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Title :

The Civilization/Barbarism Dichotomy in Matthew Arnold's *Culture and Anarchy: An Essay on Political and Social Criticism* (1869) and Samuel Huntington's *The Clash of Civilization and the Remaking of the World Order* (1996)

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To my family

&

To the memory of my dearest sister: NACERA

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Abstract

The present dissertation aims at studying the dichotomy of civilization/barbarism in Matthew Arnold's *Culture and Anarchy* (1869) and Samuel Huntington's *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of the World Order* (1996). To reach our purpose, we have analyzed their respective discourses from a cultural perspective. We have divided our work into three chapters. The first chapter explores the context of the discourse as developed by David Nunan (1993). The second chapter explains the authors' perception of culture relying on Gillian Brown and George Yule's *Discourse Analysis* (1983). The third chapter examines the construction and reconstruction of the civilized/barbarian dichotomy in the two texts and its relation to power, following Michael Foucault's thought. The results of the analysis underscore Huntington's indebtedness to Arnold. Indeed, even if he wrote from a context which can be described as global, the American scholar seems aware of the affinity in context between him and his English counterpart. For that, he reworked some of his paradigms, such as the necessity to renew the ruling class power.

General Introduction

Barbarism and Civilization, a dichotomy concept, have known considerable transformations throughout history. Both of them emerged as simple descriptors[1], but then acquired a "fierce and strident ethnocentrism"[2] due to "changing historical circumstances"[3]. Although the former has its roots in the ancient world, the latter does not[4]. Etymologically, the term barbarian meant a foreigner whose speech was not comprehensible to the Greeks[5]. Salter, quoting Euripides, notes that the word has three uses: "(1) unintelligible, (2) non-Greek referring simply to nationality, (3) foreign, with some implication of inferiority"[6]. Indeed, the last meaning of the word barbarian reflects the rising national consciousness of the Greeks during the Greek-Persian wars[7]. However, in classical Greece the word did not acquire an accurate connotative meaning, it was understood by usage[8]: "Greek poets, dramatists, and philosophers usually combined Greek civilization as the norm, and were fond of portraying the barbarian as oaf, the slave, and the predator"[9].

In the period of Imperial Expansion, the Romans adopted the word for all peoples other than those under Greco-Roman influence and domination. The Romans applied the word barbarian to such peoples like Goths, Vandals, and Huns, with whom they were fighting over the frothiers[10]. Influenced by the Greeks descriptions of the foreigner, the Romans expressed their disdain towards people outside its Empire in moral and manner terms[11]. In the third century, Christian religion was referred to as a means to reconcile the Roman civilization with its barbarians, but it (Christianity) failed because by the fourth century it "was identified as another attribute of the Latin civilization"[12]. This implies that religion became another criterion distinguishing the Romans from the barbarians, especially when "the ideals of Christianity were narrowed to coincide with Roman ethnocentrism"[13]. Accordingly, the "moral barrier separating civilization and barbarism stood its ground"[14].

Civilization, the antonym of barbarism[15], has its origin in the word *"Civil"*, from *"Civilis"* meaning in Latin a *"Citizen"*[16]. In the fourteenth century, it had a connection with *"Civility"* and *"Civilize"* and it was transformed by the seventeenth century into *"Civil Society"*[17]. However, Todorov notes that the introduction of the word "Civilization" into language was made at the same time, but separately, in the eighteenth century by Marquis de Mirabeau in France and Adam Ferguson in England[18]. Todorov indicates the association of two significant meanings to the word civilization in Marquis de Mirabeau's *L'Ami des Hommes ou Traité du Population* (1756): In the first place, civilization is a process by which humanity gradually developed from barbarity; in the second place, it is a state of society which is, then, the result of the process[19]. In his review of Norbert Elias's *The Civilizing Process: The History of Manners* (1978), E. Doyle McCarthy notes that prior to the emergence of "Civilization", words such as "politeness" and "civility" were already used by the aristocracy to designate their behavior as being different from the social manners of the lower orders[20].

The French concept of "civilization" is also the outcome of a "Civilizing Process" project which was initiated by the bourgeois class to oppose the social rising which challenged their power. Thus, civilization was used as a tool to handle internal conflicts and to express a vision of a new world.[21] In the eighteenth century, therefore, the word civilization acquired a connotative meaning which became functional by the nineteenth century.[22]In England, Adam Ferguson remarks in his "Essay on the History of Civil Society" (1767) that "not only the individual advances from infancy to manhood, but the species from rudeness to civilization".[23]

In the nineteenth century, the heyday of imperialism, racial differences were at the forefront of European thought. Civilization was one of the most powerful tools of colonialism

which provided the rationale for war, conquest and expropriation. It, therefore, emerged as a standard of international law shaping a world divided onto "Civilization" and "Barbarism". Civilization was used as the main criterion by which the place and status of different human groups would be judged[24]. Differently put, as a standard, civilization depicts the races that belong to the international law from those that do not.

Mark Neocleous(2011), quoting Starobinski, states that civilization was considered a standard of International Law in the nineteenth century because it has its roots in the word "policer: to make law and regulations for preserving the public tranquility"[25]. Mark Neocleous (2011) explains that "the word *police* worked alongside civility and politeness in the development of civilization"[26]. Neocleous (2011) argues that civilization is combined with a particular view of humanity and order which interferes in political judgment[27]. He argues that "whereas police had been the principle of social order, so civilization extended this globally"[28]. During this era, civilization became synonymous to culture[29]. Accordingly, in his analysis of the Victorian social structure, Matthew Arnold concludes implicitly in his *Culture and Anarchy* that the order which civilization is viewed to provide is required on the domestic sphere[30].

In the twentieth century, the tradition of the previous century was rejected: there is no longer a singular civilization but rather multiple civilizations[31]. The latter emerged by the end of the First World War due to the "the change of balance of power, which became less Eurocentric and more dependent on Soviet Union and the United States, the disillusionment with war, and the rising national movement in the non-Western world"[32]. Civilization is no longer the standard of international law[33]. By the end of the Second World War, a contemporary standard of civilization was introduced. In his thesis, Tadashi Iwami (2008) notes that "three dimensions of adherence to human rights principles, democracy, and the

means to peace have constituted the basic norms for the identification of legitimate thereby civilized states"[34].

With the process of decolonization, the concept was liberated from the shackles of the "cosmology of progress"[35]and was labeled an "ethnographic concept"[36]. Intellectuals, from the East and West, scrambled to "find the distinctive civilizational traditions among the people"[37]. The driving force behind such an ethnographic study was "the nationalist ideal of popular sovereignty, but it was also reinforced by the holistic conception of culture that was gaining ground globally"[38].

The concept of civilization reappeared in the global theatre by the end of the Cold War with the disappearance of the bipolar world and the emergence of the United States as the world leader[39]. This resurgence is noticeable in Samuel Huntington's article "The Clash of Civilizations?"(1993), and subsequently in his book *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of the World Order* (1996). As a reaction to the euphoria celebrating the settlement of a harmonious world in the post-Cold War era[40], Huntington forecasts a clash of civilizations caused by cultural rivalry:

> It is my hypothesis that the fundamental source of conflict in this new world will not be primarily ideological or primarily economic. The great divisions among humankind and the dominating source of conflict will be cultural. Nation states will remain the most powerful actors in world affairs, but the principal conflicts of global politics will occur between nations and group of different civilizations. The fault lines between civilizations will be the battle lines of the future[41].

Huntington, then, reintroduces the nineteenth century perception of civilization and suggests Arnold's perception of culture. Like culture for Arnold, Civilization is a standard determining inclusion and exclusion for Huntington. Accordingly, Huntington can be said to reawake the nineteenth century dichotomy civilization/barbarism.

Review of the Literature

Samuel Huntington's *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of the World Order* (1996) has already received substantial research in terms of thematic studies. To start with, Left wing critics such as Noam Chomsky (2001) and Edward Said (2001) argue that Huntington's aim in producing his theory is to incite for a clash between the West and Islam. In his lecture on *Militarism, Democracy and People's Right to Information* (2001), Noam Chomsky describes the Clash of Civilization theory as being instrumental. He says, "Everybody is flying around for some paradigm, some big thing that you can use to control people and Huntington's idea was the Clash of Civilizations"[42]. He points to the idea that Huntington's clash theory is useful for the American elite to manipulate people in the post-Cold War era. Chomsky emphasizes the context in which the theory was produced to explain that it was a period marked by the absence of any reason for war. He says that "with 1989 coming, you needed some new pretexts. This was very explicit. Remember, one of the tasks of intellectuals, the solemn task, is to prevent people from understanding what's going on."[43]

Edward Said faults Huntington's clash theory in his article "The Clash of Ignorance" (2001). Toby Zanin, quoting Said, describes "a myopic cultural chauvinism"[44] to be the fundamental source of conflict. Said writes that "the personification of enormous entities called the "West" and "Islam" is recklessly affirmed"[45], and explains that "the problem with unedifying labels like Islam and the West: they mislead and confuse the mind which is trying to make sense of a disorderly reality that won't be pigeonholed or strapped down as easily as at all"[46]. For Said, such labels are the source of ignorance which leads to the conflict between the so-called "West" and "Islam". He is, in fact, against the division of the world into adversary entities. Said criticizes also Huntington's use of "Civilizations" and "Identities".

> Huntington is an ideologist, someone who wants to make "civilizations" and "identities" into what they are not: shut-down, sealed-off entities that have been purged of the myriad currents and countercurrents that animate human history, and that over centuries have made it possible for that history not only to contain wars of religion and imperial conquest but also to be one of exchange, cross-fertilization and sharing.[47]

Said argues that Huntington ignores the historical interlacement of civilizations and views the differences between them from an orientalist tinge. In a lecture on *The Myth of "The Clash of Civilizations"* at the University of Massachusetts, he says that, "Huntington is quite misleading in what he says and how he puts things"[48]. According to Said, Huntington was preoccupied with policy prescriptions instead of analyzing cultures and history[47] and that his recommendations are bellicose.[49]

The clash theory is also criticized by academic writers like Mian M. Tahir Ashraf and Robert Marks on its conceptual inconsistency. In *"The Clash of Civilizations? A Critique"* (2012), Mian M. Tahir Ashraf argues that Huntington's definition of civilizations is overgeneralized. He states that

> Huntington is not successful in defining civilization with universal application. The second conceptual deficiency in the definition of civilization can be identified with the locational element of civilization. Geographical boundaries are so significant in his definition that it may not be applicable to the Islamic civilization because it is not boundary limited due to the nature of Islam as a universal religion.[50]

Robert Marks, on the other hand, (2000) argues that Huntington's analysis illustrates "his ignorance in the field of history"[51]. He explains Huntington's uncritical use of secondary sources and refers to his research on Islam, China and Japan as being weak. He states "his selection of sources on and hence understanding of, Asia in general and China in particular… is poor".[52]

Furthermore, authors like Fouad Ajami (1993) criticize Huntington's civilizational conflict paradigm. Ajami argues that Huntington has misunderstood the realist political maneuvering of states as cultural affiliation. In his article "The Summoning: But They Said, We Will Not Hearken" (1993), Ajami points out the desire for economic prosperity as the factor generating future conflicts. He attacks Huntington's ignorance of state interests which provoke conflicts in and within civilizations. According to him, "the battle lines in the Caucasus, too, are not coextensive with civilizational fault lines. The lines follow the interests of states."[53]

The devaluation of the Huntington's clash theory did not condemn it since it was welcomed by some scholars. For instance, Lloyd deMause appraises Huntington's clash thesis in his article "The Childhood Origins of Terrorism" (2002), and argues that Huntington's analysis in sustains his idea about the threat of Islam to the West:

> Huntington has conclusively shown that Islamic groups have both historically and recently been many times more violent towards their neighbors than other religious groups, so if nothing is done about the childhood origins of their violence and then Islamic terrorism towards the West is certain to escalate in the coming decades. [54]

In "Huntington and his Critics: the West and Islam" (2002), Gleen E. Perry argues that Huntington's clash thesis is misunderstood and that "only a distorted understanding of Huntington's thesis is conducive to the purposes of those who want to incite the West against Islam"[55]. For example, Gleen Perry notes that Huntington's phrase "bloody borders"[56] was misinterpreted, since a careful reading shows that Huntington

> …is talking more about such factors as demographic changes and the absence of a core state, as well as the difficulty of merging Muslim minorities with non-Muslim majorities (and vice versa) than about any inherent Islamic proclivity to violence as such, which he has recently rejected. [57]

He adds that instead of viewing Huntington as seeking a "crusades against the Islamic world or any other civilization outside the West', it will be better to recognize his warning about the unpleasant consequences of Western arrogance and its unrespect for the "rest"[58]

Gleen E. Perry explains Huntington's rejection of multiculturalism, stating that "Huntington is not implying to send the non-Western immigrants back to their homelands, [...] but the logic of his analysis suggests that the acceptance of such new comers must not be unduly accelerated."[59]

From this review of literature devoted to the reception and criticism of Samuel Huntington's *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of the World Order* (1996), it can be said that Huntington's idea is heavily influenced by the changes in post-Cold War time. He produced his clash thesis in response to the prevailing atmosphere of the post-Cold War era and in relation to the American foreign policy. He backs his analysis with factual arguments, predicts a clash of civilizations, and anticipates some solutions to prevent the conflict: stopping intervention[60] on other nations' affairs and rejecting multiculturalism[61].

Issue and Working Hypotheses

If considered in the tight of the above review of literature, we notice that in spite of the number of works devoted to study Huntington clash thesis, no author has linked his ideas to the ones of Matthew Arnold. Therefore, our task in the present dissertation is to trace the origin of the discourse on culture and civilization back to the nineteenth century English thought, when civilization in the West was opposed to working class culture, contemptuously described as the anarchical culture or populace[62]. Precisely, relying on a cultural perspective, we study the dichotomy of civilization/barbarism in Matthew Arnold's *Culture and Anarchy* (1869) and Samuel Huntington's *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of the World Order* (1996) by showing aspects of convergence and others of analogy in order to unveil the

sources of Huntington's thought. In so doing, we are claiming that the American scholar's exclusivist and ethnocentric ideas about civilization has an analogous origin in the aristocratic class interests for which Arnold in nineteenth century England was fighting. In other words, if Huntington feels that world cultures are posing threats to American global *imperium* and harkens to protect it from the 'barbarism' supposedly unleashed by other cultures, it is because, like Arnold before him, he's afraid of the "enemy within". For Arnold, that enemy was the working class culture; for Huntington, it is the immigrant, whose large numbers inside Western countries are inducing the hybridization of the classical heritage of Europe and the US.

Method and Materials

Method

The method selected to study the civilized/barbarian dichotomy in Huntington's text is Discourse Analysis. We assume that Discourse Analysis is the more appropriate approach in carrying this research because it aims at discovering hidden meanings. It allows shedding light on Huntington's ideas which are not obvious on the surface. That is, to unfold the established discourse that Muslims are "Barbarians" and that Islam threats the West as developed it in his theory. Similarly, through Discourse Analysis Huntington's thesis can be related to Arnold discourse on the populace. It is only thanks to Discourse Analysis that we can compare between the two works' perception of culture and use of the classical dichotomy Civilized/Barbarian.

Discourse is socially and politically constitutive[63]: It constitutes social and political life, identities and relationships amongst people in a society[64]. In *A Glossary of Literary Terms,* M.H. Abrams write that discourse analysis is:

> …the use of language in a running discourse, continued over a number of sentences, and involving the interaction of speaker (writer) and auditor (reader) in a specific situational context, and within a framework of social and cultural conventions.[65]

To make sense of the discourse under study, the interaction between the producer of the discourse and its receiver must be considered within its context. This implies that the context plays an important role in interpreting a discourse.

In *Discourse Analysis* (1983), Gillian Brown and George Yule demonstrate the possibility of analyzing written discourse. They write that "discourse is language in use"[66] and explain that "discourse analysis is the study of language in use with the reference to the social and psychological factors that influence communication"[67]. Both of them put emphasis on how humans use language to communicate and, in particular, how addressers construct linguistic messages for addressees and how addressees work on linguistic messages in order to interpret them. They argue that the knowledge of its structure is functional in the development of the analysis. For instance, they explain that elliptic items, which have a role in discourse information structure within written text, are not recognized from the words on the page and that it is the task of the analysts to depict them. They note:

> …our interest does not lie simply in describing the form of the expression, which is obviously of prime interest to the sentence grammarian. Our interest lies in observing the forms *in the context in which they are used.* We want to know how speakers, having a given quantum of information to impart, identify and package that information.[68]

It is, therefore, in this perspective that Huntington's work converge with Discourse Analysis. The word "Barbarian" is an elliptic item in Huntington's theory.

David Nunan notes in his *Introduction to Discourse Analysis* (1993) that "discourse brings together language, the individuals producing the language, and the context within which the language is used"[69]. He emphasizes the importance of context in discourse analysis.

He explains that context plays a role in communicative process. It (the context) refers to the verbal and social situations which support the possible interpretation between discourse and text. Thanks to context, addressees get easily the knowledge of addressers' utterances, and then they (addressees) can decode these based of their references within the real world. He states that "context refers to the situation giving rise to the discourse within which the discourse is embedded"[70]

Discourse according to Michael Foucault is "the practices that systematically form the objects of which they speak"[71]. For him, a discursive structure can be detected because of the systematization of the ideas, opinion, ways of thinking and behaving which are formed within a particular context, and because of the effects of those ways of thinking and behaving. In *The Sage Dictionary of Cultural Studies* (2004), Chris Barker notes that in Cultural Studies the term discourse is used technically. Baker explains Michael Foucault's discourse by writing that it is

> … said to 'unite' language and practice and refers to regulated ways of speaking about a subject through which objects and practices acquire meaning. The production of knowledge through language that gives meaning to material objects and social practices we may call discourse practice.[72]

Foucault developed a distinct form of Discourse Analysis which is called foucauldian discourse analysis. The latter explores the relationships of power in society as it is communicated through language and practices[73].

Materials

Mathew Arnold's *Culture and Anarchy*

Culture and Anarchy, a collection of essays by Matthew Arnold, published in 1869. This work contains many of Arnold's central critical arguments. The first chapter is devoted to

his concept of culture as 'sweetness and light', a phrase adopted from Swift's *The Battle of the Books;* Arnold presents culture as the classical ideal of human perfection, rather than a smattering of Greek and Latin. Subsequent chapters set forward his definitions of Barbarians, Philistines, and the Populace, and contrast the spirit of Hebraism (as manifested in primitive Christianity and Protestantism) with that of Hellenism, with its aim of seeing "things as they really are"[74].

Samuel Huntington's *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of the World Order*

The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of the World Order is a book written in 1996 by Samuel Philip Huntington, an American political scientist. It appeared subsequently as a continuation to his article "The Clash of Civilizations?" , published in *Foreign Affairs* in 1993. The book presents the author's theory of global conflict in the post-Cold War era, providing a new ground for U.S. strategists and multiple enemies pushing America to care about itself-identification.

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Results

Throughout this study, we have tried to draw a parallel between Matthew Arnold's discourse on the populace in his book *Culture and Anarchy* (1869) and Samuel Huntington's discourse on Muslim immigrants in *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of the World Order* (1996). We have deduced that the texts share some affinities at the level of context. Similarly to Arnold who warned the ruling class about its declining, we found that Huntington appeals for Western supremacy to preserve its position of World leadership. Huntington, we understand, insisted on the inevitability of renewing the West role as a super power in the world like Arnold demanded the upper class to secure its ruling position. Eventually, we have deduced that Huntington writes in the continuity of a Western tradition, whose basis was laid down in the Enlightenment period, and thus be traced up to Arnold. We have reached the result that Arnold's perception of culture as a field of representation is reappeared in Huntington's Text: the use of the civilization/barbarian dichotomy to promote one group at the expanse of another.

Discussion

Chapter I: Analogy in Contexts: *Culture and Anarchy* and *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of the World Order*

The present chapter draws a parallel in context between *Culture and Anarchy* (1869) and *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of the World Order* (1996). The study of the context is underpinned by the intention to decipher Huntington's Civilization/Barbarism dichotomy in the post-Cold War era. The chapter, then, is divided into four sections: one, studies the affinities between Globalization and the Second English Empire, two, provides an outlook into the nineteenth century aristocracy's culture and America as a defender of world order and examines the threat to the aristocracy's position in society and to America's role in the World, three, compares the Second Industrial Revolution with Digital Revolution.

Section One: Parallelism Between the American Empire and the Second British Empire

This section draws the link between British Empire and American Empire. It aims to explain the continuous existence of some characteristics of the nineteenth century Empire in the American one. In fact, like the nineteenth century, the relationship of interdependency[1] between the Empire and its different colonies is present in the American Empire: countries all over the globe are dependent on America for sustaining itself and America is dependent on them since they stand for its resources and foreign markets at the same time[2]. In other words, America's global hegemony is defined by its economic globalization. The latter is "often compared to the open international economy of the late-nineteenth century"[3]. In fact, economic interdependence is one of the significant relations linking America to the world. To ensure the continuous prosperity of its economy, the United States secure various resources and markets across the planet. Similarly, the rest of the world guarantee their advancement in economy by accepting and acknowledging the vital role played by the United States in global economy[4].

The two Empires are motivated by the motor of industrialization and Globalization. The Industrial Revolution which constituted a turning point in British society of the nineteenth century prefigured that of the end of the twentieth century[5] The American society was transformed by economic and political changes brought about by the process of Globalization. These two processes form the basis of the Empires' international trade. Besides, the second English Empire was faced by rivalries during the nineteenth century, "Italian, Belgians and Germans raised a claim to their share of the world"[6]. Similarly, Huntington argues that in the Post-Cold War the American Empire has dangerous enemies: japan and China.[7]

The nineteenth century powers justified their presence in foreign territories by proclaiming a "civilizing mission"[8]. For example, the United Kingdom backed its imperialism abroad by the idea of bringing the torch of light and progress to the dark spots or areas. Simes explains that

> Some former empires were agents of change and progress and had generally good intentions vis-à-vis their subjects. The United Kingdom was a prime example of this type, approaching its empire not only with a desire to promote development, but with a self-sacrificing willingness to spend its resources toward that end[9].

Similarly, America in the twentieth-first century is remodeling Britain's civilizing mission. It is absolving its interference in other nations' matters by the creed of doing well. In other words, its intervention abroad is a "force of good: providing international security and promoting freedom and democracy"[10]. Also, it is argued that its supremacy in the new world order and its influential role in the global politics "is a gesture of good faith because it introduces and promotes democratic ideals in the anarchic hot spots of the international system"[11]. This implies the importance of moral justification to ensure the United States' presence in other territories. Here, we have to explain that America is involved in legitimating and naturalizing its activities on the global scale by initiating a process of doing well.

However, we perceive that this hegemony to be the source of Huntington's anxiety about the future of West in general and the United States in particular in his book *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of the World Order* (1996). In fact, we understand that this slogan of doing well is behind Huntington's discourse on threat of the Rest. He warns that this process generates feelings of resentment on the non-West.

Keeping American supremacy is thus Huntington's solution to prevent conflicts between the West and the Rest. He explains that the supremacy of his country is due to its uniqueness. The latter is achieved thanks to its embodiment of "Christianity, pluralism, individualism, and rule of law"[12]. Huntington appeals to renew these unique qualities, which in his view secure the position of a world leadership to America instead of attempting "to reshape other civilizations in the image of the West"[13].

Section Two: British Aristocracy and the American Supremacy

This section introduces the social changes that occurred in two different countries: Britain and America. Its aim is to compare Arnold's promotion of the aristocracy with Huntington's view of the American supremacy in the post-Cold war atmosphere. In fact, the achievements made throughout the Industrial Revolution stimulated the gradual emergence of a middle class in the Industrial cities. Until the first half of the nineteenth century, the Victorian society was composed only of two major classes: the wealthy and privileged aristocrats born in the upper class, and the low-income people born in the working class. The middle class sought a place among the upper class and many of its members succeeded to secure it. The mobility between the classes was partly due to the upper class's philosophy of freedom and meritocracy, with which the upper class replaced Feudalism[14]. The upper class pioneered a "society in which rule is by merit, and talent and … in which wealth, income and social status are assigned through competition"[15]. They (bourgeoisie) believed that individuals must direct the course of their own lives.

The British upper class went further in the nineteenth century to consolidate its position as the ruling class. It suggested and supported Liberalism, and secured political, civil liberties, and religious rights for themselves and the lower class. The latter was attracted by the aristocrat's ideas and sought to develop its social conditions to imitate them. The lower class, whose number increased with the immigration from the countryside, asked for many reforms. However, Matthew Arnold (1896) viewed this mobility in classes as being dangerous to the upper class' position. He warns that the Aristocracy is declining; especially in economic and moral perspectives, due to the new capitalists (middle and lower classes) which are taking advantage of the aristocracy's philosophy of freedom. He supported his claim by pointing out to the anarchy the working-class generated in the Victorian society precisely the well-known event at Hyde Park in London on July 1866, which he (Arnold) witnessed the appealing for voting rights made by the populace's leaders. in fact, by making reference to this event in his book of 1869, we deduce that it stands as an inspiration for him (Arnold).

Like the British aristocracy of the nineteenth century which was influenced by changing Historical conditions, America's position in the world by the end of the Cold War has been by a huge distance the most powerful single state in the international system. This status as the 'sole superpower' has meant that world order has largely been understood by reference to perceived American dominance. For some, this has been a good thing, offering an opportunity for the United States to use its exceptional strength to reshape the world for the better. For example, William Kristol argues that "We need to err on the side of being strong. And if people want to say we're an imperial power, fine''[16]. For others, America's position as a 'hyper power' has given rise to imbalance in the international system, an excess of unconstrained influence on the part of a single state. This vision is supported by

> …historical facts on social economic inequalities and geopolitics of the international system compounded by track records of earlier holders of world supremacy such as Britain. It is argued that earlier super powers dominated other nations through imperialism that resulted to colonialism in previous

centuries, causing untold socioeconomic inequalities whose ripple effects are still felt today within the globalizing economy.[17]

Huntington adopts the last view and warns that the West's position as a world leader generates feeling of envy among other countries and thus they stand as a threat to the stability of the West. He also, points that economic developments and its process of Globalization is attracting many immigrants whose presence threatens the very essence of American Identity in particular and the West in general. This reminds us of Noam Chomsky's claim that Huntington's thesis emerged in a warless period and that Huntington is in a quest for new enemies. In doing so, we understand that the promotion of the West is made at the expense of the non-West.

Section Three: The Second Industrial Revolution and the Digital Revolution

The Industrial Revolution, the transition from "an agrarian handicraft economy to one dominated by industry and machine manufacture"[18], appeared in Britain during the nineteenth century. It brought about significant changes in agriculture, industry, transportation, economic reforms, social structure[19], and politics[20]. Ashton argues that it was labeled Industrial Revolution because all the changes that occurred in different sectors during the period were mainly the result of changes in industry[21]. The Industrial Revolution changed the face of England[22] and made of Britain "the workshop of the world"[23]. However, it is worth noting that there is an analogy between the transformations brought about by the nineteenth century Industrial Revolution and the changes which generates from post-Cold War Digital Revolution initiated by rapid computerization. The latter means the swift distribution of ideas, images, knowledge, and information across the globe[24].

Although the Industrial and Digital Revolutions emerged in different countries and indifferent period of times, they generated almost the same consequences on the national and

global levels. The movement of people between classes on the national level was one of the striking effects of Industrial revolution in Britain, whereas, their movement on the global scale was the result of Globalization. They offered opportunities to all people to get access to education and improving their standards of living. They reduced the distance between countries and led to economic and social interactions between them. They pushed the countries in which they appeared to position of superpowers. Some Scholars in both countries point out to the importance of defining and redefining the identity of the ruling powers to face the changes and to avoid decline.[25]

Coming to being within the context of Industrial Revolution and Digital Revolutions, Matthew Arnold's *Culture and Anarchy* (1896) and Samuel Huntington's *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of the World Order* (1996) accentuate this idea of identification respectively. Through their perception of culture, Arnold and Huntington clarify the importance of maintaining ruling powers' culture pure and exclusive. This point, then, is behind producing the second chapter.

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Chapter Two: Culture in Matthew Arnold's *Culture and Anarchy* and in Samuel Huntington's *The Clash of Civilizations?*

In this part of the discussion, we aim to explain the relationship between culture and power. To reach our aim we draw a parallel between Matthew Arnold's and Samuel Huntington's perceptions of culture in their books *Culture and Anarchy* (1869) and *The Clash of Civilization and the Remaking of the World Order* (1996) respectively. Before analyzing each author's conception of culture, an encompassing definition of the concept is needed.

In fact, Cultural studies sheds the light on the nature and flexibility of the word culture. Culture is a controversy word because the concept "does not stand for any entity in an independent object world"[1]. Rather it is viewed as a "mobile signifier"[2] that allows various ways of evaluating and describing human activity for a variety of purposes. That is, the concept of culture is a means that "is of more or less usefulness to us as a life form and its usage and meanings continue to change as thinkers have hoped to 'do' different things with it".[3] Culture has divergent purposes and thinkers realize that it may be more or less useful in different times and places. The concept of culture is, then, "political and contingent"[4] and to study its meaning(s) is to make sense of its uses and the consequences that follow from it.

The above outlook of culture, which explains the changing nature of the concept under different circumstances, guides our study of Matthew Arnold's and Samuel Huntington's view of culture since our aim of doing this study is to decipher the intersection of power and culture in their texts and more particularly in Huntington one.

Section One: Matthew Arnold and the Culture of the Highbrow

This section examines the definition of culture in *Culture and Anarchy* (1869) and it aims to demonstrate the play of power in Arnold's promotion of the culture of the highbrow. Indeed, Matthew Arnold's perception of culture is derived from his evaluation of the social and economic changes brought about by the Industrial era in nineteenth-century Britain. His

theory of culture was the result of his observation of his society. In the first chapter entitled "sweetness and light" in his collected essays *Culture and Anarchy* (1869), Arnold proposed a definition of culture as being a process of 'becoming something, rather than in having something, in an inward condition of the mind and spirit'[5]. Perfection of one's self is what Arnold wants the individual to realize regardless his class. He writes:

> culture being a pursuit of our total perfection by means of getting to know, on all the matters which most concern us, the best which has been thought and said in the world; and through this knowledge turning a stream of fresh and free thought upon our stock notions and habits, which we now follow staunchly and mechanically.[6]

Arnold, thus, argues that to achieve the appealed and required perfection and to change one's vision towards current thought and life, the individual has to get access to particular privileged knowledge. Arnold believed that a noble behavior and intellectual truth-grasping through comprehending the "best knowledge and thought of time"[7] are what culture should encapsulate. Here, we deduce that Arnold associates his definition of culture with people who own a noble behavior and this implies that he refers to the upper class. In other words, he is setting the ground for the naturalizing of the idea that the highbrow culture is only owned by the aristocracy. In doing so, we notice that he aims to prevent the populace from getting access to the means of power, which in Arnold view, is culture. Besides, we notice that Arnold shares the same idea of culture with Huntington. The latter views culture as being unique[8] and owned only by one group who is in his work the West.

The title of the first chapter "sweetness and light" implies the nature of the definition of culture that Arnold has developed in his work. In fact, "sweetness and light" is a distinctive feature of culture and this implies that its owned by a distinctive group. The title means a "harmonious combination of beauty and enlightenment; or a state of reasonableness and amiability, or a situation in which those qualities prevail"[9]. This explains why Arnold has emphasized the necessity of a strong doze of Hellenism in the Victorian society[10]. Arnold had

quoted this expression (the title of the first chapter), which he popularized in the nineteenth century, from Jonathan Swift's *The Battle of the Books* (1704) in which Swift draws a magnificent common point between poets and bees: sweetness and light[11]. In *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of the World Order (1996)*, Huntington, like Arnold, accentuates that western culture reflects "the highest, most enlightened…civilized thinking of humankind"[12]. Thus, both of them rely on culture to demonstrate the superiority of one group over another.

Arnold claims that the process of perfection is linked to curiosity, "to the pleasure of seeing at things as they really are"[13]. He borrows this idea of seeking truth from Hellenism. Arnold recalls the Hellenistic spirit promoting reason, knowledge-seeking and the "spontaneity of consciousness"[14] as indispensible elements that culture should reflect. To explain why culture should absorb Hellenistic ideas, Arnold engages in contrasting Hellenism with Hebraism, which is known for its "strictness of conscience"[15]. He highlights the fact that Hebraism hinders the process of bettering one's self and reaching an absolute truth by erasing ignorance. He insists that 'the difficulties of knowing oneself and conquering oneself which impede man's passage to perfection, become, for Hebraism, a positive active entity hostile to man"[16]. However, this does not mean that Arnoldian culture denies Hebraism. He suggests to keep the balance between the two poles: "When society was dominated by one or the other, the job of culture was to advocate for balance".[17]

Arnold criticizes the upper class's race to embrace power because of its ignore of the rights of the working-class. Arnold's idea of culture amounted to a radical attack on the mechanicality of their (Upper-class) thinking[18], and included his conception of the state which challenged individualism and accentuates collective obligations to all in the context of, for example, state education. Arnold asserts that culture is a social idea:

> and the men of culture are the true apostles of equality. The great men of culture are those who have had a passion for diffusing… For carrying from one

> end of society to the other, the best knowledge, the best ideas of their time…to make it efficient outside the clique of the cultivated and the learned[19].

Furthermore, Arnold's disdain of the imbalance of power in his society was manifested in his classification of English society into those with inherited social power (the Barbarians), those with economic power (the Philistines), and the mass of the people (the Populace). He distanced himself from these classes and refused to identify with any of them: he suggest going beyond individualism and to embrace collectivism by living in a unified community[20]. Huntington, again, reanimates the same idea of a unified society when he warns of the West of its declining in his clash theory.

Matthew Arnold views that acquiring culture was the means toward moral perfection and social good. Culture as human 'civilization' is counterpoised to the 'anarchy'[21] of the 'raw and uncultivated masses'[22]. Culture offered a process and practice in living which might enable people to cope with the changes. Arnold's urbane rhetorical tone seemed to be reminding those in power that culture might prevail and that the Populace had to be reached by its civilizing power. Culture was represented by Matthew Arnold as the 'civilization' of the upper, educated classes against the 'anarchy' of the lower and emerging middle. In other words, he associates culture with the upper class. He informs the upper class that in order to keep the role of the leader on the society, they should not reject the working class reforms and the middle class endeavors to belong to the upper class but rather to assimilate them through education. The latter was not really directed to the benefit of the other classes as it serves the interests of the ruling class. Education in particular and culture in general, for Arnold, is meant to control and subordinate the other classes to the upper class. Having mentioned this, we can say that culture is used by Arnold as an armor for the upper class against other classes.

Section Two: Samuel Huntington and the Supremacy of Western Culture in *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of the World Order*

This section aims to explain Huntington's borrowing and reworking of his English counterpart's perception of culture. It examines the reappearance of Arnold's exclusiveness

ideas in Huntington's text through his definition of civilization as "the highest cultural grouping of people and the broadest level of culture people have short of that which distinguishes human from other species".[23] If considered in the tight of this definition, which Huntington wrote in his article "The Clash of Civilizations?" (1993) and then in his book of 1996, we understand that he views cultural values to be the foundation and thus the core of civilizations. This means, that he equals civilization to culture. Furthermore, he defines civilization as "a cultural entity"[24]. He argues that cultural diversity within one country is unified by a common national identity. The latter is what Arnold refers to when he suggests a collective community to erase classes from his society. Like Arnold who clarifies that culture of the elite is the one to secure order in society, Huntington explains that culture is the distinctive feature of civilization which in turn is the typical indicative of the new world order. According to Huntington, the world is full of cultures, small and large ones[25]. The largest ones are so-called civilizations. The latter is also reflected in *Culture and Anarchy* (1896) in which the author identifies three different classes with distinctive cultures.

In his work, Huntington refers to cultural identities as the cause of conflict in the twenty-first century. This resembles Arnold's warning about the upper class decline; he states that the populace is reshaping itself to be like the upper class and this implies a cultural identity crisis. But since he (Huntington) put the two concept civilization and culture in the same basket, we can alter the expression civilizational identity by cultural identity to highlight the role of culture, as Huntington puts it, in shaping the future of the global order. Huntington notes that they (cultural identities) are composed of "common objective elements, such as language, history, religion and culture, and also by the subjective self-identification of people"[26]; this is, he argues, the broadest level of self- identification. In contrast, Arnold's culture is identified by the balance between Hellenism and Hebraism. In fact, identification

implies the dehumanization of one group at the expense of another with the naturalization of this process.

Religion, for Huntington, is the "principal defining characteristic of civilizations"[26]; it is "possibly the most profound difference that can exist between people"[27]; He points to the rise of religion as a threat to the West global leadership. This reminds us of Arnold's idea that Hebraism is characterized by a "strictness of mind" and thus it must not give an overwhelming power in society. In other words, Huntington reintroduces almost the same stance towards religion as Arnold. This explains Huntington's prediction of a clash between the cultures because of religious beliefs which are not negotiable. Yet, the idea of threat in itself embodies the notion of power. In other words, facing threat involves power.

That civilization equals culture is quite suggestive of the author's intention. His definition revives the nineteenth century definition of culture as being similar to civilization. The ruling powers mobilized this definition to spread their empire under the creed of the civilizing mission. They spread the ideology that they are superior and that they are civilized and they are the best. Huntington then seems to recall this ideology. He relates culture to power especially when he states that culture is "the highest, most enlightened…civilized thinking of humankind"[28]. Culture thus is a means of dominance. He advocates the uniqueness and thus the supremacy of the West in general and the US in particular.

He confirms the superiority of the West by describing it as being a "mature civilization"[29] to communicate the fact that the West has grown up to be reasonable. Also, contrary to the Rest, Huntington, demonstrates the West as holder of values of democracy and self-determination. He values the West as being unique and not as being universal. He bases its uniqueness on four significant criteria: "Christianity, pluralism, individualism, and the rule of law"[30]. These criteria form the basis of the WASPs culture, which is Huntington's culture, and therefore they present the West superiority to other cultures. The West initiated modernity

thanks to these criteria. We may understand that the fact that the non-West is trying to modernize and to compete with the West is a signal of jealousy. This desire to be like the West is denotative of the latter supremacy. It is for this advocacy of the West supremacy that Huntington was described by as an "arrogant WASP patrician"[31]

Culture, eventually, is used as a tool for identification in Huntington's text. We conclude that he promotes a particular Culture in his society at the expense of dehumanizing other ones. He is a debtor to Arnold's vision of culture as a field of representation and identification. Since he wrote from the in- group, this identification appears to be suggestive and illustrative of a particular discourse. Having mentioned the existence of the notion of identification in text, we suggest, then, a third chapter to unfold the idea behind the reintroduction of the nineteenth century dichotomy Self/Other by the end of the twentieth century.

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Chapter Three: the Civilization/Barbarism dichotomy in the *Clash of Civilization and the Remaking of the World* Order and *Culture and Anarchy*

Despite belonging to different eras, Matthew Arnold and Samuel Huntington produced two texts that address the burning cultural, social and political issues of their respective times. The two texts give shape to their authors' beliefs and reflect the social class to which they belong. They share the idea that culture has a great role in defining power in society, forming the identity of individuals, and is tightly linked to religious faiths and practices. The sources of this affinity in terms of ideological stance between Arnold and Huntington can be explained in two ways: one, Huntington writes in the continuity of a Western tradition, whose basis was laid down in the Enlightenment period, and thus be traced up to Arnold; two, the striking similarities in their background, at the level of politics, society, and international relations. Therefore, one of the postulates of the present chapter is that if Huntington's ideas on world intercultural relations have sparked controversy, and sometimes outrage, it is because they reiterate hackneyed thesis going on as far as back as the nineteenth century, and recycling Arnold's ideas, centered on class and ethnicity. In advancing this argument, we also claim that, if Huntington has made a conscious recourse to Arnold's cultural paradigm, it is because he wanted to return to the period when Western identity, to do its definition, the period before the wave of the world migration have altered the sense of purity which was associated with the West.

Section one: Ethnicity in Arnold's and Huntington's Texts

This section explores the ethnocentric treats in Arnold's and Huntington's texts. It aims to reveals the deployment of the cultural dichotomy civilization/Barbarian in *Culture and Anarchy* (1869) and *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of the World Order* (1996). In fact, Arnold's 'Culture' and 'Civilization' invaded European thought in the second half of the eighteenth century, in the eve of Enlightenment[1]. During that period, there was a

growing interest in cultures as a result of the seventeenth century discoveries in other non-European countries. Culture was used as a field of representation and identification: by the bourgeois class vis-à-vis the working class in Europe, specifically in France, by the European explorers in the foreign lands. Through culture, people tried to constitute and "understand their identities in part by […] difference from the Other"[2]. The way people represent their culture to themselves "has nothing automatic about it, but is, at every moment, the product of a construction"[3]. Meanwhile, the word civilization acquired a connotative meaning, the civilizing project of the French bourgeoisie, which was strengthened by the nineteenth century.

Using culture as a standard of identification was renewed by Matthew Arnold in the nineteenth century in his book *Culture and Anarchy (1869).* Like the eighteenth century French thinkers like Francis de Mirabeau, Arnold refers to the rise of the working-class as a threat to the stability and power of the upper class in the Victorian era. To illustrate the menace this class manifested, Arnold engaged in contrasting the upper class with the working one. In fact, we find the knowledge he (Arnold) transmits about the populace to be quite suggestive of the Hegelian Self/Other dichotomy of the previous century. He refers to the working class as being anarchic and declares that it must be ruled by the upper class to ensure law and order in the Victorian society. In other words, the Other in Arnold's view is the working-class which he named the Populace. In fact, we have to explain that Arnold aimed to maintain the cultural rights of his class by the invention of new language mainly the 'Populace'. He uses the power of naming because he is aware of its lasting effects: "to make particular descriptions stick".[4]

The defining characteristic of his identification of the populace as being dangerous is Culture: Arnold distinguishes the populace from the upper-class because the latter is endowed with a highbrow culture which the former does not. Belonging to the upper-class in Arnold's

view, ensues contact with the achievements of the previous century. As we have already explained in the second chapter, the culture Arnold prefers is the one limited to the ruling class, because of the latter access to "sweetness and light" which reflect Enlightenment ideas. Arnold insists that people should

> give rule to the aristocracy, mainly because of its dignity and politeness, surely culture is useful in reminding us, [69] that in our idea of perfection the characters of beauty and intelligence are both of them present, and sweetness and light, the two noblest of things, are united.[5]

However, we have to clarify that this knowledge about the populace is "subject to power, under particular and determinate historical conditions"[6]. By the time Arnold produced his text, Britain was the Greatest Empire in the world. Its power was mainly built upon its colonies from which it sustained its economy. To keep its presence on those lands, it initiated the "civilizing mission" by which it stigmatized the colonized as being inferior and defined itself as the bearer of the torch of civilization and light. It put itself at the center of development and progress and marginalized the colonized people by restraining them in the periphery. Considering Arnold text, we may say that he attempted to warn his government of a dangerous result of its industrialization and occupation abroad to keep its Empire: he attempted to warn against the neglect of the domestic social changes that would bring about its (British Empire) end. He alerts that the aristocracy will lose its position and power gradually if the populace is left without constraints.

Like the colonized people (the barbarian), the populace is dependent on the ruling class, and cannot be left without restriction; otherwise, it will create, in Arnold's view, disorder and anarchy:

> …strong feudal habits of subordination and deference continued to tell upon the working-class. The modern spirit has now almost entirely dissolved those habits, and the anarchical tendency of our worship of freedom in and for itself, of our superstitious faith, as I say, in machinery, is becoming very manifest.[7]

The populace is a threat because they are "uncultivated"[8] and "raw"[9]. Arnold implicitly defines this class as working against civilization and menace to the stability of the Empire in general and the aristocratic class in particular.

Like Arnold, Huntington reintroduces the Self/Other dichotomy to address an internal threat in the West which is the immigrant. He argues that "Western culture is challenged by groups within Western societies. One such challenge comes from immigrants from other civilizations".[10] Considering this claim, we may designate Huntington as believer in the power of the "Other" to consolidate national identity. This view of identification, that the constitution of the self requires the rejection of the Other, shapes Huntington's analysis of cultural politics and his condemnation of multiculturalism[11]. In fact, it is at this level that we notice how Huntington reinscribes Arnold's vision of the Populace as being a menace to the stability of the society. Furthermore, by scrutinizing Huntington's text, we come across some words that implicitly vehicles his discourse of fear of the Other. For example, Huntington claims that "on a worldwide basis Civilization seems in many respects to be yielding to barbarism"[12]

Both Arnold and Huntington's rejection of the presence of the Other can be explained on the ground of the imperialist ideology. In the nineteenth century, non-European colonial subjects were viewed as possessing varying degrees of humanity, and their cultures were considered, for the most part, inferior to European civilization. The most extreme point of imperialist ideology in that time was the extermination of non-European cultures and peoples. And. This is why calls issued for the regulation of the Other's presence in their countries and accentuates upon the renewal of the ruling class's position as a key to the problem of the cultural word Other.

Huntington's anti-multicultural agenda stems from an analogous understanding of identity formation: 'We know who we are only when we know who we are not and often only

when we know who we are against.'[13]   'People', Huntington argues, 'define their identity by what they are not'[14]. The immigrant is thus not welcomed, because he reflects some aspects of the barbarian as they are developed in the nineteenth century thought. Huntington speaks about the increase population and immigration and expresses fears at Muslims' demographical boom. He also refers to the 'hollow center' of the Islamic Civilization and reports the fundamentalist terrorist deeds to consolidate his rejection of the Muslims in the West.

To understand his elitist attention, we must first explore the social class into which he was born and highlight the ideas that underpin his belief. As we know when the writer is studying class formation, just as when we discuss culture, he cannot avoid discussing from the perspectives of his own class affiliations: "there is no neutral, outsider perspective in the idealized sense of the anthropologist forming field research; we are participant observers"[15].In fact, both Arnold and Huntington were born into the elite class, and they believed in its supremacy. Furthermore, He thought that the domination of his class will form an excellent government for the United States[2]. Similarly, Arnold is elite[16].

The influence of class is apparent in the ideas developed and promoted by Arnold and Huntington. In other words, in scrutinizing *The clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of the World Order* (1996), we understand the traditionalistic political culture which emphasizes protection of the traditional social order by limiting power "to a small and self-perpetuating group drawn from an established elite"[17]. The existence of such treats is credible since the texts are produced by the in-group about the out-group. A fundamental grain of an elite-oriented political order is revealed in his promotion of a moralistic culture which glorifies politics as a great activity in the search for a good society[18]; for example, it is reflected in the recommendations suggested by Huntington to secure the ruling seat of the WASP. For this purpose he writes that "the West differs from other civilizations not in the way it has

developed but in the distinctive character of its values and institutions. These include most notably its Christianity, pluralism, individualism, and the rule of law".[19]

Another reason why Huntington, just like Arnold, holds an elitist and exclusivist view of culture and civilization can be found in the social and political context, the latter shows striking similarities with that of his English counterpart. As we have already outlined in the first chapter, Arnold's work appeared as a reaction to the dominant social changes in his society during the industrial nineteenth century. Likewise, Huntington, was influenced by the post-Cold War atmosphere: the acceleration of the globalizing process and the euphoria expressed by other writers from his academic circle.

It is worth mentioning, however, that culture is made up of maps of meaning which is "relational and unstable rather than referential and fixed"[21], because it (meaning) is defined by the context in which it is developed. The Other is "anarchic", for Arnold, "bloody", for Huntington. We may explain that Arnold has based his judgment on the strikes launched by the Unionist in the nineteenth century, and which provoked social and economic unrest and caused huge losses for the capitalist class. Huntington, on this part, stigmatizes the Muslims as being Barbarians because, like Arnold, he backs his study on United States in the era of Cold War that witnessed, especially after the success of the Afghan resistance to pull out the Soviet red Army from the country. This success gave wings to Islamic fundamentalist groups, in Somalia, Sudan, Algeria, etc, in order to assault political power and get rid of Western interference in their countries. Furthermore, as the result of different politics of immigration adopted by European countries, a large number of Muslim immigrants and their children found their way to Europe from the 1970s through the 1990s, forming an important ethnic minority at the heart of Western civilization. This was not without causing fears to Huntington, who seems afraid to see the future generation issued from the Arab/Muslim stock

overwhelm the West. His fears are expressed in the following statement when he states that "Muslims and other societies are beginning to gain strength".

Huntington apprehension of Muslim culture are justified by the supposedly resistence of Muslims to Cultural assimilation. For him, the Muslims keep his cultural values and sticks to his religious beliefs while absorbing the fruits of modernity such as technology. In fact, this description combined with words and expressions such as bloody local conflict[21], kin-country syndrome[22], and fault line[23], remind us of the Barbarian concept as it was developed in the nineteenth century. During that period (nineteenth century), the Barbarian was described as being inflexible and irredeemable: "he has been educated falsely and cannot be re-educated"[24]. That is, the barbarian is always loyal to his culture. Reading Huntington's description of the Muslim immigrants' refusal of assimilation[25], we may say that he applies the definition of the Barbarian of the nineteenth century.

Section Two: Huntington and the Establishment of a New Order

This section is meant to decipher Huntington's idea of order and its link to the word civilization. It explains his anticipated solutions to prevent the problems, which in his analysis, threatening the stability and security of the West. Huntington's aim of the study is to anticipate solutions to reestablish an order which in his vision is disappearing. He is mainly concerned with the global order. It is the title of his book *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of the World Order* (1996) which gives us the first hint about his intention. In fact, in deconstructing the title, we understand that it embodies both the issue (clash of civilizations) and the solution (remaking the world order). The word civilizations, in plural, validates our assumption as the global vision carried in Huntington's work. Besides, words and expressions such as "other worlds?"[26], "global crisis"[27], and "an international order"[28] are here to consolidate the author's vision for a new world order. The word order, however, is also an important factor that allows us to rank Huntington's

definition of civilization as being synonymous to the nineteenth century perception of the concept. In fact, one of the meanings of civilization, as we have already outlined in the introduction, is *Policer* which implies order. Accordingly, Huntington does not make an innocent selection of the title's words of his book, but he intends to communicate implicitly the idea that the Western civilization, America specifically, is the keeper of the world order in the post-Cold War era.

Although Huntington constructs the discourse on threat and fear of the Other analogous to that of Arnold, he provides distinct solutions to handle the problem. He suggests avoiding intervention in the issues of the cleft states and torn states. He explains that interventions produce feeling of resentment on the non-West. This feeling, he adds, is strengthened by the arrogance of the West, which in his view, must be reduced. Thus, Huntington insists on the idea that the West has to let the Rest solves its problems by itself. He proclaims that "Western intervention in the affairs of other civilizations is probably the single most dangerous source of instability and potential global conflict,"[29]. Furthermore, he proposes an alliance with the European countries to consolidate the West against the Rest.[30]Multiculturalism is another factor that Huntington condemns to be dangerous to the stability and unity of the West. He makes his idea clear by warning and exposing its negative consequences on the West. He writes: "if assimilation fails in this case, the United States will become a cleft country"[31]. In other words, America will no longer be a central state of a civilization (a core state) since multiculturalism will reduce it to a home of different nations like Russia which is a cleft country, in Huntington's perception. This justifies his fear about the emergence of new identities (hybrid identities), which in his view, will inaugurate the disappearance of the very essence of the Western tradition and the founding fathers" ideals which form the basis of American culture for centuries. That is why he appeals for the renewal of the West identity by the glorification of its uniqueness.

Endnotes

1. Tzvetan Todorov, *The Fear of Barbarians: Beyond the Clash of Civilizations* (Paris: Polity Press, 2010),28.

2. Chris Barker, *The SAGE Dictionary of Cultural Studies* (London: SAGE Publication, 2004), 139.

3. Tzvetan Todorov, *The Fear of Barbarians: Beyond the Clash of Civilizations* (Paris: Polity Press, 2010), 58.

4. Barker, *The SAGE Dictionary of Cultural Studies* (London: SAGE Publication, 2004), 95.

5. Arnold, Matthew, *Culture and Anarchy*,edited by J.Dover Wilson, (Cambridge: University Press, 1869), 27.

6. Barker, *The SAGE Dictionary of Cultural Studies* (London: SAGE Publication, 2004), 163.

7. Arnold, Matthew, *Culture and Anarchy: An Essay on Political and Social Criticism*, edited by J.Dover Wilson, (Cambridge: University Press, 1869), 23.

8. Ibid, 22.

9. Ibid.

10 . Huntington, Samuel P. *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order*.(New York: Simon and Schuster, 1996), 16.

11. Ibid, 27.

12. Ibid, 30.

13. Ibid, 3

14. Ibid.

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16. http://foreignpolicyandrelations.blogspot.com/2012/10/is-huntington

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17. Gregory Claeys, *Encyclopedia of Nineteenth-Century Thought*(London: Routledge,2006),

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Order*, (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1996), 21.

22. Ibid, 2.

23. Ibid, 11.

24. Mark B. Salter, *Barbarians and Civilization in International Relations* (London: Pluto

Press, 2002), 22.

25. Huntington, Samuel P. *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World

Order*.(New York: Simon and Schuster, 1996), 16.

26. Huntington, Samuel P. *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order*.(New

York: Simon and Schuster, 1996), 4

27.Ibid, 30.

28.Ibid, 31.

29. Ibid, 22.

30. Ibid, 24.

31. Ibid, 16.

General Conclusion

The comparative study of Matthew Arnold's *Culture and Anarchy* (1869) and Samuel Huntington's *The clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of the World Order* (1996) concludes by an illuminating insight into the role of culture in identity formation and the establishment of discourse on fear through civilization/barbarian dichotomy. The study, eventually, demonstrates that the Huntington' discourse is shaped by exclusivist, ethnocentric ideas, and his social class interests. It also reached the result that the West cannot get rid of its traditional habit of promoting itself as being civilized and stigmatizing other groups as being barbarians whenever its interests are in danger.

The civilization/barbarian dichotomy, the essential common point between Arnold and Huntington, is constructed through practices of representations under specific sociological, historical, and political context. The changing atmosphere of the world in the post-Cold War era and the acceleration of Globalization form the context in which Huntington wrote his work. Though not mentioned until the final chapter of his book, multiculturalism becomes Huntington's prime target in the United States' domestic establishment. Samuel Huntington's *The clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of the World Order* (1996) is an illustrative text of the Westerners concern with the issue of identity. His rejection of the embodied globalization, the movement of people, Huntington represents the inclination to focus on ethnic, racial and cultural identities over national identities. He insists on the West's purity and rejects hybridization. Huntington was concerned mainly with the Muslim immigrant threat to the world order. To strengthen his discourse on the threat of this immigrant (Muslims), Huntington resurge the classical dichotomy Civilization/Barbarism in his work. Accordingly, he repeats the nineteenth century mindset and specifies the direction from which the West perceives its chief threat which is always the Civilized/Barbarian dichotomy

The use of the Civilized/Barbarian dichotomy to keep power on the domestic sphere in the nineteenth century and then to reintroduce it in the post- Cold War era is quite suggestive of the West manipulation of power. Huntington's use of the civilization/barbarian dichotomy highlights the continuity of the post-colonial condition in contemporary politics.

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