is evident when the audience is 'roused to emotion by speech.'⁴ The issues of morality also come into play where Aristotle claims that there is a moral imperative for correct judgment.⁵

All along the speech, Bush recalls and recreates the images of horror witnessed by American citizens on the morning of the 9/11. Furthermore, he paid tribute to ordinary citizens who responded according to him 'with extraordinary acts of courage.'⁶ Then, he went on narrating the story of a widowed mother named Rose Ellen Dowdell who lost her husband in the 9/11 attacks. He met this widow at the United States Military Academy as she was there to

¹ George W. Bush, Address to the Nation on the War on Terror, September 11, 2006. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, The American Presidency Project. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=73962>. (accessed April 19th, 2014).

² "Book I – Chapter 2: Aristotle's Rhetoric," accessed January 6, 2014, <http://rhetoric.eserver.org/aristotle/rhet1-2.html> (accessed April 19th, 2014).

³ Ibid.

⁴ Ibid.

⁵ Ibid.

⁶ George W. Bush, Address to the Nation on the War on Terror, September 11, 2006. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, The American Presidency Project. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=73962>. (accessed April 19th, 2014).

watch her son, Patrick, accept his commission, in Bush's words, in 'the finest Army the world has ever known.'¹ Accordingly, Bush commented on that saying 'our nation is blessed to have young Americans like these, and we will need them.'² At that moment, a sense of pride and heroism might be felt among the families of the young soldiers. Pathos, therefore, is probably more influential than any of the other proofs in that speech.

Bush strongly defended the war in Iraq even though he acknowledged that Saddam Hussein was not responsible for the 9/11 attacks. He said that despite the fact that Saddam's regime was lacking weapons of mass destruction, it posed a clear threat in his words 'a risk the world could not afford to take.'³ He carried on arguing that 'whatever mistakes have been made in Iraq, the worst mistake would be to think that if we pulled out, the terrorists would leave us alone.'⁴ 'They will not leave us alone. They will follow us,'⁵ the President said. The more the "evil" is shown, the greater is the recognition for the person who eliminates it. Based on this, Bush played on the fear of the unknown to give legitimacy to his invasion of Iraq. According to Aristotle:

Fear may be defined as a pain or disturbance due to a mental picture of some destructive or painful evil in the future [...] And even these only if they appear not remote but so near as to be imminent [...] From this definition it will follow that fear is caused by whatever we feel has great power of destroying or of harming us in ways that tend to cause us great pain. Hence the very indications of such things are terrible, making us feel that the terrible thing itself is close at hand; the approach of what is terrible is just what we mean by "danger." Such indications are the enmity and anger of people who have power to do something

¹ George W. Bush, Address to the Nation on the War on Terror, September 11, 2006. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, The American Presidency Project. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=73962>. (accessed April 19th, 2014).

² Ibid.

³ George W. Bush, Address to the Nation on the War on Terror, September 11, 2006. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, The American Presidency Project. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=73962>. (accessed April 19th, 2014).

⁴ Ibid.

⁵ Ibid.

to us; for it is plain that they have the will to do it, and so they are on the point of doing it. Also injustice in possession of power; for it is the unjust man's will to do evil that makes him unjust.¹

The central item of evidence for the Iraq war was Iraq's possession of weapons of mass murder which Saddam Hussein the "villain" or "bad guy" longed to use, according to the Bush Administration, not only against his own people but also against 'the free' and 'civilized world' in particular against the USA. It is agreed that one typical aspect of Bush's rhetoric is the justification of his assertion. Here, he is providing justification on the decision to take his country into the war in Iraq:

I'm often asked why we are in Iraq when Saddam Hussein was not responsible for the 9/11 attacks. The answer is that the regime of Saddam Hussein was a clear threat. My administration, the Congress, and the United Nations saw the threat. And after 9/11, Saddam's regime posed a risk that the world could not afford to take. The world is safer because Saddam Hussein is no longer in power. *And now the challenge is to help the Iraqi people build a democracy that fulfills the dreams of the nearly 12 million Iraqis who came out to vote in free elections last December.*²

In the last statement, in italics, Bush portrays America as the 'good guy.' His view is divisive, it is determined by a struggle between "good" and "evil." According to him, this "evil" is becoming gradually threatening, because it is aiming to 'to build a radical Islamic empire.'³ The majority of Bush's 17-minute speech was spent defending U.S. foreign policy, particularly the issue of Iraq. Bush described a U.S. struggle against a 'global network of extremists driven by a perverted vision of Islam.'⁴

¹ "Book II - Chapter 5: Aristotle's Rhetoric," accessed January 6, 2014, <http://rhetoric.eserver.org/aristotle/rhet2-5.html> (accessed April 19th, 2014).

² George W. Bush, Address to the Nation on the War on Terror, September 11, 2006. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, The American Presidency Project. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=73962>. (accessed April 19th, 2014). On YouTube: <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=C-Oqljh-QFo>

³ Ibid.

⁴ Ibid.

In this televised address former president Bush sought to place the war on Iraq in the context of an epic battle between tyranny and freedom. Bush defended the military campaign in Iraq and called his administration's war on terror a "struggle for civilization"¹ and said it is the 'calling of our generation [...] to maintain the way of life enjoyed by free nations.'² Bush expressed his belief that free peoples and those who yearn to be free would triumph in this "struggle for civilization."³ He argued that the power of freedom is the strongest weapon available to the United States and its allies to defeat their enemy. 'The terrorists fear freedom as much as they do our firepower,'⁴ he said.

❖ *Logos 'Thinking Right':*

Logos has numerous definitions, but usually, it refers to the logical content or reasoning or thought expressed in words. It is also the study of 'the arguments typical of the reasoning employed in practical decision making.'⁵

The concept of logos in Bush's speech may be the most difficult of the proofs to be understood. Looking at specific word use, Bush made a good use of the religious jargon. Phrases such as, 'and we go forward with trust in that spirit, confidence in our purpose, and faith in a loving God who made us to be free' and 'may God bless you,'⁶ appealed to both emotions (pathos) and to ways of thought (logos).

¹ George W. Bush, Address to the Nation on the War on Terror, September 11, 2006. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, The American Presidency Project. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=73962>. (accessed April 19th, 2014).

² Ibid.

³ Ibid.

⁴ Ibid.

⁵ "Book I - Chapter 3: Aristotle's Rhetoric," accessed January 6, 2014, <http://rhetoric.eserver.org/aristotle/rhet1-3.html>

⁶ George W. Bush, Address to the Nation on the War on Terror, September 11, 2006. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, The American Presidency Project. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=73962>. (accessed April 19th, 2014).

Bush also makes an appeal to logos throughout the piece. When he discusses the nature of the enemy, he provides fact and reasoning regarding the “evils” and malpractices of “radical Muslims.” These extremists, he said, ‘have murdered people of all colors, creeds, and and made war upon the entire free world.’¹ He added that they look forward to creating ‘a radical Islamic empire where women are prisoners in their homes, men are beaten for missing prayer meetings, and terrorists have a safe haven to plan and launch attacks on America and other civilized nations.’²

Then Bush went on providing reasons as to why it is a must to face that enemy and eradicate it from the Middle East at that time without any further waiting. ‘The worst mistake is to think that if we pulled out (out of Iraq), the terrorists would leave us alone, they will follow us. The safety of America depends on the outcome of the battle in the streets of Baghdad,’³ Bush argued. The reasoning and logic he uses to define the enemy and what is the proper response to it should be providing rationality and to his arguments. And this is what exactly President Bush did.

Bush used Aristotle’s artistic proofs, logos, pathos, and ethos all together, avoiding the use of each one alone. He did so to create a wholesome speech that was successful to a certain extent. Pathos was used expertly, the audience’s feelings, needs, and emotions were all connected with the speeches. Logos or logical sense was displayed to the listeners throughout the nation. Ethos, or character and credibility, was also eloquently displayed by Bush. Despite that fact Aristotle’s artistic proofs are thousands years old, they are still used nowadays. For

¹George W. Bush, Address to the Nation on the War on Terror, September 11, 2006. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, The American Presidency Project. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=73962>. (accessed April 19th, 2014).

² Ibid.

³ Ibid.

they, first, allow the audience to understand public speeches at a greater depth and second, allow the speaker to shape and mold her or his speech to one of success.¹

Section Two: Lakoffian Conceptual Metaphor Theory, Metaphor in Political Communication:

1. Defining Metaphor:

The broad question of what really metaphor is, has been recently more tackled by a vast range of different scholars.² In fact, ‘metaphor has by now been defined in so many ways that there is no human expression, whether in language or any other medium, that would not be metaphoric in someone’s definition.’³ In an etymological sense, the term ‘metaphor’ comes from the Greek word “metapherein” which means “to transfer.”⁴ This certainly fits the notion that a metaphor is ‘one in which meanings are transferred.’⁵ Aristotle defined metaphors as follows: ‘metaphor consists in giving the thing a name that belongs to something else.’⁶ And recently Jonathan Charteris-Black has given it this definition ‘a linguistic representation that results from the shift in the use of a word or phrase from the context or domain in which it is expected to occur in another context or domain where it is not expected to occur, thereby causing semantic tension.’⁷

Generally, metaphors are understood in two ways, a rhetorical understanding, and a cognitive understanding.⁸ The rhetorical understanding is where metaphors are considered

¹ Jonathan Charteris-Black, *Politicians and Rhetoric: The Persuasive Power of Metaphor* (United Kingdom: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011), 16.

² Alexander Spencer, *The Tabloid Terrorist: The Predicative Construction of New Terrorism in the Media* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010), 84.

³ Wayne C. Booth, "Metaphor as Rhetoric: The Problem of Evaluation," *Critical Inquiry* 5, no. 1 (January 1978): 76.

⁴ Ibid.

⁵ Ibid, 31.

⁶ Ibid, 160.

⁷ Jonathan Charteris-Black, *Corpus Approaches to Critical Metaphor Analysis* (Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004), 21.

⁸ Ibid.

“convenient labels”¹ or a ‘purely rhetorical tool which replaces one word with another and thereby serve(s) little purpose but to make speech sound nice.’² In the same sense, metaphor has been considered as ‘a mere use of language; a pretty turn of phrase rippling along on the surface of discourse.’³

In the late part of the twentieth century, however, this rhetorical understanding of metaphor has been changed through the advances in cognitive linguistics. Cognitive linguists went further and challenged the traditional approach to metaphors and offered the cognitive linguistic view of metaphor. Cognitive linguist George Lakoff and Mark Johnson, a philosopher, are among the most influential scholars in this respect. In their book, *Metaphors We Live By* (1980), they have managed to change the status of metaphor from a merely rhetorical flourishes or ornamentation to be viewed as a mode of thought inherent to human reasoning.⁴ In their words, they argue that:

Metaphor is for most people a device of the poetic imagination and the rhetorical flourish [...] metaphor is typically viewed as characteristic of language alone, a matter of words rather than thought or action [...]. Our ordinary conceptual system, in terms of which we both think and act, is fundamentally metaphorical in nature.⁵

Lakoff and Johnson noted that the ‘essence of metaphor is understanding and experiencing one kind of thing in terms of another.’⁶ It thereby makes humans understand one conceptual domain of experience in terms of another.⁷ That is to say, a metaphor is a means of

¹ Chilton, Paul and George Lakoff (1999) ‘Foreign Policy by Metaphor’, in Christina Schaffner and Anita L. Wenden, *Language and Peace (war & Peace)* (Amsterdam: Harwood Academic, 1999), 56.

² Jonathan Charteris-Black, *Corpus Approaches to Critical Metaphor Analysis* (Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004), 24.

³ Raymond D. Gozzi, *The Power of Metaphor in the Age of Electronic Media (Hampton Press Communication Series)* (United States: Hampton Press, 1998), 09.

⁴ George Lakoff and Mark Johnson, *Metaphors We Live by*, 2nd 2003 ed. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1980), 12.

⁵ Ibid.

⁶ George Lakoff and Mark Johnson, *Metaphors We Live by*, 2nd 2003 ed. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1980), 13- 4.

⁷ Ibid.

accessing one event, situation, concept etc. by “mapping” conceptual structures from the first familiar, experientially grounded “source domain” onto the second a more abstract “target domain.”¹ In short, metaphor is often an attempt at understanding an abstract concept by explaining it through another concrete or physical. It is a way of taking something intangible and making it more accessible through the use of phenomena from the real world that people recognize and understand.²

2. The Conceptual Metaphor Vs. Metaphorical Linguistic Expression:

In dealing with Conceptual Metaphor Theory (CMT), we have to distinguish between two kinds of metaphors: metaphorical linguistic expression and the conceptual metaphor.³ The metaphorical linguistic expressions are the linguistic construction most people would think of as “metaphor.” They are directly visible and represent the specific statements. They are sayings like “he shot down all my arguments” and “I’ve never won an argument with him.”⁴ In contrast, the conceptual metaphor does not have to be explicitly visible in discourse. ‘The conceptual metaphor represents the conceptual basis, idea or image’⁵ that underlies a set of metaphorical expressions.⁶ For example, the conceptual metaphor, ARGUMENT IS WAR, encompasses the abstract connection between one “conceptual domain” to another by mapping a source domain (WAR) and a target domain (ARGUMENT).⁷

A single conceptual metaphor may have an infinite number of metaphorical linguistic expressions linked to it.⁸ Examples of metaphorical linguistic expressions belonging to the

¹ George Lakoff and Mark Johnson, *Metaphors We Live by*, 2nd 2003 ed. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1980), 156 - 60.

² Ibid.

³ Ibid.

⁴ Ibid, 12.

⁵ Jonathan Charteris-Black, *Corpus Approaches to Critical Metaphor Analysis* (Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004), 09.

⁶ Ibid.

⁷ George Lakoff and Mark Johnson, *Metaphors We Live by*, 2nd 2003 ed. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1980), 12.

⁸ George Lakoff and Mark Johnson, *Metaphors We Live by*, 2nd 2003 ed. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1980), 12.

conceptual metaphor ARGUMENT IS WAR, apart from the two metaphors mentioned previously, are expressions such as “he attacked every weak point in my argument”, “his criticisms were right on target”, “I demolished his argument”, “your claims are indefensible”, “you disagree? Okay, shoot!” and “if you use that strategy, he'll wipe you out.”¹ In all of these expressions, the concept of ARGUMENT is described in terms belonging to the vocabulary of WAR.² “Weak points of attack”, “targets”, “demolishing”, “indefensible”, “shoot” and “wipe out” are all sayings from warfare with quite bloody literal meanings that when transmitted into metaphors can be used to describe and access a completely different concept.³

3. Categories of Metaphors:

Lakoff and Johnson divided metaphors into three categories, structural, ontological, and orientational. The structural metaphors ‘enable speakers to understand target A by means of the structure of source B,’⁴ the ontological metaphors ‘give an ontological status to general categories of abstract target concepts’⁵ while the orientational metaphors ‘make a set of target concepts coherent in our conceptual system’⁶ and ‘give a concept a spatial orientation.’⁷

Oriental metaphors are metaphors related to spatial orientation, such as “HAPPY IS UP” and “SAD IS DOWN.”⁸ Examples of linguistic expression of such conceptual metaphors are “i’m feeling up”, “my spirits rose”, “you're in high spirits” and “he’s really low these days.”⁹ The authors of *Metaphors We Live By* suggest that these metaphors have come into being based on physical experiences. For instance, people having a vertical posture when

¹ George Lakoff and Mark Johnson, *Metaphors We Live by*, 2nd 2003 ed. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1980), 12.

² Ibid.

³ Ibid.

⁴ Zoltan Kovecses, *Metaphor: A Practical Introduction* (New York: Oxford University Press, USA, 2002), 33-35.

⁵ Ibid.

⁶ Ibid.

⁷ George Lakoff and Mark Johnson, *Metaphors We Live by*, 2nd 2003 ed. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1980), 14.

⁸ George Lakoff and Mark Johnson, *Metaphors We Live by*, 2nd 2003 ed. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1980), 14.

⁹ Ibid.

being happy, and reversely a drooping posture when they are sad;¹ “I’m feeling down”, “He’s really low these days”, “I fell into a depression.”² Here, the body is once again viewed as the starting point of all human experience of the world and believed to form the basis of human understanding of less accessible concepts such as feelings and states of mind.³

Structural metaphors ‘are grounded in systematic correlations within our experience’⁴ and “allow us [...] to use one highly structured and clearly delineated concept to structure another”⁵ One example of a structural metaphor is RATIONAL ARGUMENT IS WAR. Here target A, rational argument, is understood by means of source B, war. This is an example of the previously mentioned way something abstract is made readily available by means of something concrete.

Ontological metaphors are used ‘to comprehend events, actions, activities, and states.’⁶ In other words, events and actions are understood as objects, activities are seen as substances, and states are viewed as containers.⁷ As it is the case with the structural metaphor, the ontological metaphor, also, permits people to access abstract or complex constructions through something recognizable and simple. Objects, substances, and containers are tangible and, therefore, easily accessible.⁸ They are, also, entities we recognize from our physical experiences of the world, allowing them to act as cognitive bridges to the more abstract events, actions, activities, and states.⁹

¹ George Lakoff and Mark Johnson, *Metaphors We Live by*, 2nd 2003 ed. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1980), 21.

² Ibid.

³ Ibid.

⁴ Ibid, 72.

⁵ Ibid.

⁶ Ibid, 38.

⁷ Ibid.

⁸ George Lakoff and Mark Johnson, *Metaphors We Live by*, 2nd 2003 ed. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1980), 33.

⁹ Ibid.

Another kind of ontological metaphors are ‘those where the physical object is further specified as being a person.’ For example, linguistic metaphorical expressions like “his theory explained to me the behavior of chickens raised in factories”, “this fact argues against the standard theories” and “life has cheated me,”¹ are all personifications which allow us to understand ‘a wide variety of experiences with nonhuman entities in terms of human motivations, characteristics, and activities.’² According to Lakoff and Johnson, personification metaphors are probably the most obvious of the ontological metaphors.³

4. “Highlighting and Hiding:”

Highlighting and hiding is the fact that “when a source domain is applied to a target, only some (but not all) aspects of the target are brought into focus.”⁴ Metaphor is a process of mapping meaning from the source to the target domain, and in this process, it only some aspects of that concept are highlighted. For instance, understanding an aspect of arguing in terms of a battle ‘will necessarily hide other aspect of a concept.’⁵ That is to say, ‘in allowing us to focus on one aspect of a concept (e.g. the battling aspects of arguing), a metaphor can keep us from focusing on other aspects of the experience or phenomena that are inconsistent with that metaphor.’⁶

In this example “time is money” the value of time is highlighted. However, as George Lakoff and Johnson argue: ‘time isn’t really money. If you spend your time trying to do something and it doesn’t work, you can’t get your time back. There are no time banks. I can give you a lot of time, but you can’t give me back the same time, though you can give me back

¹ George Lakoff and Mark Johnson, *Metaphors We Live by*, 2nd 2003 ed. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1980), 33.

² Ibid.

³ Ibid.

⁴ Zoltan Kovecses, *Metaphor: A Practical Introduction* (New York: Oxford University Press, USA, 2002), 79.

⁵ George Lakoff and Mark Johnson, *Metaphors We Live by*, 2nd 2003 ed. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1980), 12.

⁶ George Lakoff and Mark Johnson, *Metaphors We Live by*, 2nd 2003 ed. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1980), 12.

the same amount of time. And so on. Thus, part of a metaphorical concept does not and cannot fit.’¹ In short, metaphors have the ability to hide some aspects of the concept and highlight some others.

5. “Metaphor, Truth, and Power:”

The two authors of *Metaphors We Live By* (1980) claim that ‘the most fundamental values in a culture will be coherent with the metaphorical structure of the most fundamental concepts in the culture’² and add that ‘our values are not independent but must form a coherent system with the metaphorical concepts we live by.’³ This means that metaphors can reveal a given culture’s values and possibly ‘play a central role in the construction of social and political reality.’⁴

Furthermore, Lakoff and Johnson see that ‘most of our metaphors have evolved in our culture over a long period, but many are imposed upon us by people in power.’⁵ Based on this claim it seems that political rhetoric is a good place to examine metaphors. In the same respect, the authors state that ‘political and economic ideologies are framed in metaphorical terms.’⁶ They are not advocating the view that metaphors alone can shape reality or hold the key to political power, however, they do emphasize the importance of studying metaphors when examining political rhetoric, to quote them ‘it is reasonable enough to assume that words alone don’t change reality. But changes in our conceptual system do change what is real for us and affect how we perceive the world and act upon those perceptions.’⁷ It is this view on the link

¹George Lakoff and Mark Johnson, *Metaphors We Live by*, 2nd 2003 ed. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1980), 13.

² Ibid, 22.

³ Ibid.

⁴ Ibid, 160.

⁵ Ibid.

⁶ George Lakoff and Mark Johnson, *Metaphors We Live by*, 2nd 2003 ed. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1980), 237.

⁷ Ibid, 156.

between metaphor and political reality that forms the basis of this section, and the area of investigation that will be dealt with in the following pages.

6. Applying Metaphor Theory to Bush's Selected Speeches:

In political contexts metaphor can be, and often is, used for ideological purposes because it activates unconscious emotional associations and thereby contributes to myth creation: politicians use metaphor to tell the right story.¹

In the light of the above quote, we understand that politicians use metaphors to communicate their ideologies. For they are increasingly persuasive and help in the creation of the political myth.² The following is a figure that is based on an understanding of the connection between metaphors and Jonathan Charteris-Black's *Rhetorical Means for Persuasion in Political Communication*³ figure (1), which is illustrated and defined in section one page (41). A brief description of the influence that metaphors have in each box is followed.

¹ Jonathan Charteris-Black, *Politicians and Rhetoric: The Persuasive Power of Metaphor* (United Kingdom: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011), 28.

² Ibid.

³ Ibid, 14.




Figure (2): Metaphors Influence on Political Persuasion.¹

a. Metaphors Influence on Establishing Integrity (Ethos). ‘Having The Right Intentions’:

As previously explained in this chapter, a speaker without ethos will face problems in persuading his audience. Without ethos the speaker’s rhetoric will sound empty and, therefore, he will be seen as ‘fraudulent or manipulative.’² To avoid falling in this trap, the prime means

¹ Jonathan Charteris-Black, *Politicians and Rhetoric: The Persuasive Power of Metaphor* (United Kingdom: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011), 318.

² Jonathan Charteris-Black, *Politicians and Rhetoric: The Persuasive Power of Metaphor* (United Kingdom: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011), 318.

to achieve credibility (Ethos) is the use metaphors.¹ For instance, metaphors of “light” and “dark” can associate the speaker with “good” and the opponent with “evil” respectively.² Jonathan Charteris-Black concludes that ‘metaphors heighten the ethical qualities of the speaker by self-representation as a judge of ethical issues who is ethically close to his audience and shares their intentions.’³

b. Metaphors Influence on Heightening pathos ‘Sounding right’:

Metaphors are vital for augmenting the emotional impact of any given message.⁴ Arousal of emotions is important to the creation of victims, enemies and heroes.⁵ This emotional appeal responds to the human feelings that are related to the ‘protection of the family, loyalty to the tribe, fear of invasion by an unknown other.’⁶ Such emotional involvement can facilitate the construction of political reality.⁷

c. Metaphors influence on: Communicating political arguments (Logos). ‘Thinking right’

Metaphors may be exploited or manipulated or even reversed in order to communicate a particular political argument.⁸

The use of metaphors strengthens logical arguments. This can be done, for example, by providing equality between one word and another. For instance, George W. Bush represented the 9/11 attacks as an “evil act.” Through this metaphor, Bush draws a parallel between the word “terrorism” and the word “evil”, which is connected with all what is extremely bad in the world. This equality increase the understanding of “terrorism” in terms of “evil.” This argument

¹ Jonathan Charteris-Black, *Politicians and Rhetoric: The Persuasive Power of Metaphor* (United Kingdom: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011),), 318.

² Black, Jonathan Charteris. (2011), *Politicians and Rhetoric. The persuasive power of metaphor*, (Palgrave Macmillan. 2011), 318- 19.

³ Ibid, 320.

⁴ Ibid, 321.

⁵ Ibid.

⁶ Ibid, 320.

⁷ Ibid.

⁸ Ibid.

is, therefore, based on this logical equality which means logos.¹ Bush knew that his audience has already witnessed the given situation (9/11 attacks) this gives him the opportunity to extend it through the use of metaphors, which leads the audience to draw extended images about it, based on the meaning that is provided by the metaphors. By the means of metaphors Bush proves that he is “thinking right.”

d. Communication of Ideology by Political Myth:

Myth is another key term in understanding the use of metaphor in political communication, and one that is also relevant to Discourse Analysis. Charteris-Black defines myth as ‘a story that provides an explanation of all things for which explanations are felt to be necessary.’² He considers myth as a method of constructing meaning, a technique or a strategy to communicate ideologies. ‘Myth therefore shares with ideology a persuasive purpose and engages the hearer by providing stories that express aspects of the unconscious.’³ I will build on this definition of myth later on in this chapter when examining a pervasive discourse in the selected speeches, namely the discourse of ‘The All American Hero.’

According to Charteris-Black “political myths” are crucial to the analysis of political discourse. He identifies three political myths widely employed by U.S. political leaders which are:

1. *The myth of the Conspiratorial Enemy* (a hostile out-group is plotting to commit some harmful acts against an in-group)
2. *The Valiant Leader myth* (the political leader is benevolent and is effective in saving people from danger).

¹Jonathan Charteris-Black, *Politicians and Rhetoric: The Persuasive Power of Metaphor* (United Kingdom: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011), 223.

² Jonathan Charteris-Black, *Politicians and Rhetoric: The Persuasive Power of Metaphor* (BASINGSTOKE: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004), 22.

³ Ibid.

3. *The United We Stand myth* (a belief that a group can achieve victory by obeying and making sacrifices).¹

Bush's speechwriting team makes use of all of these strategies in their War on Terror discourse. "*The United We Stand myth*" is especially frequent in the speeches and can be found on page (67) under the title: "*Friendly States and Rogue/Hostile States.*" "*The Valiant Leader myth*" is dealt with in details in page (72) under the title: "*The Fairy Tale of the Just War (All America as a Hero)*" and "*The myth of the Conspiratorial Enemy*" can be found on page (78) "*Conflict Metaphors.*"

SECTION THREE: George W. Bush's Personification Metaphors in Selected Speeches.

Language is always exploited to convey the goal of the speaker and have an influence on its audience. Personification is a linguistic figure 'where the physical object is further specified as being a person.'² They arouse our feelings and beliefs about a given subject. The typical reasoning for using personifications is 'either to arouse empathy for a social group, ideology or belief evaluated as heroic or to arouse opposition towards a social group, ideology or belief that is evaluated as villainous.'³

1. "STATE AS PERSON:"

The personification metaphor of "Nation as Person" system is one of the most used by the Bush administration in its foreign policy. Charteris-Black suggests that what encourages politicians to use this type of metaphor is 'the intensity of emotions evoked by war scenarios.'⁴

¹Jonathan Charteris-Black, *Politicians and Rhetoric: The Persuasive Power of Metaphor* (BASINGSTOKE: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004), 25.

² George Lakoff and Mark Johnson, *Metaphors We Live by* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1980), 33.

³ Jonathan Charteris-Black, *Politicians and Rhetoric: The Persuasive Power of Metaphor* (United Kingdom: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011), 61.

⁴ Charteris-Black, *op. cit.*, 174.

In his classic paper, “Metaphor and War: The Metaphor System Used to Justify War in the Gulf (1991),” Lakoff defines the “State as Person” personification metaphor, as follows:

A state is conceptualized as a person, engaging in social relations within a world community. Its landmass is its home. It lives in a neighborhood, and has neighbors, friends and enemies. States are seen as having inherent dispositions: they can be peaceful or aggressive, responsible or irresponsible, industrious or lazy.¹

Such metaphors draw attention to certain aspects of a phenomenon and invite the listener or reader to think of one concept in the light of another.² Personifications ‘limit what we notice, highlight what we do see, and provide part of the inferential structure that we reason with.’³ Lakoff argues that:

The Nation as Person metaphor is pervasive, powerful, and part of an elaborate metaphor system. It is part of an International Community metaphor, in which there are friendly nations, hostile nations, rogue states, and so on. This metaphor comes with a notion of the national interest: Just as it is in the interest of a person to be healthy and strong, so it is in the interest of a Nation-Person to be economically healthy and militarily strong. That is what is meant by the ‘national interest.’⁴

The “State as Person” system entails the use of metaphors that serve to conceptualize states as persons.⁵ Through this metaphor, states are supposed to have “friends” who have to be loyal, supportive, and hurry to help when needed.⁶ Moreover, just as we have “friendly nations,” so there must be “rogue and hostile” nations as enemies too.

¹ Lakoff, George (1991) Metaphor and War: The Metaphor System Used to Justify War in the Gulf, http://www2.iath.virginia.edu/sixties/HTML_docs/Texts/Scholarly/Lakoff_Gulf_Metaphor_1.html (Accessed January 6, 2015).

² Ibid.

³ Lakoff, George (1991) Metaphor and War: The Metaphor System Used to Justify War in the Gulf, http://www2.iath.virginia.edu/sixties/HTML_docs/Texts/Scholarly/Lakoff_Gulf_Metaphor_2.html (Accessed January 6, 2015).

⁴ George Lakoff, *Don't Think of an Elephant!: Know Your Values and Frame the Debate: The Essential Guide for Progressives* (White River junction, VT: Chelsea Green Publishing Co, 2004), 69.

⁵ George Lakoff, "Metaphor and War, Again," March 18, 2003, http://www.alternet.org/story/15414/metaphor_and_war_again (Accessed January 6, 2015).

⁶ Ibid.

For example, President Bush so often used Saddam Hussein's name to personify Iraq in the person of Saddam Hussein alone. He, also, classifies the nation of Iraq as a "rogue state." However, as Lakoff argues this metaphor is dangerous and "can kill,"¹ for it 'hides [...] the 3000 bombs to be dropped in the first two days [that] will not be dropped on that one person [Saddam Hussein]. They will kill many thousands of the people hidden by the metaphor, people that according to the metaphor we are not going to war against.'²

Original Word/State	Personification
Country	Awakened to danger and called to defend freedom. ³
The United States of America	Makes the following demands on the Taliban: Deliver to United States authorities all the leaders of al Qaeda who hide in your land. Release all foreign nationals, including American citizens, you have unjustly imprisoned. Protect foreign journalists, diplomats and aid workers in your country. Close immediately and permanently every terrorist training camp in Afghanistan, and hand over every terrorist, and every person in their support structure, to appropriate authorities. ⁴
America	They hope that (America) grows fearful, retreating from the world and forsaking our friends.
The civilized world	Is rallying to America's side.

¹ George Lakoff, "Metaphor and War, Again," March 18, 2003, http://www.alternet.org/story/15414/metaphor_and_war_again (Accessed January 6, 2015).

² Ibid.

³ George W. Bush: "Address Before a Joint Session of the Congress on the United States Response to the Terrorist Attacks of September 11," September 20, 2001. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=64731> (accessed May 21, 2013).

⁴ George W. Bush, "Address Before a Joint Session of the Congress on the United States Response to the Terrorist Attacks of September 11," September 20, 2001. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=64731> (accessed May 21, 2013).

<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • This country • The united states 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Will define our times, not be defined by them • Is determined and strong
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The world's • Civilization's 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Fight • Fight
The United States	is grateful that many nations and many international organizations have already responded ¹
Our country	Is strong ²
America	has stood down enemies before, and we will do so this time.
Our nation	is strong of heart, firm of purpose. ³

Table (1): George W. Bush's Personifications of The "State As Person" In Selected Speeches.

➤ Friendly States and Rogue/Hostile States:

One key figure of speech that runs through the discourse of Bush's rhetoric throughout his presidential career, especially after the 9/11 attacks, is that of metaphors of friendship. Despite the overwhelming sympathy that flooded the U.S. in the days immediately following 9/11, the superpower met a strong resistance to its foreign policies and decision to enter Afghanistan and Iraq as well. The term friend(s) is used very liberally in Bush's speeches, sometimes alone, sometimes along with the term allies as the examples in the table below show:

States	Friendly States
France and Germany	"I recognize that not all of our friends agreed with our decision to enforce the

¹ George W. Bush, "Address Before a Joint Session of the Congress on the United States Response to the Terrorist Attacks of September 11," September 20, 2001. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, The American Presidency Project. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=64731> (accessed May 21,2013).

² George W. Bush, "Address to the Nation on the Terrorist Attacks," September 11, 2001. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=58057> (accessed May 21,2013).

³ George W. Bush, "Remarks at the Department of Defense Service of Remembrance in Arlington, Virginia," October 11, 2001. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=73424> (accessed May 21,2013).

	Security Council before committing troops to Iraq” ¹
America and its allies	“We will hunt them by day and by night in every corner of the world until they are no longer a threat to America and our friends ” ²
Poland	“I want to thank our friends from Poland” ³
Qatar	“I want to thank the Amir of Qatar, with whom I just met, for his hospitality and for his friendship to the United States of America” ⁴ “Qatar, the host of CENTCOM, a great friend to the United States” ⁵
United Arab Emirates (UAE)	“ Our friends in Bahrain and the UAE” ⁶
US’s Allies	“The United States and our friends and allies will first take care of the Iraqi citizens” ⁷
US’s Allies	“Because of you, America and our friends and allies , those of us who love freedom are now more secure” ⁸
US’s Allies	“The people of the United States and our friends and allies will not live at the mercy of an outlaw regime” ⁹
Great Britain	“America has no truer friend than Great Britain [...] Thank you for coming, friend” ¹⁰
USA and its Allies	“The regime [...] has a deep hatred for America and our friends and it has aided, trained and harbored terrorists” ¹¹

¹ George W. Bush, "Address to the Nation on the War on Terror," September 7, 2003. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, The American Presidency Project, Appendix P 02 <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=64561> (accessed May 21, 2013).

² _____, "Remarks at a Reenlistment Ceremony on the 30th Anniversary of the All-Volunteer Force," July 1, 2003. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, The American Presidency Project, Appendix P23, <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=63955> (accessed May 21, 2013).

³ _____, "Remarks to the Troops at Camp As Sayliyah", Qatar June 5, 2003. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, The American Presidency Project. Appendix P 25, <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=64952> (accessed May 21, 2013).

⁴ George W. Bush, "Remarks to the Troops at Camp As Sayliyah", Qatar June 5, 2003. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, The American Presidency Project. Appendix P 25, <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=64952> (accessed May 21, 2013).

⁵ Ibid.

⁶ Ibid.

⁷ Ibid.

⁸ Ibid.

⁹ George W. Bush, "Address to the Nation on Iraq," March 19, 2003. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=63368> (accessed May 21, 2013).

¹⁰ _____, "Address Before a Joint Session of the Congress on the United States Response to the Terrorist Attacks of September 11," September 20, 2001. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=6473> (accessed May 21, 2013).

¹¹ George W. Bush, "Leave Iraq within 48 hours" March 18, 2003. <http://edition.cnn.com/2003/WORLD/meast/03/17/spri.irq.bush.transcript/> (accessed May 21, 2013).

America	“America is a friend to the people of Iraq” ¹
Arab countries	“Together with our friends and allies from Europe to Asia, and Africa to Latin America” ²
Arab countries	“The enemy of America is not our many Muslim friends ; it is not our many Arab friends ” ³
France and Germany	“There have been disagreements in this matter, among old and valued friends ” ⁴

Table (2): Bush’s Personifications of the “State as Person: Friendly States” In Selected Speeches

Here, the metaphorical use of the term friend(s) allowed nations to interact and have relations between each other just like humans do. It is worthy to mention that in all the cited examples, Bush has portrayed America as being friendly to the rest of the world while some “rogue states” such as Iraq just hated that, ‘the regime [...] has a deep hatred for America and our friends.’⁵ These metaphors serve, first, as a personification fitting the “*United We Stand*” political myth⁶ and, second, as an appeal for uniting to legitimate the war on Iraq, in particular, and the War on Terror, in general.

Since the 9/11 attacks, President Bush had ‘communicated a clear message that “rogue” regimes are marked for destruction in one way or another.’⁷ Basically, a “rogue state” is considered as such whenever it infringes international law. According to Article Two of the United Nations Charter, all member nations shall ‘refrain in their international relations from

¹ George W. Bush, "Address to the Nation on Iraq From Cincinnati, Ohio," October 7, 2002. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=73139> (accessed May 21, 2013).

² George W. Bush, "Remarks by the President to the Employees of Cecil I. Walker Machinery Company," January 22, 2002. <http://www.ssa.gov/history/gwbushstmts2.html#1> (accessed May 21, 2013).

³ Ibid.

⁴ _____, "Remarks on the Anniversary of Operation Iraqi Freedom," March 19, 2004. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=72580> (accessed May 21, 2013).

⁵ Ibid.

⁶ Jonathan Charteris-Black, *Politicians and Rhetoric: The Persuasive Power of Metaphor* (United Kingdom: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011), 61.

⁷ Christopher Preble, “The Bush Doctrine And ‘Rogue’ States,” *Foreign Service Journal* 92, no. 3 (October 2005), 25.

the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state.’¹ Based on this article, Iraq obviously acted as a “rogue” state when it occupied Kuwait in 1990, and the international community quickly responded and pushed back Saddam.²

During the presidency of Bush, however, the definition of ‘rogue state’ ‘has become increasingly muddled.’³ It became taking ‘account not simply of how states interact with other states, but also of how particular regimes treat their own people.’⁴ From Bush’s perspective, a state can be classified as a “rogue” if it restricts the freedom of its citizens. He considered the “rogue” states as the main threat to global order. His foreign policies, therefore, “aim either to alter the behavior of rogue states, or, failing that, to eliminate those regimes’ to follow the rules.”⁵ In this respect, the Bush Doctrine advances three core principles:

- (1) Preemption, or America’s declared right to a war to thwart a suspected attack;
- (2) an unchallengeable America, meaning no other power would be allowed to develop military strength equivalent to that of the United States; and
- (3) the spread of democratic values as fundamental American mission and a hedge against global instability and American vulnerability.⁶

Preemption, typically, means ‘attacking an enemy before he attacks you.’⁷ But preemption in the Bush’s sense is ‘more accurately understood as “preventive war.”’⁸ In June 2002 he highlighted the importance of acting first before “the enemy,” to quote him:

If we wait for threats to fully materialize, we will have waited too long [...] we must take the battle to the enemy, disrupt his plans and confront the worst

¹ The United Nations Charter, Article 02, <http://www.un.org/en/documents/charter/chapter1.shtml> (accessed May 25, 2015).

² Fraser Cameron, *US Foreign Policy After the Cold War: Global Hegemon or Reluctant Sheriff?*, 2nd ed. (New York: Routledge, 2005), 16.

³ Christopher Preble, “The Bush Doctrine and ‘Rogue’ States,” *Foreign Service Journal* 92, no. 3 (October 2005), 26.

⁴ Ibid.

⁵ Ibid.

⁶ Robert W Merry, *Sands of Empire: Missionary Zeal, American Foreign Policy, and the Hazards of Global Ambition* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2005), 223.

⁷ Christopher Preble, “The Bush Doctrine and ‘Rogue’ States,” *Foreign Service Journal* 92, no. 3 (October 2005), 27.

⁸ Ibid.

threats before they emerge. In the world we have entered, the only path to safety is the path of action. And **this nation will act.**¹

Bush administration's "preventive war" is intertwined with the second principle of the Bush Doctrine, that is to say, that of spreading of U.S.' democratic values. The decision to remove the Iraqi President Saddam Hussein from power went beyond simply "eliminating a possible threat." In fact, according to the Bush administration it was intended to dislodge a tyrant and establish a democratic government in Iraq. In Bush's words:

We're helping to rebuild Iraq, where the dictator built palaces for himself, instead of hospitals and schools. And we will stand with the new leaders of Iraq as they establish a government of, by, and for the Iraqi people. The **transition from dictatorship to democracy** will take time, but it is worth every effort. Our coalition will stay until our work is done. Then we will leave, and we will leave behind a free Iraq.²

On September the eleventh, **enemies of freedom** committed an act of war against our country. Americans have known wars, but for the past 136 years, they have been wars on foreign soil, except for one Sunday in 1941 [...] **freedom** itself is under attack.³

For Bush, freedom, one of the most sacred values in the U.S. Constitution, is "under attack." And those "enemies of freedom" are aiming to attack freedom itself. In these metaphors, 'we find embedded a series of abstractions which are presented as concrete entities: "the enemy" (which in fact was not clearly identified, in national terms) and 'freedom' (which is a concept,

¹ George W. Bush, "Commencement Address at the United States Military Academy in West Point, New York," June 1, 2002. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=62730> (accessed May 21, 2013).

² George W. Bush: "Address to the Nation on Iraq from the U.S.S. *Abraham Lincoln*," May 1, 2003. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=68675> (accessed May 21, 2013).

³ _____, "Address Before a Joint Session of the Congress on the United States Response to the Terrorist Attacks of September 11," September 20, 2001. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=64731> (accessed May 21, 2013).

rather than a physical entity, against which an act of war, a physical action, cannot be committed).'¹

The enemy, therefore, can be understood as being dangerous for the freedom of everybody instead of just being that group which committed the attacks on 11th of September. In other words, through this metaphor the understanding of the Americans to those who committed the attacks is extended and can be understood as “enemies against freedom” as well. This metaphor strengthens Bush’s argument by drawing a logical equality between the 9/11 perpetrators and the “enemies of freedom.”²

2. “The Fairy Tale of the Just War” (All America as a Hero):

As in his father's Iraq war, President Bush has floated two powerful storylines to effectively, and dangerously, frame America as both victim and hero.³

The story of “the good guy” fighting “the bad guys” is, indeed, not new, but a part of U.S. identity dating back to the very founding of the nation. According to Joseph Campos, ‘it could be argued that the terrorist attacks on September 11th tapped into an American imagination of xenophobia and isolationism that had historical credence and viability within the story of the American state [...] each president strategically framed US responses to terrorism within a highly specialized national security discourse.’⁴ This national security discourse is one that presents terrorism as a threat that requires preemptive actions and ‘and legitimizes power relations that act as a field of statecraft in which security becomes a commodity within the control of the state.’⁵ In the wake of 9/11 terrorist attacks security

¹ Antonio Reyes Rodríguez, “Speeches and Declarations: A War of Words,” *Revista Alicantina de Estudios Ingleses*, no. 19 (2006).

² George W. Bush, “Address Before a Joint Session of the Congress on the United States Response to the Terrorist Attacks of September 11,” September 20, 2001. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=64731> (accessed May 21, 2013).

³ Lakoff, George (2003), *Metaphor and War, Again* http://www.alternet.org/story/15414/metaphor_and_war_again (Accessed January 6, 2015).

⁴ Campos Joseph H, *The State and Terrorism: National Security and the Mobilization of Power* (Aldershot, Hants, England: Ashgate Publishing, 2007), 30-2.

⁵ Ibid.

becomes highly sought after and desired, thus allowing states to ‘use terrorism to strengthen their identity and legitimacy.’¹

“The Fairy Tale of the Just War” is an American discourse used to justify its wars between “personified nations.”² It features a villain, a victim, and a hero, sometimes the victim and the hero may be the same.³ The discourse follows a classical fairy tale narrative with the villain committing a sort of crime against the innocent victim, prompting the hero to action. The hero, in his turn, ‘either gathers helpers or goes into combat alone,’⁴ setting out on an epic journey overcoming adversity before defeating the villain in a glorious and righteous fight.⁵ Each of these characters has certain attributes. The hero is moral, brave and rational, while the villain ‘is inherently evil, perhaps even a monster, and thus reasoning with him is out of the question,’ leaving the hero with no other choice but fight.⁶

As a result, according to Lakoff, ‘the enemy-as-demon metaphor arises as a consequence of the fact that we understand what a just war is in terms of this fairy tale.’⁷ In fact, the construction of the enemy as amoral and inhuman is evident in Bush Jr.’s deployment of rhetoric so that to fit in with “The Fairy Tale of the Just War.” The more an enemy is demonized the less a political leader have to worry about his public reputation.⁸ Dehumanizing the enemy helps to legitimize the war, since it is represented as a necessity of defense and a last resort.

¹ Campos Joseph H, *The State and Terrorism: National Security and the Mobilization of Power* (Aldershot, Hants, England: Ashgate Publishing, 2007), 90.

² Lakoff, George (1991) Metaphor and War: The Metaphor System Used to Justify War in the Gulf, http://www2.iath.virginia.edu/sixties/HTML_docs/Texts/Scholarly/Lakoff_Gulf_Metaphor_1.html (Accessed January 6, 2015).

³ Ibid.

⁴ Ibid.

⁵ Ibid.

⁶ Ibid.

⁷ Ibid.

⁸ Ibid.

Lakoff argues that this idea of the just war uses the “Nation as Person” metaphor in addition to two stories: “The Self Defense Story and The Rescue Story.”¹

a. “The Rescue Story:”

A hero myth is fundamental to an American worldview that favors tales of a hero coming to the rescue in times of need.² The hero myth is one that is adapted to support the ideologies of the nation.³ For the Bush administration, the purpose of the war against terrorism was not only to fight the enemies of America or freedom but also to save the Afghans and later the Iraqis (the victims) from their compatriot ‘murderers,’ namely the Taliban regime and Saddam Hussein with his Baathist Party.⁴ After several years of Taliban’s rule in Afghanistan and Hussein’s in Iraq, their peoples are, suddenly, defined by Bush as suffering and in need of liberation.⁵ On different occasions, Bush tried to foster the idea that the coalition are the Afghans and Iraqi people’s saviors:

The oppressed people of Afghanistan will know the generosity of America.⁶ The United States respects the people of Afghanistan. After all, we are currently its largest source of humanitarian aid, but we condemn the Taliban regime. It is not only repressing its own people, it is threatening people everywhere by sponsoring and sheltering and supplying terrorists. By aiding and abetting murder, **the Taliban regime is committing murder.**⁷

[Saddam Hussein] ordered the killing of every person between the ages of 15 and 70 in certain **Kurdish villages in northern Iraq. He has gassed** many Iranians and **40 Iraqi villages.**⁸ This same tyrant [...] has experience in using chemical weapons. He has ordered chemical attacks on Iran, and on more than

¹ Lakoff, George (2003), Metaphor and War, Again
http://www.alternet.org/story/15414/metaphor_and_war_again (Accessed January 6, 2015).

² Ibid.

³ Ibid.

⁴ Ibid.

⁵ Ibid.

⁶ George W. Bush, "Address to the Nation Announcing Strikes Against Al Qaida Training Camps and Taliban Military Installations in Afghanistan," October 7, 2001. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, The American Presidency Project. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=65088> (accessed May 21, 2013).

⁷ _____, "President Bush's address to a joint session of Congress," September 20, 2001, <http://edition.cnn.com/2001/US/09/20/gen.bush.transcript/> (accessed May 21, 2013).

⁸ _____, "President Bush's address to the United Nations," September 12, 2002 <http://edition.cnn.com/2002/US/09/12/bush.transcript/> (accessed May 22, 2013).

forty villages in his own country. These actions **killed or injured** at least **20,000 people, more than six times the number of people who died in the attacks of September 11.**¹

These declarations demonstrate that the Bush-Cheney administration worked to demonize its enemy. The motivations for doing so are obvious. First, they are seeking to arouse their citizen's emotions (pathos, sounding right) so as to win their support, and second, to appear as "the good guy" doing "the right thing." The metaphor The Fairy Tale Of The Just War provides a powerful means of painting such pictures.²

Bush and his administration made a good use of language to create an "evil" image of the enemy. However, their post 9/11 discourse on the war of terror marked a shift in enemy rhetoric 'from depicting an entire people as cruel and inferior to describing the leaders in satanic terms.'³ 'In order to protect the state, terrorists and their actions must be relegated to the status of the barbaric and uncivilized.'⁴ Bush's speeches are rife with examples of this rhetoric. Saddam Hussein, Al Qaeda and Osama bin Laden are all portrayed as "evil itself" as the following table shows:

Table (3): Demonization of the Enemy:

Saddam Hussein	The Taliban Regime
<ul style="list-style-type: none">• There's no question that the leader of Iraq is an evil man. [He] is a homicidal dictator who is addicted to weapons of mass destruction.⁵	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Saudi authorities have also uncovered terrorist operations in the holy city of Mecca, demonstrating once again that

¹George W. Bush, "Don't wait for mushroom cloud," October 8, 2002, CINCINNATI, OHIO <http://edition.cnn.com/2002/ALLPOLITICS/10/07/bush.transcript/> (accessed May 22, 2013).

² Lakoff, George (2003), Metaphor and War, Again http://www.alternet.org/story/15414/metaphor_and_war_again (Accessed January 6, 2015).

³ Brigitte Mral, "The Rhetorical State of Alert before the Iraq War 2003," *Nordicom Review* 27, no. 1 (2006): 49 , http://www.nordicom.gu.se/sites/default/files/kapitel-pdf/226_mral.pdf (Accessed January 6, 2015).

⁴ Campos Joseph H, *The State and Terrorism: National Security and the Mobilization of Power* (Aldershot, Hants, England: Ashgate Publishing, 2007), 14.

⁵George W. Bush, President Bush Outlines Iraqi Threat, Remarks by the President on Iraq, October 7, 2002, Cincinnati Museum Center - Cincinnati Union Terminal, Cincinnati, Ohio <http://2001-2009.state.gov/p/nea/rls/rm/14203.htm>

<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • In this conflict, America faces an enemy who has no regard for conventions of war or rules of morality. Saddam Hussein has placed Iraqi troops and equipment in civilian areas, attempting to use innocent men, women, and children as shields for his own military, a final atrocity against his people.[...] We will not be intimidated by thugs and killers.¹ • [Military campaign] it will be directed against the lawless men who rule your country.² • Iraq's weapons of mass destruction are controlled by a murderous tyrant who has already used chemical weapons to kill thousands of people.³ 	<p>the terrorists hold nothing sacred and have no home in any religion.⁴</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • We value every life, our enemies value none.⁵ • The United States respects the people of Afghanistan - after all, we are currently its largest source of humanitarian aid - but we condemn the Taliban regime. It is not only repressing its own people; it is threatening people everywhere by sponsoring and sheltering and supplying terrorists. By aiding and abetting murder, the Taliban regime is committing murder.⁶
--	---

As shown in the previous table, the demonization of leaders, such as Saddam, is just prevalent. He is described in demonizing terms of lawlessness and lack of honor. In his Address to the Nation (March 2003), Bush describes him as an 'evil men plot chemical biological and

¹ George W. Bush, "Address to the Nation on Iraq," March 19, 2003. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, The American Presidency Project. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=63368> (accessed May 21, 2013).

² _____, "Address to the Nation on Iraq," March 17, 2003. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*, Appendix P39, <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=63713> (accessed May 21, 2013).

³ _____, "Address to the Nation on Iraq From Cincinnati, Ohio," October 7, 2002. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*, Appendix P 41, <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=73139> (accessed May 21, 2013).

⁴ George W. Bush, "Remarks at a Reenlistment Ceremony on the 30th Anniversary of the All-Volunteer Force," July 1, 2003. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. Appendix P 76, <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=63955> (accessed May 21, 2013).

⁵ _____, "Address to the Nation From Ellis Island, New York, on the Anniversary of the Terrorist Attacks of September 11," September 11, 2002. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*, Appendix P 41, <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=62948> (accessed May 21, 2013).

⁶ _____, "Address Before a Joint Session of the Congress on the United States Response to the Terrorist Attacks of September 11," September 20, 2001. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*, Appendix P 81, <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=64731> (accessed May 21, 2013).

nuclear terror.’¹ This rhetorical strategy of demonization and rendering the enemy satanic is a powerful strategy in a country where Christianity holds a big part in people’s daily life.² This representation is a part of a discursive practice justifying the ‘war on terror,’ as the depiction of terrorists ‘as existentially evil,’ creates a space where ‘it becomes fully legitimate to destroy the enemy using all available means.’³

b. “The Self-defense Story:”

In order to convince the American public of the necessity of sending troops to Iraq, President Bush had to use “*the self-defense scenario*” embodied in the search for the weapons of mass destruction.⁴ This war is justified as being for the sake of both the world (self-defense) and the Iraqi people who have been tortured and segregated by the “evil tyrant” Saddam Hussein (saving the victims).⁵

The Bush administration argued that they could in no way ignore the imminent threat that was approaching them. They had the power to turn things around. Undoubtedly, if the citizens were persuaded that they are standing with “the good guy” against “the bad guy” they can tolerate their nation’s involvement in any military conflict, even if it comes at the expense of their own army.⁶ This strategy of dehumanization brings a rationalization to the U.S. oversea interventions.

3. “Conflict Metaphors:”

¹ George W. Bush, “Address to the Nation on Iraq,” March 17, 2003. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*, <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=63713> (accessed May 21, 2013).

² Brigitte Mral, “The Rhetorical State of Alert before the Iraq War 2003,” *Nordicom Review* 27, no. 1 (2006), 50 http://www.nordicom.gu.se/sites/default/files/kapitel-pdf/226_mral.pdf (Accessed January 6, 2015).

³ Ibid.

⁴ Lakoff, George (2003), *Metaphor and War, Again* http://www.alternet.org/story/15414/metaphor_and_war_again (Accessed January 6, 2015).

⁵ Ibid.

⁶ Ibid.

Conflict metaphors imply a type of evaluation because the agent of conflict is positively represented as a heroine – a Boudicca – while that which is struggled against is negatively represented as an alien invading ideology.¹

In the light of this definition provided by Charteris-Black, conflict metaphors involve a conflict between two oppositions, where one part is positively represented, whereas the other is negatively represented.² Conflict metaphors might be dichotomies such as enemy/allies and good/evil.

As the following quote shows, George W. Bush compared the war in Iraq to the situation in Europe during the time of Nazism:³

We cannot fully understand the designs and power of evil. It is enough to know that evil, like goodness, exists. And in the terrorists, evil has found a willing servant. In New York, the terrorists chose as their target a symbol of America's freedom and confidence. Here, they struck a symbol of our strength in the world. And the attack on the Pentagon, on that day, was more symbolic than they knew. **It was on another September 11th September 11th, 1941 that construction on this building first began. America was just then awakening to another menace: The Nazi terror in Europe.** And on that very night, President Franklin Roosevelt spoke to the nation. The danger, he warned, has long ceased to be a mere possibility. The danger is here now. Not only from a military enemy, but from an enemy of all law, all liberty, all morality, all religion. For us too, in the year 2001, an enemy has emerged that rejects every limit of law, morality, and religion. The terrorists have no true home in any country, or culture, or faith. They dwell in dark corners of earth. And there, we will find them.⁴

¹ Jonathan Charteris-Black, *Politicians and Rhetoric: The Persuasive Power of Metaphor* (United Kingdom: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011), 170.

² Ibid.

³ Ibid, 322 – 3.

⁴ George W. Bush, "Remarks at the Department of Defense Service of Remembrance in Arlington, Virginia," October 11, 2001. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, The American Presidency Project. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=73424> (accessed May 21, 2013).

The reason behind drawing such comparison was to increase the understanding of the situation in Bush's audience minds.¹ This is because Nazism is estimated to be more familiar to his audience.² Moreover, Nazism and Hitler constitute the perfect image of the enemy which serves well in shaping the image of the enemy in Iraq.³

This conflict metaphor, increases the understanding of 'the radical network' by drawing a logical parallel between it and the ideologies of Nazism in the 20th century, therefore, communicating a logical argument or logos. Simultaneously, this metaphor could, also, have an emotional impact on the audience. Nazism is, generally, associated with fear in the western mind, as a result, this equality can arouse and enhance the fears of the audience (pathos).⁴

President Bush made use of conflict metaphors since they are described to be 'effective in constructing national identities, heightening the political spectacle and clarifying political decisions so as to encourage the taking of particular political stances.'⁵

CONCLUSION:

As a conclusion, in this chapter we have seen the different rhetorical means used by George W. Bush to persuade his audience. The first highlighted means are the Aristotelian artistic proofs: Ethos (Credibility), or ethical appeal, Pathos (Emotional proof), Logos (Logical proof).⁶ Obviously, President Bush, masterfully, made use of these three artistic proofs in nearly all his speeches.

Furthermore, we can say, that metaphor is one of the rhetorical devices that is used the most by President Bush. We have seen the significant role it played in the discursive practices

¹ Jonathan Charteris-Black, *Politicians and Rhetoric: The Persuasive Power of Metaphor* (United Kingdom: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011), 322 – 3.

² Ibid.

³ Ibid.

⁴ Ibid.

⁵ Ibid.

⁶ Jonathan Charteris-Black, *Politicians and Rhetoric: The Persuasive Power of Metaphor* (United Kingdom: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011).

unfolding in his speeches. Lakoff and Johnson (1980) introduced metaphors as cognitive processes that are commonplace, inescapable, and rooted deep in our cognitive unconscious. Far from merely adding rhetorical flourish to pieces of information, metaphors are viewed as being ‘conceptual in nature’ and essential for the creation of social realities.¹

Lakoff and Johnson explain that conceptual metaphors are the ideas that govern possible metaphorical expressions.² Moreover, they argue that these conceptual metaphors have the ability of revealing patterns of human cognition, showing typical culturally determined understandings of a concept, while metaphorical linguistic expressions are ways in which these understandings are expressed linguistically.³ This view on metaphor as a conceptual phenomenon became the cornerstone of cognitive metaphor theory.

This chapter used metaphors suggested by Lakoff (1991-2003) which pertain to war. The conceptual metaphors pertaining to war provided an understanding of how George W. Bush constructed his “war on terror” based on shared conceptual metaphors, such as The Fairy Tale of the Just War.⁴ here, war is presented metaphorically in an attempt to constitute a discourse that presents the wars as well as the political leaders in charge as “good” and “just,” while the enemy is “demonized” and “dehumanized.”⁵

Once adopted, the war metaphor permitted President Bush to assume war powers, which made him politically immune from criticism and gave him high domestic support to carry on the agenda of his neoconservative administration.

¹ George Lakoff and Mark Johnson, *Metaphors We Live by*, 2nd 2003 ed. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1980), 33.

² Ibid, 12.

³ Ibid.

⁴ Lakoff, George (1991) Metaphor and War: The Metaphor System Used to Justify War in the Gulf, http://www2.iath.virginia.edu/sixties/HTML_docs/Texts/Scholarly/Lakoff_Gulf_Metaphor_2.html (Accessed January 6, 2015).

⁵ Ibid.

CHAPTER THREE:

The War on Terror: The Disguised “Clash of Civilizations”

“Language matters, because it can determine
how we think and act.”

Lakoff & Frisch (2006)

INTRODUCTION:

In this chapter, I will try to show how the “Clash of Civilizations” was metaphorically conceptualized in President Bush’s discourse in the aftermath of 9/11. Moreover, I will show how he managed, with the help of Orientalist conceptual metaphors, to win the support of the American public regarding his war on terror. The argument I put forward in this chapter goes along with that of Memoona Sajjad who claims that George W. Bush’s war on terror was a merely an announced clash of civilizations.

It was not the lack of expertise but rather political correctness, which, in fact, prevented the Bush-Cheney administration from naming its war appropriately.¹ They simply could not too clearly announce that the USA was going to fight militant Islamic radicals because it would be similar to Samuel P. Huntington’s thesis of the Clash of Civilizations.² Bush’s choice of words was very deliberate and likewise ideologically determined. In his war on terror rhetoric, he intended to show positive images of the Self (Us) and negative images of the Other (Them).³

Section One: The Clash of Civilizations and the Orientalist Framework

1. The Orientalist Thoughts In Huntington’s Clash Of Civilizations’ Thesis:

Traditionally and historically speaking, the East or the Orient has been viewed by the West through the lens of Orientalism, and it continues to be so. It is the source of the stereotypical representations of Arabs and Muslims in U.S. political discourse.⁴ Edward Said (1978-1997) was the first to draw attention to these stereotypical representations of Arabs, in particular, and Muslims and Islam, in general. In his book, *Orientalism* (1978), Said, defines

¹ Memoona Sajjad, “A ‘NON WESTERN’ READING OF THE ‘CLASH OF CIVILIZATIONS’ THEORY: Through the Eyes of ‘The Rest,’” *International Journal of Political Science and Development* Vol. 1(2) (October 2013).

² Ibid.

³ Ibid.

⁴ Ibid.

Orientalism as consisting of ‘a body of ideas, beliefs, clichés or learning about the East at large in Western society,’¹

[and] a way of coming to terms with the Orient that is based on the Orient’s special place in European or Western experience. The Orient is not only adjacent to Europe. It is also the place of Europe’s greatest and richest and oldest colonies, the source of its civilizations and languages, its cultural contestant, and one of its deepest and most recurring images of the Other. In addition, the Orient has helped to define Europe (or the West) as its contrasting image, idea, personality, experience. Yet none of this Orient is merely imaginative. The Orient is an integral part of European material civilization and culture. Orientalism expresses and represents that part culturally and even ideologically as a mode of discourse with supporting institutions, vocabulary, scholarship, imagery, doctrines, even colonial bureaucracies and colonial styles.²

Through Orientalism, the Orient is associated with some basic and constant characteristics. Westerners, therefore, began to identify it with these already accorded characteristics.³ These prime characteristics, which were attributed to the Orient at the time of the falling of the Ottoman Empire, were ‘sensuality, despotism, aberrant mentality, inaccuracy, backwardness’⁴ as well as ‘separateness, eccentricity, silent indifference, feminine penetrability, supine malleability.’⁵

Considering these traits as being, basically, Oriental signifies that the Orient was no more than ‘a passive subject to be studied, analyzed, perceived and interpreted.’⁶ In this respect, Said writes, ‘every writer on the Orient... saw the Orient as a locale requiring Western attention, reconstruction, even redemption. The Orient existed as a place isolated from the mainstream of

¹ Edward W. Said, *Orientalism: Western Concepts of the Orient* (New York: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1980), 205.

² Ibid, 1-2.

³ Memoona Sajjad, “A ‘NON WESTERN’ READING OF THE ‘CLASH OF CIVILIZATIONS’ THEORY: Through the Eyes of ‘The Rest,’” *International Journal of Political Science and Development* Vol. 1(2) (October 2013).

⁴ Ibid, 205- 6.

⁵ Ibid.

⁶ Ibid.

European progress in the sciences, arts and commerce.¹ Westerns perceived the Orient as being exotic, therefore, studied it to nurture their curiosity.² To quote Said again:

Along with all other peoples variously designated as backward, degenerate, uncivilized and retarded, the Orientals were viewed [...] having in common an identity best described as lamentably alien. Orientals were rarely seen or looked at; they were seen through, analyzed not as citizens or even people, but as problems to be solved or confined or taken over [...] Since the Oriental was a member of the subject race, he had to be subjected: it was that simple.³

Orientalists have a special and a very important role to play as advisors to governments and often turn into 'special agents of Western power as it attempted policy vis a vis the Orient.'⁴ Since the Second World War, Orientalists had increased their interest in the Arab-Muslim world. However, with the 9/11 attacks Orientalism 'step down from the domain of the intellectual elite and enter into public discourse and street talk.'⁵

Lacking direct experience in the Orient, contrary to the European colonial powers France and Britain, American Orientalism is, completely, based on abstraction.⁶ Yet, it is argued that the USA has a strong alliance with Israel which serves and safeguards its interests in the region.⁷ American Orientalism viewed Muslims in terms of "Us and Them."⁸ During the so-called "war on terror" this view of Islam has 'been standardized as a global paradigm which consists of the ancient, core stereotypes of Islam prevalent in Orientalist discourse.'⁹ Gradually,

¹ Edward W. Said, *Orientalism: Western Concepts of the Orient* (New York: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1980), 207.

² Memoona Sajjad, "A 'Non Western' Reading Of The 'Clash Of Civilizations' Theory: Through the Eyes of 'The Rest,'" *International Journal of Political Science and Development* Vol. 1(2) (October 2013).

³ Ibid.

⁴ Edward W. Said, *Orientalism: Western Concepts of the Orient* (New York: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1980), 223.

⁵ Maryam Sakeenah, *Us Versus Them and Beyond: An Oriental-Islamic Rejoinder to the Clash of Civilizations Theory* (Kuala Lumpur: The Other Press, 2010), 23.

⁶ Ibid, 24.

⁷ Palestine Diary, "Edward Said on Orientalism," *YouTube*, October 28, 2012, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=fVC8EYd_Z_g

⁸ Maryam Sakeenah, *Us Versus Them and Beyond: An Oriental-Islamic Rejoinder to the Clash of Civilizations Theory* (Kuala Lumpur: The Other Press, 2010), 23.

⁹ Maryam Sakeenah, *Us Versus Them and Beyond: An Oriental-Islamic Rejoinder to the Clash of Civilizations Theory* (Kuala Lumpur: The Other Press, 2010), 23.

this new view of the Muslim world as enemy has, gradually, got reinforced, 'so that even the unusual becomes routinized as new events are forced into existing frames of reference. Hence Muslims are "othered" in a mediated world where simplistic notions of good and evil peoples find currency.'¹

It is argued that Orientalism has a great influence on Western policy making.² The Clash of Civilizations thesis is a clear example because, 'owing to Huntington's influence in the Pentagon, his hypothesis with all its baggage of Orientalism is fundamental to American foreign policy. The onus in Huntington's work falls overwhelmingly on Islam. For his viewpoint on Islam, Huntington, in a classical Orientalist gesture, borrows from Bernard Lewis who embodies in his work the essence of modern Orientalism.'³ For Huntington Islam and the West are ancient rivals.⁴ In this respect, Said argues that:

The conflict between Islam and the West, gets the lion's share of Huntington's attention. In this belligerent kind of thought, he relies heavily on a 1990 article by the veteran Orientalist Bernard Lewis, whose ideological colors are manifest in its title, "The Roots of Muslim Rage." In both articles, the personification of enormous entities called "the West" and "Islam" is recklessly affirmed, as if hugely complicated matters like identity and culture existed in a cartoonlike world where Popeye and Bluto bash each other mercilessly, with one always more virtuous pugilist getting the upper hand over his adversary. Certainly, neither Huntington nor Lewis has much time to spare for... the unattractive possibility that a great deal of demagoguery and downright ignorance is involved in presuming to speak for a whole religion or civilization.⁵

In his book(1996), Huntington devotes a whole section to "Islam's bloody borders,"⁶ where he explains that Muslims were, so often, aggressive to the peoples of other civilizations, and they have never coexisted peacefully with their neighbors.⁷ He adds that by the 1990s

¹ Elizabeth Poole and John E. Richardson, *Muslims and the News Media* (LONDON: I B Tauris & Co, 2006), 06.

² Maryam Sakeenah, *Us Versus Them and Beyond: An Oriental-Islamic Rejoinder to the Clash of Civilizations Theory* (Kuala Lumpur: The Other Press, 2010), 27.

³ Ibid.

⁴ Quoted in ibid, 213.

⁵ Edward W. Said, "The Clash of Ignorance," *The Nation* October 22, 2001.

⁶ Samuel P. Huntington, *The Clash of Civilizations: And the Remaking of World Order* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1996), 254.

⁷ Samuel P. Huntington, *The Clash of Civilizations: And the Remaking of World Order* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1996), 254.

Muslims were engaged in more inter-group violence than non-Muslims, and two-thirds to three-quarters of inter-civilizational wars were between Muslims and non-Muslims. Islam's borders are bloody, and so are its innards.¹

2. 'The West Versus the Rest':

In the previous section I tried to show how Huntington based his assumptions on the Orientalist literature, namely, that of Bernard Lewis. This literature considered Muslims as being the backward "Other," threatening the stability and prosperity of the 'self' Westerners.² This is one of the ways which make 'Huntington's perspective of Islam is considerably parallel to Orientalist scholarship's story of conflict rather than dialogue or at least peaceful coexistence between the two worlds.'³

At the beginning of his work, Huntington divided the world into "seven or eight civilizations,' however, he later gathered them up to form only two opposing civilizations: the West and the Rest. In his words, 'with the end of the Cold War, international politics moves out of its Western phase, and its centerpiece becomes the interaction between the West and non-Western civilizations.'⁵Huntington concludes his thesis with several policy recommendations to the West, especially the U.S., in order to preserve and maintain its civilization and its hegemony on the other civilization. These recommendations are as follows:

For Domestic Politics:

- Tightening immigration and assimilating immigrants and minorities in order to increase the civilizational coherence. Otherwise, the US would be a 'cleft country'.

¹ Ibid, 258.

² Maryam Sakeenah, *Us Versus Them and Beyond: An Oriental-Islamic Rejoinder to the Clash of Civilizations Theory* (Kuala Lumpur: The Other Press, 2010), 23.

³ Engin I. Erdem Mr., "The 'Clash of Civilizations': Revisited After September 11," *Alternatives: Turkish Journal of International Relations* 1, no. 2 (2002).

⁴ Samuel P. Huntington, *The Clash of Civilizations: And the Remaking of World Order* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1996), 21.

⁵ Samuel P. Huntington, "The Clash of Civilizations?," *Foreign Affairs* 72, no. 3 (1993).

- Instead of multiculturalism, pursuing the policy of Americanization.
- **For the US Foreign and Security Policy:**
- Maintaining Western technological and military superiority over other civilizations.
- Enhancing Western unity by means of pursuing Atlanticist policy. Hence, the US should empower trans-Atlantic cooperation
- Limiting the expansion of Islamic-Confucian states' military and economic power and exploiting differences between these states.
- Avoiding universalist aspiration since the West is unique, not universalist.
- Not to intervene in the affairs of other civilizations.
- In case of a World War III, which civilizational differences are highly likely to cause, the United States should get Japan, Latin American states, and Russia in her side against potential Islamic-Confucian cooperation.¹

These policy recommendations have received a great amount of attention in both the West and the rest of the world; it has drawn lots of criticisms.² It is worth mentioning the 'fact that Huntington was an advisor to Pentagon in 1994 while his thesis has become so popular in all over the world.'³ For the U.S. neoconservatists, these recommendations fit very well and strengthen their agendas to perpetuate hegemony and the pursuit of strategic interests, meanwhile, gave justifications to post-Cold War American policies.

3. The Impact Of The Clash Of Civilizations' Thesis On The War On Terror:

Erroneous or valid, Huntington's assumptions have had profound impact on international relations. In this respect, James Michael Wilson argues that:

It is important to highlight the fundamentally erroneous assumptions of modern day diplomacy made in his article immortalized in that issue of the Foreign Affairs journal. Seemingly it is not possible to fully argue for or against the thesis Huntington set forth, hence the apparently perpetual debate. The dispute

¹ Engin I. Erdem, "The Clash of Civilizations Revisited", Alternatives Journal of International Relations, Vol.1, No.2, Summer 2002.

² Ibid.

³ Ibid.

is a deeply interesting point to discuss, and one feels it important to stir up the hornets' nest once again.¹

It is agreed that Huntington has created a paradigm shift in international relations. After years of being forgotten, this paradigm reached the surface again with the events of September 11, 2001.² The Clash of Civilizations thesis, therefore, entered the White House discourse, and 'the Islam-West debate was widened and intensified.'³ Moreover, it also received great attention in the media worldwide, as Engin Erdem notes, 'not unexpectedly, the Western media looked at 'Islamic roots' of the terrible attacks. Thereafter, 'Islam,' 'Islamism,' 'political Islam' and 'Islamic fundamentalism' became the most frequently used terms in the media.'⁴

On the morning of September 11, 2001, when the Twin Towers crumbled the Clash of Civilizations thesis seemed to be proven true and gained acceptance instantly.⁵ The falling towers looked like "clashing civilizations materialized."⁶ At that time, Huntington was seen as almost prophetic for his assumptions seem to become true.⁷ The dichotomies of 'us and them', wars between 'our way of life and theirs' went mainstream, rapidly.⁸ The impact of the Clash of Civilizations discourse on the Bush administration discourse is obvious. According to Sakeenah Maryam, in the wake of the "war on terror" the discourse of the White House fostered 'an officialized refrain built on Huntingtonian discourse.'⁹ Following the attacks, the atmosphere that reigned was that of terror, fear, and anxiety, and 'rhetoric built around

¹ James Michael Wilson, "How the West and the Rest Are Permanently Intertwined: A Critique of Samuel P. Huntington's," May 25, 2009, <http://www.e-ir.info/2009/05/25/how-the-west-and-the-rest-are-permanently-intertwined-a-critique-of-samuel-p-huntingtons-the-clash-of-civilizations/> (Accessed January 5, 2015).

² Maryam Sakeenah, *Us Versus Them and Beyond: An Oriental-Islamic Rejoinder to the Clash of Civilizations Theory* (Kuala Lumpur: The Other Press, 2010), 85.

³ Ibid.

⁴ Engin I. Erdem, "The Clash of Civilizations Revisited", *Alternatives Journal of International Relations*, Vol.1, No.2, Summer 2002.

⁵ Memoona Sajjad, "A 'Non Western' Reading Of The 'Clash Of Civilizations' Theory: Through the Eyes of 'The Rest,'" *International Journal of Political Science and Development* Vol. 1(2) (October 2013).

⁶ Ibid.

⁷ Ibid.

⁸ Ibid.

⁹ Maryam Sakeenah, *Us Versus Them and Beyond: An Oriental-Islamic Rejoinder to the Clash of Civilizations Theory* (Kuala Lumpur: The Other Press, 2010), 86.

Huntington's prospect of 'Clashing Civilizations' fit exactly into place.'¹ In this respect, Kim Walker argues that:

Since 9/11, political and cultural climate has become increasingly febrile as governments and their agencies ramp up their rhetoric on terrorism with devastating social and inter-subjective consequences. Terrorism hence becomes a strategic device deployed by a range of actors and entities to manipulate and undermine the 'Western Way of Life.' The rhetoric of terrorism is designed to propagate the politics of fear and anxiety. Our task is not to be cowed down by terrorism's relentless assault on our intellects and sensibilities.²

In the same context, Edward Said points out that the Clash of Civilizations thesis in post 9/11 contributed to the creation of a 'wartime status in the minds of Americans and other [...] It argues from the stand point of Pentagon planners and Defence industry executives, who may have temporarily lost their occupations after the end of the Cold War but have now discovered a new vocation for themselves.'³

Interestingly, while former U.S. president George W. Bush overtly rejected Huntington's Clash of Civilizations thesis on several occasions, including, in his National Security Strategy of 2002, most of his rhetoric following that confirmed his belief in it. The following are just some selected excerpts:

'This is the world's fight. This is a civilization's fight.'⁴
'The civilized world is rallying to America's side.'⁵
'The civilized world faces unprecedented dangers.'⁶

¹ Ibid.

² Kim Walker, "Alert but Not Alarmed? The Rhetoric of Terrorism and Life After 9/11," *Contemporary Nurse* 21, no. 2 (May 2006): 267–276.

³ Edward W. Said, *The Myth of the Clash of Civilizations*, (University of Massachusetts, Amherst, 1998), 03.

⁴ George W. Bush, "Address Before a Joint Session of the Congress on the United States Response to the Terrorist Attacks of September 11," September 20, 2001. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, The American Presidency Project, <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=647311>, (April 19th, 2013).

⁵ _____, "Address Before a Joint Session of the Congress on the United States Response to the Terrorist Attacks of September 11," September 20, 2001. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=647311> (accessed May 30, 2013).

⁶ George W. Bush, "Address Before a Joint Session of the Congress on the State of the Union," January 29, 2002. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=29644> (accessed May 30, 2014).

‘Our way of life and our very freedom came under attack.’¹

‘Today, our nation saw evil, the worst of human nature, and we responded with the best of America. We stand together to win the War against Terrorism. We go forward to defend freedom and all that is good and just in our world.’²

‘And we’re now called to defend freedom, and our allies understand that. And the United States military understands that, and freedom we will defend with all our might.’³

‘The heirs of all the murderous ideologies of the twentieth century’

‘This is the world's fight. This is civilization's fight. This is the fight of all who believe in progress and pluralism, tolerance and freedom.’⁴

In the light of the already cited fragments, Bush implied that the attack on America is an attack on “democracy and civilization itself,” a theme that keeps recurring in his many speeches even in the years following the attack. The “war on terror” was interpreted as a defense of civilization, democracy and freedom rather than a response to the surprising 9/11 assaults.

This discourse of defending civilization, also, emphasizes the necessity for action as a response to the threat to U.S. security and to its citizens, consequently, serving as a perfect tool in the scheme of legitimizing Bush’s war appeals. As a matter of fact, his post 9/11 speeches contain statements as ‘the war on terror would be a lengthy way, a different kind of war fought on many fronts in many places,’⁵ Bush foregrounds the novelty of “terrorist warfare” and the need to bring the war to all corners of the world. He argues that ‘these enemies view the entire

¹George W. Bush, “Address to the Nation on the Terrorist Attacks,” September 11, 2001. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=58057> (accessed May 30, 2014).

²_____, “Address to the Nation on the Terrorist Attacks,” September 11, 2001. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=58057> (accessed May 30, 2014).

³_____, “Remarks to the Troops at Osan Air Base in Seoul,” February 21, 2002. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=64173> (accessed May 30, 2014).

⁴_____, “Address Before a Joint Session of the Congress on the United States Response to the Terrorist Attacks of September 11,” September 20, 2001. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=64731> (accessed May 30, 2014).

⁵George W. Bush, “Address to the Nation on the War on Terror,” September 7, 2003. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*, <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=64561> (accessed May 30, 2013).

world as a battlefield, and we must pursue them wherever they are’¹ and ‘in this new kind of war, civilians find themselves suddenly on the front lines.’² These quotes are centered on establishing the “war on terror” as a new form of war different from the previous ones. All these declarations had one main goal which was providing the key arguments for entering Iraq in March 2003.³

Soon after President Bush launched the U.S. air strikes against Afghanistan, he declared, ‘we’re a peaceful nation,’⁴ and ‘this is the calling of the United States of America, the most free nation in the world, a nation built on fundamental values, that rejects hate, rejects violence, rejects murderers, rejects evil. And we will not tire.’⁵ His language, therefore, exemplified a clash of the United States of America, which is presented as the heart of Western civilization believing in democracy, freedom, and peace, against an “evil” “Islamic” civilization determined to demolish all that.⁶ Bush presented America’s strategy to fight the “war on terror” as his nation’s mission to save the ‘Western Way of Life.’⁷ Accordingly, the dichotomy “evil” as opposed to “good” kept recurring in the White House’s discourse.⁸ Edward Said remarks that, to preserve its national interests, the United States, calls “terrorism” any threat to it, including its oil interests in the Middle East. Moreover, according to it, ‘terrorism is magnified

¹ George W. Bush, "Address Before a Joint Session of the Congress on the State of the Union," January 29, 2002. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, The American Presidency Project. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=29644> (accessed May 30, 2014).

² _____, "Remarks on the Anniversary of Operation Iraqi Freedom," March 19, 2004. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, The American Presidency Project. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=72580> (accessed May 30, 2014).

³ Michael dunn, "'the clash of civilizations' and 'the war on terror,'" *49th parallel* Vol.20 (Winter 2006-2007). n.d., 03.

⁴ George W. Bush, "Address to the Nation Announcing Strikes Against Al Qaida Training Camps and Taliban Military Installations in Afghanistan," October 7, 2001. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=65088> (accessed May 30, 2014).

⁵ _____, "Remarks Announcing the Most Wanted Terrorists List," October 10, 2001. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=73422> (accessed May 30, 2014).

⁶ Memoona Sajjad, "A 'NON WESTERN' READING OF THE 'CLASH OF CIVILIZATIONS' THEORY: Through the Eyes of 'The Rest,'" *International Journal of Political Science and Development* Vol. 1(2) (October 2013).

⁷ Ibid.

⁸ Memoona Sajjad, "A 'NON WESTERN' READING OF THE 'CLASH OF CIVILIZATIONS' THEORY: Through the Eyes of 'The Rest,'" *International Journal of Political Science and Development* Vol. 1(2) (October 2013).

and blown up to insensate proportions[...] this focus obscures the enormous damage done by the U.S militarily, environmentally, economically on a world scale which far dwarfs anything terrorism might do.’¹

Not surprisingly, after 9/11, the clashing civilizations rhetoric ‘has revived the Crusade mentality,’² especially when Bush declared ‘this crusade, this war on terrorism is going to take a while.’³ Consequently, all the stereotypes and clichés previously accorded to the Muslims and Islam began to reappear, and this led the Westerners to consider them as being the “Other” and the “enemy” at the same time.⁴ In this respect, Kyle Fedler explains that ‘when we demonize our enemies we see ourselves as totally righteous and the abstract enemy as totally evil.’⁵

Following the 9/11 events, Bush was addressing a nation that found itself in a war seen by many as a religious war between the Christian, Western democratic U.S. and the Muslim, despotic Middle East.⁶ This gave President Bush a good argument for his “war on terror.” In this respect, Charteris-Black says that ‘religious belief has always been an acceptable pretext for political action in American politics’⁷ and ‘the rhetorical objective of choosing words from

¹ Edward W. Said, "They Call All Resistance Terrorism," (September 2001), *International Socialist Review*, no. http://isreview.org/issues/19/Said_part2.shtml (accessed March 25, 2015).

² Memoona Sajjad, "A 'NON WESTERN' READING OF THE 'CLASH OF CIVILIZATIONS' THEORY: Through the Eyes of 'The Rest,'" *International Journal of Political Science and Development* Vol. 1(2) (October 2013).

³ George W. Bush: "Remarks on Arrival at the White House and an Exchange With Reporters," September 16, 2001. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=63346> (accessed March 1, 2015).

⁴ Memoona Sajjad, "A 'NON WESTERN' READING OF THE 'CLASH OF CIVILIZATIONS' THEORY: Through the Eyes of 'The Rest,'" *International Journal of Political Science and Development* Vol. 1(2) (October 2013).

⁵ Kyle Fedler, "On the Rhetoric of a War on Terror," www.crosscurrents.org September 2001. (Accessed January 30, 2014).

⁶ Maryam Sakeenah, *Us Versus Them and Beyond: An Oriental-Islamic Rejoinder to the Clash of Civilizations Theory* (Kuala Lumpur: The Other Press, 2010), 96.

⁷ Jonathan Charteris-Black, *Politicians and Rhetoric: The Persuasive Power of Metaphor* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004), 136.

the domain of religion is to enhance the ethos of the speaker because they imply that political decisions are made on the basis of high principle rather than crude self-interest.’¹

Many observers interpreted Bush’s appeals for action in the Middle East as being his “personal crusade” and accused him of willing to finish his father’s Gulf War at the same time.² Through his use of religious discourse, Bush aimed ‘to create a myth of a political leadership as equivalent to spiritual guidance’³ setting himself as the righteous leader. According to Jonathan Charteris-Black, it is the Valiant Leader Myth which is played out. A technique that portrays the leader, President Bush in this case, as ‘benevolent and is effective in saving people from danger.’⁴

SECTION TWO: METAPHOR AND GEORGE W. BUSH’S WAR ON TERROR:

1. Conceptualizing the Other via Metaphor:

Obviously, metaphor was not the cause of the “war on terror;” however, it was constructed with its help.⁵ Dwight Bolinger notes that the “loaded weapons” that is to say, stereotypes and fear metaphors, helped in the creation of the Other.⁶ For him, it would have been next to impossible to persuade the audience of the necessity of invading Iraq to prevent it from developing a program of weapons of mass destruction.⁷

¹ Ibid.

² Daniel Lieberfeld, “Theories Of Conflict And The Iraq War,” *International Journal of Peace Studies* 10, no. 2 (2005), 14, (accessed December 18, 2016), http://www.gmu.edu/programs/icar/ijps/vol10_2/wLieberfeld10n2IJPS.pdf.

³ Jonathan Charteris-Black, *Politicians and Rhetoric: The Persuasive Power of Metaphor* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004), 137.

⁴ Ibid, 25.

⁵ Sandikcioglu Esra, “Orientalism - the Ideology Behind the Metaphorical Gulf War,” accessed December 18, 2016, <http://www.tulane.edu/~howard/LangIdeo/Sandikcioglu/Sandikcioglu.html>.

⁶ Dwight Bolinger, *Language, the Loaded Weapon: The Use and Abuse of Language Today*, 2nd ed. (New York: Longman, 1980).

⁷ Dwight Bolinger, *Language, the Loaded Weapon: The Use and Abuse of Language Today*, 2nd ed. (New York: Longman, 1980).

George Lakoff argues that there is a ‘system of metaphor that we use automatically and unreflectively to understand complexities and abstractions’¹ and part of this system is ‘devoted to understanding international relations and war.’² Based on this understanding of metaphor, it is interesting to comprehend the metaphorical thought implied in the “war on terror.” Lakoff considers the use of conceptual metaphors and metaphor systems in the war on Iraq as an “Idealized Cognitive Model.”³

In this section, Orientalism is considered as an “Idealized Cognitive Model”⁴ which characterizes the relationship between the West and the Orient encompassing the West’s view of itself as being superior to the Othered Orient.⁵ By doing so, Iraq will be conceptualized as the incarnation of the Orient and thereby justify a specific political and military approach to the conflict which exemplifies the historical relationship between the West and the Orient.⁶

Orientalist metaphors hold the power of painting that scary image of Muslims and Islam, which provides a valid justification to launching war against them in order to preserve the Western civilization and the West’s way of life.⁷ There must be no doubt that those metaphors are very powerful.⁸ As Lakoff and Johnson point out ‘people in power get to impose their metaphors.’⁹ Especially, ‘in the context of foreign policy those who act as mediators

¹Lakoff George (1991) “Metaphor and War: The Metaphor System Used to Justify War in the Gulf,” http://www2.iath.virginia.edu/sixties/HTML_docs/Texts/Scholarly/Lakoff_Gulf_Metaphor_1.html

² Ibid.

³ An Idealized Cognitive Model, or ICM, is the name given in cognitive linguistics to describe the phenomenon in which knowledge represented in a semantic frame is often a conceptualization of experience that is not congruent with reality. It has been proposed by scholars such as George Lakoff and Gilles Fauconnier.

⁴ Lakoff George, *Women, Fire and Dangerous Things: What Categories Reveal about the Mind*(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1987).

⁵ Sandikcioglu Esra, “Orientalism - the Ideology Behind the Metaphorical Gulf War,” accessed December 18, 2016, <http://www.tulane.edu/~howard/Langldeo/Sandikcioglu/Sandikcioglu.html>.

⁶ Sandikcioglu Esra, “Orientalism - the Ideology Behind the Metaphorical Gulf War,” accessed December 18, 2016, <http://www.tulane.edu/~howard/Langldeo/Sandikcioglu/Sandikcioglu.html>.

⁷ Ibid.

⁸ Sandikcioglu Esra, “Orientalism - the Ideology Behind the Metaphorical Gulf War,” accessed December 18, 2016, <http://www.tulane.edu/~howard/Langldeo/Sandikcioglu/Sandikcioglu.html>.

⁹ George Lakoff and Mark Johnson, *Metaphors We Live By* (1980), (Chicago : University of Chicago Press, 2nd ed., 2003), 157.

between the individual and the rest of the world, serve as a filter in the sense that they control both what we perceive and most importantly how we perceive it.’¹

Lakoff and Johnson (1980) highlighted the point that metaphor is not a ‘matter of mere language,’² they explain that:

Our ordinary conceptual system, in terms of which we both think and act, is fundamentally metaphorical in nature. [...] Our concepts structure what we perceive, how we get around in the world, and how we relate to other people. Our conceptual system thus plays a central role in defining our everyday realities.³

The conceptualization of Iraqis as the perfect representative of the Orientals, from one hand, and the Americans as the representative of the Westerners, on the other, led to the creation of conventional metaphors based on the Orientalist frame work.⁴ These conventional metaphors can be considered as “metaphors we live by” as they ‘structure our actions and thoughts,’⁵ and they, in Lakoff’s and Johnson’s words,

can have the power to define reality. They do this through a coherent network of entailments that highlight some features of reality and hide others. The acceptance of the metaphor which forces us to focus only on those aspects of our experience that it highlights, leads us to view the entailments of the metaphor as being true. Such “truths” may be true, of course, only relative to the reality defined by the metaphor.⁶

Since these metaphors can hide some aspects of the concept and highlight some others, President Bush was obliged to highlight his good intentions so as to be able to hide his the real ones. To do so, it often, ‘requires reinterpreting political reality to match the respective images of Self and Other. And this is where metaphors come into the picture, each of the Orientalist

¹ Sandikcioglu Esra, “Orientalism - the Ideology Behind the Metaphorical Gulf War,” accessed December 18, 2016, <http://www.tulane.edu/~howard/LangIdeo/Sandikcioglu/Sandikcioglu.html>.

² Ibid., 145.

³ Ibid., 03.

⁴ Ibid.

⁵ George Lakoff and Mark Johnson, *Metaphors We Live By* (1980), (Chicago : University of Chicago Press, 2nd ed., 2003), 55.

⁶ Ibid, 157-8.

frames with its specific set of metaphors offers a partial explanation for the 9/11 attacks and the West's response to it.'¹ In the context of the 'war on terror,' this meant that Bush (and his allies) supported by the media, were using Orientalist metaphorical conceptualizations of the Other in order to win public support for the U.S.-led military action against a threat to 'our way of life.'²

2. The Orientalist Framework: Us Vs. Them:

After the collapse of the Soviet Union, the West has come to be a synonym for the powerful, while the East represents the weak.³ The Orient is definitely weak since it belongs to the East and so are the Islamic countries for they are part of the Orient.⁴ The two worlds, Us and Them, represents the two categories, characterizing the Us-Them dichotomy. Basically, Orientalism is built on contrasting images between the two worlds, offering positive images of the "Self" and negative images of the "Other."⁵ The construction of the "Self" 'is 'characterized by a belief in the superiority of one's own identity and a willingness to both maintain and defend this perceived contrast against perceived enemies.'⁶ Explaining the relation between the West and the Orient Said (1996) argues that:

From at least the end of the eighteenth century until our own day, modern Occidental reactions to Islam have been dominated by a radically simplified type of thinking that may still be called Orientalist. The general basis of Orientalist thought is an imaginative and yet drastically polarized geography dividing the world into two unequal parts, the larger, "different" one called the Orient, the other, also known as "our" world, called the Occident or the West.⁷

¹ Sandikcioglu Esra, "Orientalism - the Ideology Behind the Metaphorical Gulf War," accessed December 18, 2016, <http://www.tulane.edu/~howard/LangIdeo/Sandikcioglu/Sandikcioglu.html>.

² George W. Bush, "The President's News Conference With Prime Minister Tony Blair of the United Kingdom in London," November 20, 2003. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, The American Presidency Project. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=824> (accessed May 1, 2015).

³ Ibid.

⁴ Sandikcioglu Esra, "Orientalism - the Ideology Behind the Metaphorical Gulf War," accessed December 18, 2016, <http://www.tulane.edu/~howard/LangIdeo/Sandikcioglu/Sandikcioglu.html>.

⁵ Ibid.

⁶ Ibid.

⁷ Edward W. Said, *Covering Islam: How the Media and the Experts Determine How We See the Rest of the World*, 2nd ed. (London: Vintage, 1996), 47.

The general structure of the Orientalist framework works as follows: (1) it represents the origin of clichéd thought in the perceptions of Self as superior and the Other as inferior that needs, always, assistance and care;¹ (2) there exist a certain number of Orientalist frames, prearranged as interrelated frames of Self-presentation and Other-representation;² and (3) these prearranged frames of Self-presentation and Other-representation are to be implemented by conceptual metaphors such as Nation-adults and Nation-children, where the West are mature nations and the Orient (Arab/Muslim countries) are immature nations.³

During Bush's "war on terror," 'Iraq, despite being the cradle of civilization, is seen via this metaphor as a kind of defiant armed teenage hoodlum who refuses to abide by the rules and must be "taught a lesson."' ⁴ The use of such conceptualizations of the "Self" and the "Other" has a rhetorical effect in the context of international relations, in fact, 'the context, framework, setting of any discussion [...] [is] limited, indeed frozen, by these ideas.'⁵ Said differently, these 'black-and-white images of *Us* and *Them* were used to explain what had happened in the Middle East and to justify what had to happen in response [...] many had come to accept the inevitable or what seemed inevitable, since even the most strident critics of war would identify with *Us*—as presented in the following Orientalist frames—rather than with *Them*.'⁶ Table (4), therefore, presents the most prominent frames that have emerged from the analysis of data material collected (Selected Speeches of George W. Bush):

US	THEM
• Civilization/civilized	• Barbarism/despotism
• Power/strong	• Weakness/fragility

¹ Sandikcioglu Esra, "Orientalism - the Ideology Behind the Metaphorical Gulf War," accessed December 18, 2016, <http://www.tulane.edu/~howard/LangIdeo/Sandikcioglu/Sandikcioglu.html>.

² Ibid.

³ Lakoff, George, Metaphor And War, Again, March 17, 2003, News and Politics, Alternet http://www.alternet.org/story/15414/metaphor_and_war_again (Accessed March 13, 2015).

⁴ Ibid.

⁵ Edward W. Said, *Culture and Imperialism* (London: Vintage, 1994), 295.

⁶ Sandikcioglu Esra, "Orientalism - the Ideology Behind the Metaphorical Gulf War," accessed December 18, 2016, <http://www.tulane.edu/~howard/LangIdeo/Sandikcioglu/Sandikcioglu.html>.

• Maturity/adult	• Immaturity/children
• Rationality	• Irrationality

Table (4): Orientalist Frames (Dichotomous Categories)

a) Civilization vs. Barbarism:

This omnipresent dichotomy is based on the conceptual metaphors “Orientals are Barbarians; Westerners are Civilized” and “the Oriental is immoral; the Westerner is moral.”¹ Saddam Hussein, therefore, would also be seen as heir to countless Oriental rulers who in ancient times had attempted to defeat or actually succeeded in defeating the Judeo-Christian West. Saddam is then given the characteristic of Orientals i.e. cowardice and cruelty.² In fact, he was conceptualized, as shown in the following speeches’ excerpts, by Bush as a prototypical immoral, inhuman, and a blood- thirsty leader.³

The regime is **actively pursuing** components for **prohibited ballistic missiles**. And we have sources that tell us that **Saddam Hussein** recently **authorized Iraqi field commanders to use chemical weapons**, the very weapons **the dictator** tells the world he does not have [...] **The dictator of Iraq** is making his choice. Now the nations of the Security Council must make their own. ⁴ **He's used weapons of mass destruction on his own people.**⁵

In this conflict, American and coalition forces face **enemies** who **have no regard for the conventions of war or rules of morality**. **Iraqi officials** have **placed troops and equipment in civilian areas**, attempting to use innocent men, women, and children as shields for the dictator's army. I want Americans and all the world to know that **coalition forces will make every effort to spare innocent civilians from harm.**⁶

The dictator's regime has ruled by fear and continues to use fear as a tool of domination to the end. Many **Iraqis** have been ordered to fight or **die by Saddam's death squads**. Others are pressed into service by threats against their children. Iraqi

¹ Ibid.

² Sandikcioglu Esra, “Orientalism - the Ideology Behind the Metaphorical Gulf War,” accessed December 18, 2016, <http://www.tulane.edu/~howard/LangIdeo/Sandikcioglu/Sandikcioglu.html>.

³ Ibid.

⁴ George W. Bush, "Remarks on the Iraqi Regime's Noncompliance With United Nations Resolutions," February 6, 2003. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=62796> (accessed May 30, 2014).

⁵ _____, "Remarks to the American Medical Association National Conference," March 4, 2003. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=64796> (accessed May 30, 2014).

⁶ George W. Bush, The President's Radio Address, March 22, 2003. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=25127>

civilians attempting to flee to liberated areas **have been shot and shelled from behind by Saddam's thugs**. Schools and hospitals have been used to store military equipment. They serve as bases for military operations. **Iraqis** who show friendship toward coalition troops are **murdered in cold blood by the regime's enforcers**.¹

With nuclear arms or a full arsenal of chemical and biological weapons, Saddam Hussein could resume his ambitions of conquest in the Middle East and create deadly havoc in that region.²

Our Nation is at war.... and **the civilized world** faces unprecedented dangers. Iraq continues to flaunt its hostility toward America and to support terror. The **Iraqi regime has plotted to develop anthrax and nerve gas and nuclear weapons** for over a decade. **This is a regime that has already used poison gas to murder thousands of its own citizens, leaving the bodies of mothers huddled over their dead children.** This is a regime that agreed to international inspections, then kicked out the inspectors. **This is a regime that has something to hide from the civilized world.**³

We're fighting an enemy that knows no rules of law, that will wear civilian uniforms, that is willing to kill in order to continue the reign of fear of Saddam Hussein. But we're fighting with bravery and courage.⁴ (Bold type is mine)

In spite of Bush's insistence on peace conditions that the U.S. knew were unacceptable to Saddam Hussein, he would still be cast as a benevolent leader who was in pursuit of peace:⁵

I've just met with our leaders here at the Pentagon, who are monitoring the course of our battle **to free Iraq** and rid that country of weapons of mass destruction. Our coalition is on a steady advance. We're making good progress.⁶

The people of **our Armed Forces** are serving at a crucial period for America and **for all free nations**. We're at war with terrorists who hate what **we stand for, liberty, democracy, tolerance, and the rights and dignity of every person**. We're a peaceful nation, yet we are prepared to confront any danger. We are fighting the terrorists in Iraq

¹ _____, Remarks at the Port of Philadelphia in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, March 31, 2003. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=64485> (accessed May 30, 2014).

² _____, Address Before a Joint Session of the Congress on the State of the Union, January 28, 2003. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=29645> (accessed May 30, 2014).

³ George W. Bush, "Address Before a Joint Session of the Congress on the State of the Union, January 29, 2002. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=29644> (accessed May 30, 2014).

⁴ _____, "Remarks at the Pentagon in Arlington, Virginia, March 25, 2003. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=64771> (accessed May 30, 2014).

⁵ Sandikcioglu Esra, "Orientalism - the Ideology Behind the Metaphorical Gulf War," accessed December 18, 2016, <http://www.tulane.edu/~howard/Langldeo/Sandikcioglu/Sandikcioglu.html>.

⁶ George W. Bush, Remarks at the Pentagon in Arlington, Virginia, March 25, 2003. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=64771> (accessed May 30, 2014).

and Afghanistan and in other parts of the world so we do not have to fight them on the streets of our own cities. And we will win.¹

September the 11th was not the beginning of global terror, but [...] **a day of decision when the civilized world was stirred to anger and to action** [...] **A mighty coalition of civilized nations** is now defending our common security [...] By driving terrorists from place to place, we disrupt the planning and training for further attacks on **America and the civilized world** [...] **Every nation should know that for America**, the war on terror is not just a policy; it's a pledge. **I will not relent in this struggle for the freedom and security of my country and the civilized world.**² (Bold type is mine)

b) Power vs. Weakness; Maturity Vs. Immaturity:

These dichotomies consist of the conceptual metaphor “the Oriental is a child; the Westerner is an adult.”³ As in the preceding dichotomy, here also, ‘the relationship between the Orient (Iraq) and the West (USA) is not a one between equals. Rather, one party holds the control and the other is controlled.’⁴ In the case of the adult-child relationship, the Oriental (Saddam Hussein) is conceptualized as someone ‘who need to be taught how to develop properly and to be disciplined when they fail to follow instructions.’⁵ This metaphor suggests, on the one hand, that Orientals, like children, ‘have a lower level of knowledge and experience in this world. The Westerner, on the other hand, is conceptualized as culturally, politically, and economically advanced i.e. in a position to educate, instruct, and guide.’⁶ Based on this conceptual metaphor, the nation-child is supposed to reach the same state of development as the nation-adult through a whole process of formation and education. The nation-adult, in its

¹ _____, "Remarks to Military Personnel at Fort Carson, Colorado," November 24, 2003. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=64913> (accessed May 30, 2014).

² _____, "Remarks on the Six-Month Anniversary of the September 11th Attacks," March 11, 2002. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=63061> (accessed May 30, 2014).

³ Lakoff, George, *Metaphor And War, Again*, March 17, 2003, News and Politics, Altnet http://www.altnet.org/story/15414/metaphor_and_war_again (Accessed March 13, 2015).

⁴ Sandikcioglu Esra, "Orientalism - the Ideology Behind the Metaphorical Gulf War," accessed December 18, 2016, <http://www.tulane.edu/~howard/Langldeo/Sandikcioglu/Sandikcioglu.html>.

⁵ Lakoff, George, *Metaphor And War, Again*, March 17, 2003, News and Politics, Altnet http://www.altnet.org/story/15414/metaphor_and_war_again (Accessed March 13, 2015).

⁶ Ibid.

turn, is expected to be unselfish, and have just one objective, which is the teaching and guidance of the unexperienced nation-children.¹

However, to achieve this, nation-adults have to be patient as the nation-children lack the knowledge and experience that would allow them to take the right decisions.² It is also, understood in this conceptualization that sometimes nation-children can become a source of problems if they do not follow the rules.³ In this case, they must be punished through sanctions (such as economic sanctions). Therefore, the U.S. invasion of Iraq was not only conceptualized as an act of restoring justice and freeing the Iraqis from the “child” Saddam Hussein, but also as a lesson in international politics, especially, to nation-children category. The subsequent quotes illustrate how Bush conceptualized Saddam and his nation in terms of nation-child metaphor:

The world has now come together to say that **the outlaw regime in Iraq will not be permitted to build or possess chemical, biological, or nuclear weapons.**⁴

Our Nation enters this conflict reluctantly. Yet our purpose is sure. The **people of the United States and our friends and allies will not live at the mercy of an outlaw regime that threatens the peace** with weapons of mass murder [....] In this conflict, **America faces an enemy who has no regard for conventions of war or rules of morality. Saddam Hussein has placed Iraqi troops and equipment in civilian areas**, attempting to use innocent men, women, and children as shields for his own military, **a final atrocity against his people.** I want Americans and all the world to know that coalition forces will make every effort to spare innocent civilians from harm.⁵

The world is also uniting to answer the unique and urgent threat posed **by Iraq, whose dictator has already used weapons of mass destruction to kill thousands. We must not and will not permit either terrorists or tyrants to blackmail freedom-loving nations.**⁶ (Bold type is mine)

¹ Ibid.

² Sandikcioglu Esra, “Orientalism - the Ideology Behind the Metaphorical Gulf War,” accessed December 18, 2016, <http://www.tulane.edu/~howard/Langldeo/Sandikcioglu/Sandikcioglu.html>.

³ Ibid.

⁴ George W. Bush, "Remarks on the Passage of a United Nations Security Council Resolution on Iraq," November 8, 2002. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=73175> (accessed May 30, 2014).

⁵ _____, “Address to the Nation on Iraq,” March 19, 2003. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=63368> (accessed May 30, 2014).

⁶ _____, "The President's Radio Address," November 23, 2002. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=25040>

The asymmetry inherent in this relationship is that the “adult” is in a position to determine everything, i.e. “establishing the rules/laws”, “educating and teaching”, “guiding” then “evaluating the performance” of the “child.”¹ The conceptualization of the U.S. as a strict/controlling “Nation-Adult” implies the notion that adults sometimes have “to be cruel or use force” in order to achieve certain instructive objectives.² Not handling Iraq’s “possession of WMD” through negotiation was considered to be the best way to achieve the instructive objective, i.e. maintaining the control of the “adult.”³

c) Rationality vs. Irrationality:

This dichotomy depends on two main clichés “Orientals are emotional, therefore, irrational” and “Westerners are rational.”⁴ According to Lakoff’s “Rational Actor Model,” ‘countries act naturally in their own best interests, preserving their assets, that is, their own populations, their infrastructure, their wealth, their weaponry, and so on.’⁵ Accordingly, the Orient is conceptualized as being ruled by irrational leaders rather than by rational ones, and the implication is that ‘this is simply a case of cultural difference, i.e. something that cannot be changed and has to be accepted when dealing with Orientals.’⁶

Applying this understanding to the Iraqi war renders negotiations between the U.S. President and his Iraqi counterpart meaningless. In this respect, Bush declared: ‘if we go into battle, as a last resort, we will confront an enemy capable of irrational miscalculations, capable

¹ Sandikcioglu Esra, “Orientalism - the Ideology Behind the Metaphorical Gulf War,” accessed December 18, 2016, <http://www.tulane.edu/~howard/LangIdeo/Sandikcioglu/Sandikcioglu.html>.

² Lakoff, George, Metaphor And War, Again, March 17, 2003, News and Politics, Alternet http://www.alternet.org/story/15414/metaphor_and_war_again (Accessed March 13, 2015).

³ Ibid.

⁴ Sandikcioglu Esra, “Orientalism - the Ideology Behind the Metaphorical Gulf War,” accessed December 18, 2016, <http://www.tulane.edu/~howard/LangIdeo/Sandikcioglu/Sandikcioglu.html>.

⁵ Lakoff, George, Metaphor And War, Again, March 17, 2003, News and Politics, Alternet http://www.alternet.org/story/15414/metaphor_and_war_again (Accessed March 13, 2015).

⁶ Sandikcioglu Esra, “Orientalism - the Ideology Behind the Metaphorical Gulf War,” accessed December 18, 2016, <http://www.tulane.edu/~howard/LangIdeo/Sandikcioglu/Sandikcioglu.html>.

of terrible deeds.’¹ In the light of this declaration, an obvious asymmetry remains in the conceptualization of Saddam Hussein as ruling his country by irrationality rather than by logic.

Lakoff, in his turn, interprets this fact as the nation-child which surpassed its tutor (the nation-adult). He points out that the decisions of Iraqi leader and his political moves were perfectly in line with ‘rationality [that] is the maximization of self-interest.’² Following Lakoff’s “Rational Actor Model,” Saddam was in the right path, however, according to the previous metaphor, nation-adult, he did not obey to the rules, therefore, he is considered as an “outlaw” and he must be punished.

By highlighting these cognitive contrasted images between Saddam Hussein “image of the Oriental leader” and George W. Bush “image of the Western leader,” and keep repeating them ‘over and over again, the American public gradually came to accept the dismissal of diplomatic efforts in favor of a military option as inevitable.’³ Leading the way, therefore, to the execution of Bush’s plan for Iraq:

These attacks are not **inevitable**. They are, however, possible. And this very fact underscores the reason **we cannot live under the threat of blackmail. The terrorist threat to America and the world will be diminished the moment that Saddam Hussein is disarmed [...]**The only way to reduce the harm and duration of war is to apply the full force and might of our military, and we are prepared to do so.⁴ (Bold type is mine)

3. Frames of “Self-Presentation” vs. Frames of “Other-Representation:”

¹ George W. Bush, Remarks on Signing the Authorization for Use of Military Force Against Iraq Resolution of 2002, October 16, 2002. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=73153>

² Lakoff George (1991) “Metaphor and War: The Metaphor System Used to Justify War in the Gulf,” http://www2.iath.virginia.edu/sixties/HTML_docs/Texts/Scholarly/Lakoff_Gulf_Metaphor_1.html

³ Sandikcioglu Esra, “Orientalism - the Ideology Behind the Metaphorical Gulf War,” accessed December 18, 2016, <http://www.tulane.edu/~howard/LangIdeo/Sandikcioglu/Sandikcioglu.html>.

⁴ George W. Bush, “Address to the Nation on Iraq,” March 17, 2003. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=63713>

The conceptual metaphors deriving from the frames of “Self-presentation” and “Other-representation” reveal a controlling view of the West “Us” regarding the Orient “Them.”¹ Framing images aims to presenting simplified explanations of a complex cultural and political reality.²

By identifying with images that are attributed to the West such as democracy, freedom, and human rights, the Western public finds it easier to accept and support the decisions taken by their government, including that of engaging them in war.³ On the other hand, by associating Orientals with ‘undemocratic,’ ‘archaic political and social systems, launching a war on them is given another dimension, that of serving a humane objective, that is to say, freeing the Iraqi people from hands of their ‘tyrant’ leader.⁴ President Bush achieved his objective in launching his global ‘war on terror’ through the use of Orientalist metaphors which contrasted the positive ‘Self-presentation’ of the U.S. with the negative ‘Other-representation’ of Iraq, its leader, and its army as well as of Orientals, in general.

CONCLUSION:

As a conclusion to this chapter, I can say, that during his “war on terror” George W. Bush made ample use of Orientalism as the “Idealized Cognitive Model”⁵ that continues to dominate Western thought and action regarding the Orient. It is clear that in Bush’s thought the term “West” is used as a label to refer to the dominant political, economic, and cultural world system. Bush used the Orientalist metaphors to conceptualize his enemy, Iraqi leader, in order

¹ Sandikcioglu Esra, “Orientalism - the Ideology Behind the Metaphorical Gulf War,” accessed December 18, 2016, <http://www.tulane.edu/~howard/Langldeo/Sandikcioglu/Sandikcioglu.html>.

² Ibid.

³ Ibid.

⁴ Ibid.

⁵ Lakoff George, *Women, Fire and Dangerous Things: What Categories Reveal about the Mind* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1987).

to justify the war as a way to protect Western civilization and its way of life from the “backward” Orientals.¹

President Bush and his speech-writing relied heavily on the Orientalist framework in their conceptualization their enemy as a threat to the “civilized” world, in general, and to the U.S., in particular. The Orientalist framework is characterized by the conceptual metaphors presented in dichotomies such as Civilization/ Barbarism, Power/Weakness, Maturity/ Immaturity, and Rationality/ Irrationality.² These frameworks divided the world world into the Orient and the West, into Us and Them, where the Orient is associated with negative images of barbarism, and backwardness, while the West is equated with the opposite images, meaning civilization and development. These representations of the Oriental “Other” Iraq served to demonize it so that to give the West “Self” legitimacy to intervene militarily to save its people from their “irrational” leader.

¹ Sandikcioglu Esra, “Orientalism - the Ideology Behind the Metaphorical Gulf War,” accessed December 18, 2016, <http://www.tulane.edu/~howard/LangIdeo/Sandikcioglu/Sandikcioglu.html>.

² Ibid.

General Conclusion

GENERAL CONCLUSION:

To conclude this dissertation, one can say that the American foreign policy followed the change in its national interests and the clash of civilizations thesis fits well its hegemonic ideology. Many agree that the attacks of September 11, 2001 marked a turning point in contemporary history. It is argued that it brought out the more aggressive side of Bush Administration, as the Neoconservatives increased their influence within the White House national security apparatus. The U.S. administration was then given a golden opportunity to launch a series of overseas military actions, with the stated purpose of fighting terrorism and later promoting and protecting democracy across the world.

The United States of America is a country with a unique political rhetorical tradition. American politicians, often, refer to America as being ‘a beacon of hope for the rest of the world.’¹ The American public, therefore, believe that it is their mission to fight for global freedom and peace and to help those who suffer. To persuade their audience, American politicians use figurative language in their speeches, especially religious metaphors and historical concepts. President George W. Bush, was no exception. In his speeches and declarations, he uses the three classical rhetorical modes (logos, ethos, and pathos).

Through an analysis of Bush’s post 9/11 selected speeches, I outlined a discursive pattern in which these events are exploited to promote his discourse concerning Iraq, and other countries said to “harbor terrorists.”² For political leaders, speeches are the vehicle delivering their discourse. It is agreed that politics is essentially a linguistic activity, an activity in which language is employed to inform others about political issues and persuade them to adopt courses

¹ Kjell O. U. Lejon, *God Bless America!: President George Bushs Religio-Politiska Budskap* (Lund, Sweden: Lund University Press, 1994), 41.

² George W. Bush, "Address to the Nation on the Terrorist Attacks," September 11, 2001. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=58057> (accessed April 19th, 2014).

of action with regards to tackled issues. To this end, politicians intend to make use of different linguistic devices, such as metaphors.

With the publication of *Metaphors We Live By* (1980) by George Lakoff and Mark Johnson metaphors have gained more attention in the field of cognitive linguistics. The most important idea mentioned by the two authors is that conceptual metaphors are a matter of not only language but of thought as well. In other words, the conceptual metaphor is the framework to which literal instances of metaphorical expressions belong. Moreover, the conceptual metaphor reveals patterns of human cognition, showing typical culturally determined understandings of a concept, while metaphorical linguistic expressions are ways in which these understandings are expressed linguistically.

The idea of the clash of civilizations reappeared in the West with an article (1993) of the American political scientist, Samuel P. Huntington. This highly controversial article sparked a fierce debate pushing its author to extend it into a book (1996) to present his arguments in a more explicit way. Huntington's main assumption is that post-Cold War conflict would not be ideological or economic, but rather cultural. He, therefore, identified seven or eight major civilizations, and claims that the most important conflicts of the future will be along the fault lines separating these civilizations from one another. Furthermore, Huntington argued that the Islamic civilization is the only one among the seven non-Western civilizations that should be viewed as a demographic threat rather than an economic challenge to Western civilization. He added that there is also a direct connection between 'Islamic civilization' and violence, because he considers that Islam has 'bloody borders.'

Huntington's thesis was highly discussed when it appeared but soon forgotten and sent to the archives. However, an event brought it again to the surface. It was the 9/11 attacks on the United States of America. In fact, many of Huntington's predictions seemed somehow

confirmed true. On 11 September 2001, President George W. Bush, as a reaction to the attacks, first declared a 'war against terrorism' but soon after the appellation changed and thus the metaphor 'War on Terror' came into existence. Bush reassured his nation that '[he and his staff] stand together to win the war against terrorism.'¹ Shortly afterwards, Bush and his administration launched their so-called the global 'war on terror,' a war based mainly on a misleading political rhetoric. In fact, to win the support of the American citizens, Bush used all the stereotypes the West has internalized about the Orient and the Orientals for the sake of demonizing his enemies (the Taliban Regime, Bin Laden and later Saddam Hussein).

One discursive way of constructing an enemy is through the use of Orientalism. As a matter of fact, Bush's speeches rely heavily on the misrepresentations of the Orient and Orientals, considering them as being irrational, backward and immature.² And the purpose behind doing this was to distinguish his nation, the 'Self', from his enemy the 'Other,' to make it easier for the American public to side with the 'good' against 'evil' and support their President in every decision.

By using frames and images associated with what is considered to be typically Oriental, Bush and his administration conceptualized both Iraq and other Muslim nations in terms of conceptual metaphors, such as 'Nation – Adult' and 'Nation – Children' relationship.³ While the frames of 'Self-presentation' serve to present a positive image of the United States, the frames of 'Other-representation' aim to provide a negative image of the enemy.⁴ Westerners

¹ George W. Bush: "Address to the Nation on the Terrorist Attacks," September 11, 2001. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=58057>

² Sandikcioglu Esra, "Orientalism - the Ideology Behind the Metaphorical Gulf War," accessed December 18, 2016, <http://www.tulane.edu/~howard/LangIdeo/Sandikcioglu/Sandikcioglu.html>.

³ Sandikcioglu Esra, "Orientalism - the Ideology Behind the Metaphorical Gulf War," accessed December 18, 2016, <http://www.tulane.edu/~howard/LangIdeo/Sandikcioglu/Sandikcioglu.html>.

⁴ Ibid.

are perceived as balanced, reliable and self-controlled; by contrast, Orientals are considered as irrational and undependable.¹

Recently, as I was editing this dissertation, a new U.S. President was elected. Donald J. Trump is the name of this new elected President. His presidential campaign was one of the most followed worldwide, and this was because of his visions regarding different issues especially, immigration and trade. Regarding immigration, he pointed out the necessity of establishing new immigration controls, by selecting immigrants ‘based on their likelihood of success in the U.S.’² and ‘vet applicants to ensure they support America’s values, institutions and people, and temporarily suspend immigration from regions that export terrorism and where safe vetting cannot presently be ensured.’³ As for his ‘plan to rebuild the American economy’ he pinpointed the need to:

- Instruct the Treasury Secretary to label **China** a currency manipulator.
- Instruct the U.S. Trade Representative to bring trade cases against **China**, both in this country and at the WTO. **China's** unfair subsidy behavior is prohibited by the terms of its entrance to the WTO.
- Use every lawful presidential power to remedy trade disputes if **China** does not stop its illegal activities, including its theft of American trade.⁴ (**Bold** is mine)

For the public all these propositions are new and they are the product of Trump’s brain or his advisors’. However, Samuel P. Huntington (1996), in the section entitled “The Renewal of the West,” tackled all these issues twenty years ago. He highlighted the fact that ‘the Islamic Resurgence and the economic dynamism of Asia demonstrate that other civilizations are alive and well and at least potentially threatening to the West.’⁵ According to him, ‘the future health

¹ Ibid.

² Donald J. Trump, “Immigration,” August 31, 2016, accessed December 17, 2016, <https://www.donaldjtrump.com/policies/immigration>.

³ Donald J. Trump, “Trade,” June 28, 2016, accessed December 17, 2016, <https://www.donaldjtrump.com/policies/trade>.

⁴ Ibid.

⁵ Samuel P. Huntington, *The Clash of Civilizations: And the Remaking of World Order* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1996), 302.

of the West and its influence on other societies depends in considerable measure on its success in coping with those trends, which, of course, give rise to the assertions of moral superiority by Muslims and Asians.’¹

Huntington also addressed the issue of immigration and argued that, ‘Western culture is challenged by groups within Western societies. One such challenge comes from immigrants from other civilizations who reject assimilation and continue to adhere to and to propagate the values, customs, and cultures of their home societies.’² To solve this issue, Huntington proposed a number of solutions among which, giving priority ‘to able, qualified, energetic people with the talents and expertise needed by the host country’ and the assimilation of the new migrants and their children into the cultures of the country and the West.³ The faces of similarity between Trump’s suggestions and those of Huntington are quite obvious. The point with which I close this dissertation is that, once again, after President Bush another U.S. President is being influenced by Samuel Huntington’s thoughts. And if this means anything, it means that the clash of civilizations theory played and keeps playing an important role in shaping the American domestic and foreign policies.

¹Samuel P. Huntington, *The Clash of Civilizations: And the Remaking of World Order* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1996), 304.

² *Ibid*, 305.

³ *Ibid*.

Bibliography

BIBLIOGRAPHY:

I. PRIMARY SOURCE:

Selected speeches of President George W. Bush (2001-2008).

<http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/index.php> (last time accessed January 7th , 2016).

II. SECONDARY SOURCES

A. Cultural Studies:

➤ Books:

1. Poole, Elizabeth and John E. Richardson. *Muslims and the News Media*. LONDON: I B Tauris & Co, 2006.
2. West, Richard L. and Lynn H. Turner. *Introducing Communication Theory: Analysis and Application*. Mountain View, CA: Mayfield Publishing Co ,U.S., 2000.

B. History:

➤ Books:

3. Ambrose, Stephen E. and Douglas G Brinkley. *Rise to Globalism: American Foreign Policy Since 1938*, Ninth Revised Edition. 9th ed. New York: Penguin (Non-Classics), 2011.
4. Cameron, Fraser. *US Foreign Policy After the Cold War: Global Hegemon or Reluctant Sheriff?* 2nd ed. New York: Routledge, 2005.
5. H, Campos Joseph. *The State and Terrorism: National Security and the Mobilization of Power*. Aldershot, Hants, England: Ashgate Publishing, 2007.
6. Herring, George C. *From Colony to Superpower: U. S. Foreign Relations Since 1776*. New York: Oxford University Press, 2008.
7. Merry, Robert W. *Sands of Empire: Missionary Zeal, American Foreign Policy, and the Hazards of Global Ambition*. New York: Simon & Schuster, 2005.
8. Oberdorfer, Don. *From the Cold War to a New Era: The United States and the Soviet Union, 1983-1991*. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1998.
9. Reeves, Thomas C. *Twentieth Century America: A Brief History*. New York: Oxford University Press, USA, 1999.

➤ **Articles:**

10. Waltz, Kenneth N. "Structural Realism After the Cold War." *International Security* 25, no. 1 (2000): 5–41. Accessed October 25, 2016. doi:10.1162/016228800560372. http://www.columbia.edu/itc/sipa/U6800/readingssm/Waltz_Structural%20Realism.pdf.

C. Political Science:

➤ **Books:**

11. Ambrose, Stephen E. and Douglas G. Brinkley. *Rise to Globalism: American Foreign Policy Since 1938*. 9th ed. New York: Penguin Group (USA), 2011.
12. Campos, Joseph H. 2007. *The State And Terrorism*. Aldershot, Hants, England: Ashgate.
13. Chomsky, Noam, and David Barsamian. 1992. *Chronicles of Dissent*. Monroe, Me.: Common Courage Press.
14. Fry, Greg, and Jacinta O'Hagan. 2000. *Contending Images of World Politics*. Houndmill, Basingstoke, Hampshire: Macmillan Press.
15. Fukuyama, Francis. *The End of History and the Last Man*. New York: Maxwell Macmillan International, 1992.
16. Gergen, David R. *Eyewitness to Power: The Essence of Leadership: Nixon to Clinton*. New York: Simon & Schuster Adult Publishing Group, 2001.
17. Hart, R. P, and Childers, J.P. 2003. *George W. Bush and the Language of Command: A Daily Diary*. Washington.
18. Huntington, Samuel P. *The Clash of Civilizations: And the Remaking of World Order*. New York: Simon & Schuster, 1996.
19. Lakoff, George. *Don't Think of an Elephant!: Know Your Values and Frame the Debate: The Essential Guide for Progressives*. White River junction, VT: Chelsea Green Publishing Co, 2004.
20. Lakoff, George. *Women, Fire and Dangerous Things: What Categories Reveal about the Mind*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1987.
21. Lejon, Kjell O. U. *God Bless America!: President George Bushs Religio-Politiska Budskap*. Lund, Sweden: Lund University Press, 1994.

➤ **Articles:**

22. Bush, George W. H. "Mission To Somalia; Transcript of President's Address on Somalia." *World*(AP), December 5, 1992.
<http://www.nytimes.com/1992/12/05/world/mission-to-somalia-transcript-of-president-s-address-on-somalia.html> (Accessed January 6, 2014).
23. Bush, George W. and Al Gore. "CPD: October 11, 2000 Debate Transcript." n.d.
<http://www.debates.org/index.php?page=october-11-2000-debate-transcript> (Accessed January 6, 2014).
24. "Bush: Job Ratings." <http://www.pollingreport.com/BushJob.htm> (Accessed January 6, 2014).
25. Blix, Hans. "UN News - Blix Welcomes Accelerated Cooperation by Iraq, but Says Unresolved Issues Remain." March 7, 2003.
<http://www.Un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=6383&Cr=iraq&Cr1=inspect.html> (Accessed May 5, 2014).
26. Dunn, Michael. "'The Clash of Civilizations' and 'The War on Terror.'" 49th Parallel Vol.20 (Winter 2006-2007).
27. Erdem Mr., Engin I. "The 'Clash of Civilizations': Revisited After September 11." *Alternatives: Turkish Journal of International Relations* 1, no. 2 (2002).
28. Francis Fukuyama, "The End Of History And The Last Man," *The National Interest* 16 (1992): 4–18.
29. Huntington, Samuel P. "The Clash of Civilizations?" *Foreign Affairs* 72, no. 3 (1993).
30. Klaus, Larres. "'Bloody as Hell': Bush, Clinton, and the Abdication of American Leadership in the Former Yugoslavia, 1990–1995," *Journal of European Integration History*. 10. July 2004.
31. Larres, Klaus. "Bloody as Hell': Bush, Clinton, and the Abdication of American Leadership in the Former Yugoslavia, 1990–1995." *Journal of European Integration History* 10 (2004): 192.
32. Lewis, Bernard. "The Roots of Muslim Rage: Why So Many Muslims Deeply Resent the West, and Why Their Bitterness Will Not Be Easily Mollified." *The Atlantic Monthly* 266, no. 3 (September 1990): 47–58.
33. Lieberfeld, Daniel. "Theories of Conflict And The Iraq War." *International Journal of Peace Studies* 10, no. 2 (2005). Accessed December 18, 2016.
http://www.gmu.edu/programs/icar/ijps/vol10_2/wLieberfeld10n2IJPS.pdf.

34. Merskin, Debra. "The Construction of Arabs as Enemies: Post-September 11 Discourse of George W. Bush." *Mass Communication and Society* 7, no. 2 (May 2004): 157–175. doi:10.1207/s15327825mcs0702_2.
35. O'Shaughnessy, Nicholas J. "Politics and Propaganda: Weapons of mass seduction." Manchester University Press. 2004.
36. Preble, Christopher. "The Bush Doctrine and 'Rogue' States." *Foreign Service Journal* 92, no. 3 (October 2005).
37. Randfield, Sam. "Bush and Us Foreign Policy: Change or Continuity?" E-International Relations Students July 3, 2012.
38. Sajjad, Memoona. "A "Non Western" Reading of The "Clash of Civilizations" Theory: Through the Eyes of "The Rest."" *International Journal of Political Science and Development* Vol. 1(2). (Oct. 2013): 42–104.
39. *USATODAY.com*. (USA TODAY), n.d.
<http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/polls/tables/live/01132003.htm> .no. 2 (May 2004): 157–175.
40. Wilson, James Michael. "How the West and the Rest Are Permanently Intertwined: A Critique of Samuel P. Huntington's." May 25, 2009. <http://www.e-ir.info/2009/05/25/how-the-west-and-the-rest-are-permanently-intertwined-a-critique-of-samuel-p-huntingtons-the-clash-of-civilizations/> (Accessed June 5, 2015).

D. Rhetoric:

➤ Books

41. Bolinger, Dwight. *Language, the Loaded Weapon: The Use and Abuse of Language Today*. 2nd ed. New York: Longman, 1980.
42. Charteris-Black, Jonathan. *Corpus Approaches to Critical Metaphor Analysis*. Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004.
43. Charteris-Black, Jonathan. *Politicians and Rhetoric: The Persuasive Power of Metaphor*. BASINGSTOKE: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004.
44. Charteris-Black, Jonathan. *Politicians and Rhetoric: The Persuasive Power of Metaphor*. United Kingdom: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011.
45. Charteris-Black, Jonathan. *Analysing Political Speeches: Rhetoric, Discourse and Metaphor*. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014.

46. Chilton, Paul and George Lakoff. 'Foreign Policy by Metaphor'. in Schaffner, Christina and Anita L. Wenden. *Language and Peace (war & Peace)*. Amsterdam: Harwood Academic, 1999.
47. Chomsky, Noam. *Chronicles of Dissent*. Monroe, Me: Common Courage Press, 1992.
48. Foss, S. K., & Griffin, C. L. Beyond persuasion: A proposal for an invitational rhetoric. *Communication Monographs*. 1995.
49. Mure, G. R. G. trans. *Posterior Analytics* by Aristotle. United States: Kessinger Publishing Co, 2004.
50. Gozzi, Raymond D. *The Power of Metaphor in the Age of Electronic Media (Hampton Press Communication Series)*. United States: Hampton Press, 1998.
51. Johnson, June, John D Ramage, and John C Bean. *Writing Arguments: A Rhetoric with Readings, Concise Edition (4th Edition)*. 4th ed. New York: Pearson Longman, 2007.
52. Kovecses, Zoltan. *Metaphor: A Practical Introduction*. New York: Oxford University Press, USA, 2002.
53. Lakoff, George and Mark Johnson. *Metaphors We Live by*. 2nd 2003 ed. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1980.
54. Lakoff, George. *Women, fire, and dangerous things: what categories reveal about the mind*. Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press, 1987.
55. montgomery, Maureen. "Savage Civility: September 11 And The Rhetoric Of 'Civilization.'" *Australasian Journal of American Studies* Vol. 21, no. No. 2 (December 2002): pp. 56–65.
56. Spencer, Alexander. *The Tabloid Terrorist: The Predicative Construction of New Terrorism in the Media*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010.

➤ **Articles:**

57. Booth, Wayne C. "Metaphor as Rhetoric: The Problem of Evaluation." *Critical Inquiry* 5, no. 1 (January 1978): 49. doi:10.1086/447972.
58. Cezar M., Ornatowski. "Rhetoric Goes to War: The Evolution of the United States of America's Narrative of the 'War On Terror'." *African Yearbook of Rhetoric: Diplomatic rhetoric in the South* Vol 3, no. Issue 3 (2012): 65–74.
59. Fedler, Kyle. "On the Rhetoric of a War on Terror." www.crosscurrents.org September 2001. (Accessed January 30, 2014).

60. Foss, Sonja K. and Cindy L. Griffin. "Beyond Persuasion: A Proposal for an Invitational Rhetoric." *Communication Monographs* 62, no. 1 (March 1995): 2–18. doi:10.1080/03637759509376345.
61. Kellner, Douglas. "Bushspeak and the Politics of Lying: Presidential Rhetoric in the 'war on terror'." *Presidential Studies Quarterly* (Wiley-Blackwell) 37, no. 4 (December 2007) : 622–45.
62. Mral, Brigitte. "The Rhetorical State of Alert before the Iraq War 2003." *Nordicom Review* 27, no. 1 (2006): 45–62. Accessed January 6, 2015. http://www.nordicom.gu.se/sites/default/files/kapitel-pdf/226_mral.pdf.
63. Quarantello, Kim. "The Bush Doctrine and Presidential Rhetoric: Change and Continuity in US Foreign Policy", Honors Thesis Collection. 2013.
64. Reyes Rodríguez, Antonio. "Speeches and Declarations: A War of Words." *Revista Alicantina de Estudios Ingleses*, no. 19 (2006): 365–86.
65. Walker, Kim. "Alert but Not Alarmed? The Rhetoric of Terrorism and Life After 9/11." *Contemporary Nurse* (Informa UK) 21, no. 2 (May 2006): 267–76. doi:10.5172/conu.2006.21.2.267.

➤ **Web Sites:**

66. Charter Of The United Nations, Chapter I: Purposes And Principles, Article (2), [Http://Www.Un.Org/En/Documents/Charter/Chapter1.Shtml](http://Www.Un.Org/En/Documents/Charter/Chapter1.Shtml) (accessed May 25, 2015).
67. Lakoff, George. Metaphor and War: The Metaphor System Used to Justify War in the Gulf. 1991. http://www2.iath.virginia.edu/sixties/HTML_docs/Texts/Scholarly/Lakoff_Gulf_Metaphor_1.html (Accessed January 6, 2015).
68. Lakoff, George. Metaphor and War, Again. 2003. http://www.alternet.org/story/15414/metaphor_and_war_again (Accessed January 6, 2015).
69. "Book I - Chapter 3: Aristotle's Rhetoric." Accessed November 16, 2016. <http://rhetoric.eserver.org/aristotle/rhet1-3.html>.

E. Orientalism:

➤ Books:

70. Said, Edward W. *Orientalism: Western Concepts of the Orient*. New York: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1980.
71. _____. *Covering Islam: How the Media and the Experts Determine How We See the Rest of the World*. 2nd ed. London: Vintage, 1996.
72. _____. *Culture and Imperialism*. London: Vintage, 1994.
73. Sakeenah, Maryam. *Us Versus Them and Beyond: An Oriental-Islamic Rejoinder to the Clash of Civilizations Theory*. Kuala Lumpur: The Other Press, 2010.
74. Esra, Sandikcioglu. "Orientalism - the Ideology Behind the Metaphorical Gulf War." Accessed December 18, 2016. <http://www.tulane.edu/~howard/LangIdeo/Sandikcioglu/Sandikcioglu.html>.

➤ Articles:

75. Said, Edward W. "The Clash of Ignorance." *The Nation* October 22, 2001. <http://www.thenation.com/article/clash-ignorance>
76. Said, Edward W. "They Call All Resistance Terrorism." (September 2001) *International Socialist Review*, no. http://isreview.org/issues/19/Said_part2.shtml (accessed May 25, 2015).

➤ Audio Visual Material:

77. LeighaCohen. "Noam Chomsky (2014): What Does National Interests Actually Mean?" YouTube. May 11, 2014. Accessed November 5, 2016. <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=tbVhz5SUmtw>.
78. Palestine Diary. "Edward Said on Orientalism." *YouTube*. October 28, 2012. Accessed May 2, 2014. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=fVC8EYd_Z_g
79. Said, Edward W. *The Myth of the Clash of Civilizations*. University of Massachusetts, Amherst, 1998. <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=aPS-pONiEG8> (Accessed May 2, 2014).

Résumé :

Le présent mémoire démontre comment l'utilisation de la langue est toujours manipulée pour véhiculer les objectifs de l'orateur afin d'avoir un effet sur l'auditeur. Les politiciens, en particulier, comprennent le pouvoir des mots pour expliquer et justifier des actes ; ainsi que de persuader les gens à les soutenir, même si ce soutien implique un risque pour leurs vies. Basé sur cette compréhension, j'ai analysé les discours et les déclarations de l'ancien président des États-Unis, George W. Bush, à partir du 11 Septembre 2001 jusqu'à l'attaque de 2003 sur l'Irak, avec un accent particulier sur la façon dont il a fait usage de métaphores. Le but de l'analyse est de révéler l'agenda caché, l'idéologie, la pensée ou les intentions et les motivations qui ont poussé Bush et son administration à mener « La guerre contre la terreur. » L'idée de Samuel P. Huntington sur le choc des civilisations (1993) est avant tout la plus susceptible motivation (cachée) de Bush. En outre, je suggère que l'orientalisme est la plus importante idéologie tenant derrière la rhétorique de Bush sur la guerre contre le terrorisme. Pour prouver tout cela, je consacrerai énormément d'attention à l'usage des métaphores et à la théorie cognitive de la métaphore basée sur George Lakoff et Mark Johnson (1980), la critique métaphore tel que présenté par Lakoff (1991-2003) et Jonathan Charteris-Black (2005-2011). Les métaphores sont des stratégies rhétoriques puissantes car elles puisent dans les connaissances et les croyances culturelles communes. De plus, elles sont un moyen très efficace de présenter les actes et les actions d'une manière qui engage le public et remporte sa sympathie, car elles permettent à l'orateur de se rallier au juste et bon, et l'ennemi au tort et le mal. Avec l'aide de métaphores George W. Bush a réussi à déformer les événements entourant la guerre en Irak. En effet, les agressions deviennent défense préventive, invasion militaire devient changement de régime, guerre devient pour la paix, et l'occupation devient intervention humanitaire.