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**Hobbes, Locke and Astell:  
Dialogue and Polemics**

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## *Dedication*

*To my wife Sadfia, to my children, Fethi, Rym and Ferial*

*To my parents, sisters and brothers*

## Abstract

Seventeenth century political philosophy sanctioned the institution of the Monarchy of Divine Rights and secular absolutism. Though the 1215 Magna Carta and the 1628 petition voted by Parliament, (Cf. Marx, 1972: 11; 115) limited somehow the power of kings, the support of absolute governmental power prevailed. It found expression in Sir Robert Filmer's *Patriarcha* (1680) and Thomas Hobbes's *Leviathan* (1651). Filmer relied on Scripture to justify kingly power as ordained by God whereas Hobbes argued that conferring power sovereignty in one, a monarch or an assembly, would put an end to the primitive 'jingoism' and transgressions that prevailed in English society of his time, a period of conflict between the supporters of the royalist cause and the parliamentary advocates. According to Hobbes, belligerents are comparable to the uncivilised people of the state of "mere nature" which was characterised by warfare and misery.

Hobbes's thesis was challenged by John Locke in his *Second Treatise on Government* wherein the state of nature is an ideal one because men were born equal and free, with an endowment of natural reason. Unlike Hobbes's hordes, the people in Locke's state of nature can govern themselves without transgressing the limits set by the natural law.

Given these considerations, Hobbes offered a "social contract" theory in which the citizens surrender all their rights to an absolute sovereign in return for the preservation of their lives. Locke provided a plan for limited government with people's

reserve to rebellion. In his version of the social contract, Locke extended the natural rights of property, life and freedom into the civil government from whose he demanded protection in exchange of the surrender of some liberties. Yet Locke's Enlightenment philosophy is inscribed in a male frame of reference and overlooks what he deems the female species.

In this dissertation which is composed of three chapters, we propose to discuss, through a comparison, two models of government as they find expression in Thomas Hobbes's *Leviathan* and John Locke's *Second treatise on Government*. We start from the hypothesis that these two documents were meant to sustain and/reform the then current forms of government for the general good of the "commonwealth". The first chapter outlines the most important aspects of the history, culture, and politics of seventeenth century England. The second chapter attempts a comparison between the works cited above in order to bring to the fore the debate in ideas as far as the construction of an ideal "commonwealth" is concerned. Our final argument in this chapter is that the Lockean model of government displaces the Hobbesian one partly because of Locke's advocating individual rights, and partly because his historical documentation has a vantage point against hobbes's imaginary state of nature and the artificiality of his "Leviathan".

The last chapter continues the Enlightenment debate. In order to check the universality of Lockean paradigm, we have compared his essay with Mary Astell's *Some Reflections Upon Marriage*. By shifting the discussion from the high sphere of government to that of the household, we have identified inconsistencies in Locke's

essay and have consequently revised the conclusion we have reached in the previous chapter.

Throughout our discussion, we have borrowed Mikhail Bakhtin's theory of dialogism which he expounded in two books of his: *The dialogic Imagination* (1992) and *La poétique de Dostoievski* (1970) as well as feminist criticism. Our justification for the appropriation of Bakhtin's theory lies in the essay form of the two works and Bakhtin's statement that "the Enlightenment was always struggling against authoritarian conception". The authoritarian conception for Locke is the absolutist power of the reign of James II. For Astell, it refers to patriarchal paternalism as it finds substantiation in Locke himself.

## Résumé

L'objet de ce mémoire est de débattre de la question de l'émancipation de l'homme qui été inscrite dans le projet politique et social des grands philosophes du siècle des lumières. Ce projet s'était fixé l'objectif de renverser les valeurs établies de l'époque médiévale qui prônaient la peur et la superstition, et de les remplacer par de nouveaux paramètres qui sont la vérité, la raison humaine, le consentement et la loi de la nature. Ces valeurs devaient concrétiser dans un contrat social entre le gouverneur et les gouvernés. Ce contrat devait éventuellement aboutir à la tolérance, la rationalité et l'égalité dans les droits. Par conséquent, l'émancipation apparaît comme étant le principe fondamental de ce mouvement libéral et cette émancipation n'était nullement restreinte, mais avait une tendance à l'universalisme. Sa raison d'être était la répudiation de la conception absolutiste et autoritaire et l'instauration d'un régime qui repose sur le consentement mutuel.

D'après John Locke et d'autres philosophes de cette époque, l'émancipation n'était possible que si l'homme arrivait à comprendre l'univers d'une manière rationnelle obéissant aux lois de la nature. C'est dans cette perspective là que s'inscrit la révolution scientifique qui avait connu ses débuts pendant La Renaissance et avait atteint une importante maturation en Angleterre pendant le 17eme siècle avec Francis Bacon et Isaac Newton. C'est ce dernier qui a réussi à expliquer l'univers et à justifier la rationalité de la nature.

C'est aussi dans ce cadre qu'est inscrite l'œuvre de John Locke intitulée : « Essai sur l'Entendement Humain » publiée en 1690. Selon lui, le cerveau de l'homme et à la naissance, comme une feuille blanche « a tabula rasa ». Cela veut dire que les idées ne sont pas innées, mais sont le résultat de l'expérience qu'on vit. Son « 2eme Traité sur Le Gouvernement Civil » soutient l'établissement d'un contrat politique entre le peuple et son gouverneur, ainsi que la doctrine selon laquelle l'homme possède naturellement certains droits inaliénable : **la vie, la liberté et la propriété**. Ces théories ont été formulées dans l'espoir de mettre fin à l'esclavage et l'état de guerre dans **l'état de la nature**.

Ce que Locke a apporté comme nouvelle théorie converge à l'idée que les abus et les inégalités existant sur les plans social, économique et politique peuvent être corrigés étant donné qu'ils ne sont que le résultat des expériences de la vie et de l'environnement, non comme étant ordonnés par Dieu et prêchés par les théologiens.

« Le Second Traité sur le Gouvernement Civil » de Locke s'adresse au monarchisme patriarcal et autoritaire soutenu par Sir Robert Filmer dans son œuvre « Patriarcha » (1680) et Thomas Hobbes dans son livre « Leviathan » (1651). Ces deux livres ont été publiés en une période où l'Angleterre était ravagée par des conflits intenses entre le Roi et le Parlement. Pour retrouver la paix et la stabilité dans la pays, Filmer est allé justifier le droit divin des rois en se referant à l'ancien Testament et à Adam et Noé qui étaient les patriarches de leurs peuples selon ce que Dieu a ordonné. Le premier type de gouvernement, pour lui, était monarchique. C'est donc de la famille, qui n'est qu'une forme naturelle de gouvernement, que les états politiques sont nés.

De son côté, Hobbes a avancé l'argument que le fait d'investir tous les pouvoirs individuels dans une seule personne voire une assemblée, devait mettre un terme au transgressions qui prévalaient dans l'Angleterre de cette époque, une époque caractérisée par un conflit entre les supporteurs de la cause royaliste d'un côté, et les parlementaires de l'autre. Selon lui, les belligérants sont comparables au peuples non- civilisés de l'état primitif de la nature, noyés dans les guerres et la misère.

La thèse de Hobbes a été remise en cause par John Locke dans son *Second Treatise on Gouvernement* (1690). Pour lui, l'état de la nature est un état idéal parce que les hommes naissent égaux et libres et sont dotés de la raison naturelle. Contrairement aux hordes de Hobbes, le peuple dans l'état de la nature de Locke peut se gouverner par lui même sans transgresser les limites établies par la Loi de la nature.

Avec ces données, Hobbes nous offre une théorie du contrat social dans laquelle les citoyens renoncent à toutes leurs libertés et droits en faveur d'un souverain absolu, en échange de la préservation de leurs vies. Locke, par contre propose un plan pour un gouvernement de consensus avec un pouvoir limité laissant au peuple un droit de réserve pour une rébellion. Dans sa version du contrat social, Locke étend les droits naturels de propriété, de vie et de liberté (du peuple) à un gouvernement civil (qui lui assurera, en contre partie de ce renoncement, protection et sauvegarde) . Toutes fois, la philosophie de John Locke est inscrite dans un cadre de référence masculine, et omet par conséquent la gent féminine de son plan.

La présente dissertation, composée de trois chapitres, discute à travers une comparaison, deux modèles de gouvernement qui sont exposés dans *Leviathan* de Hobbes et dans *The Second Treatise on Gouvernement* de John Locke . Nous partons de l'hypothèse que

ces deux documents étaient destinés à soutenir et reformer les types de gouvernement de cette époque là dans l'intérêt général du « commonwealth »

Le premier chapitre trace les aspects importants de l'histoire, de la culture et de la politique de l'Angleterre du 17<sup>ème</sup> siècle.

Dans le 2<sup>ème</sup> chapitre, une comparaison est établie entre les œuvres sus-citées afin de mettre en évidence le débat d'idées concernant la construction d'un « commonwealth » idéal. L'ultime argument dans ce chapitre, est que le modèle Lockeen du gouvernement détrône celui de Hobbes, en effet, Locke défend les droits individuels et sa documentation historique le place en avantage contre Hobbes qui a développé sa thèse en imaginant l'état de la nature.

Le troisième chapitre reflète le prolongement du débat à l'aube du 18<sup>ème</sup> siècle. Afin de vérifier l'universalité du principe Lockeen, nous avons comparé son essai avec *Some Reflections Upon Marriage* de Mary Astell. En déplaçant la discussion de la sphère du gouvernement à celle du foyer, nous avons décelé (identifié) des inconsistances dans l'essai de Locke et par conséquent nous avons révisé la conclusion que nous avons atteint à la fin du chapitre précédent.

Tout au long de notre discussion, nous avons emprunté la théorie de dialogisme de Mikhail Bakhtin qu'il a développé dans ces deux livres : *The dialogic Imagination* (1992) et *la Poétique de Dostoïevski* (1970). L'appropriation de la théorie de Bakhtin est justifiée par le genre des 2 œuvres, à savoir l'essai, et la remarque de Bakhtin, selon laquelle l'âge de lumière reflétait souvent une lutte contre la conception autoritaire. Celle ci, pour Locke, était le pouvoir absolutiste du Roi , Charles. Cependant pour Astell, elle représente le paternalisme patriarcal qui n'est que perpétué par John Locke lui-meme.

## General Introduction

The purpose of this thesis is to discuss the thematic concern of human emancipation and construction of commonwealth set forth in the Enlightenment philosophical, political, and social project which "seeks to replace fear and superstition with **consent** and **truth** and looks forward to the establishment of a social order based upon **reason** and **natural law**" (Macey: 2000:111). **Consent**, truth, reason and natural law constitute the very nature of the Enlightenment. These will eventually concretize in a **social contract** between the governor(s) and the governed. Once the members of society– by consent– enter civil body politic rationality, tolerance, and equal rights will prevail. Therefore, the paradigm of the Enlightenment is emancipation. This emancipation is not restricted but tends to universality; its *raison d'être* is mutual consent and compact which will displace absolutism.

Emancipation, according to John Locke and other philosophers of the Enlightenment, can be reached only if knowledge, that hero of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, is reached. In other words, in order for humanity to attain universal peace and freedom, it is necessary to understand the natural world and man's place in it on the basis of reason. Understood in this perspective, the Enlightenment posits a secular philosophy which assumes change and progress. This assumption draws its force from the fact that history is a dialectical progression, a dialectical progression which takes roots in

the Renaissance and the Reformation of the sixteenth century with their twofold intent of breaking up the Christian Church and ending the world view that the latter has imposed for centuries. Coupled with these events was the scientific revolution, a modern discipline that soon lost patience with religious hair-splitting and pedantry and what was seen as the attempts of churches to hamper progress in thought. Among the leaders of this revolution were Francis Bacon, Rene Descartes, Nicolaus Copernicus, Galileo, Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz, and most significant of all Isaac Newton. It was Newton who explained the universe and who justified the rationality of nature. (CIE)

upon its surface. His *Second Treatise on Government* argues in favour of a **political contract** between the governor and the governed and preaches the doctrine that men naturally possess certain rights, the chief being **life, liberty, and property**. Rulers derived their power only from the consent of the people. The people give up certain of their rights in return for just rule, and the ruler should hold his power only so long as he uses it justly. These ideas were formulated in order to put an end to slavery and the state of war within the **natural state**.

The optimistic view of establishing peace and brotherhood touches upon several levels. On the social level this is reinforced by John Locke's notion that people are the result of their environment. This leads to the idea that the existing social, economic, and political abuses should be corrected. The brutality of law enforcement and the institution of slavery are both attacked by those who believed in the moral improvement of society through reason.

The turmoil of Enlightenment thought draws its existence from discussions about government. The beginning of the Enlightenment period in England coincided with the publication of John Locke's *Second Treatise On Government* (1690) which addresses patriarchal/authoritarian monarchism supported by Sir Robert Filmer (*Patriarcha*, 1680) and Thomas Hobbes (*Leviathan*, 1651). "On the continent of Europe, **reason** and **natural law** seem to dictate that powerful monarchs should rule society. In France, Voltaire poured much of his energy into supporting the powers of the crown against the legislatures and the nobility" (CIE). In England,

Seventeenth-century government was inextricably bound together with the social hierarchy that dominated local communities. Rank, status, and reputation were the criteria that enabled members of the local elite to serve the crown either in the counties or at court. Political theory stressed hierarchy, patriarchy, and deference in describing the natural order of English society. The most common visual description of this political community was the metaphor of the body politic. Like the human body, government and society were organic and their parts interdependent. Each element had its special and essential tasks to perform, without which the body could not function. At the head was the king, whose rule was based upon divine right and whose conception of his role in the state came closer to personal ownership than corporate management. Most of the aristocracy and gentry were the king's own tenants, whose obligations to him included military service, taxes, and local office holding. The monarch's claim to be God's vice-regent on earth was relatively uncontroversial, especially since his obligations to God included good governance. Except in dire emergency, the monarch could not abridge the laws and customs of England nor seize the persons or property of his subjects. (Britannica CD 1994-1994)

The established tradition of the monarchy of divine right as charted out in the quote above was endangered by the political turbulence between Parliament and King Charles I in the 1640s. With the triumph of Parliament and the regicide of King Charles I, the doctrine of divine-ordered monarchy/patriarchy was shaken to its foundation

It is against this political background that the idea of conferring/re-establishing sovereignty to a single monarch was advocated by Sir Robert Filmer. Filmer was a fervent supporter of the divine right of kings, a "doctrine in defense of monarchical absolutism, which asserted that kings derived their authority from God and could not therefore be held accountable for their actions by any earthly authority such as a parliament." (Britannica CD, 1994-1999). Filmer claimed that the family is the natural form of government and that states are developed from it. In his *Patriarcha or Natural Power of Kings* (1680) Filmer reiterates James I's monarchical authority:

The first government in the world was monarchical, in the father of all flesh. Adam being commanded to multiply, and people the earth, and to subdue it, and having dominion given him over all creatures, was thereby the monarch of the whole world; none of his posterity had any right to possess anything, but by his grant or permission, or by succession from him.

Adam was the father, king and lord over his family. A son, a subject, and a servant or a slave, were one and the same thing at first. The father had power to dispose or sell his children or servants; whence we find that, at the first reckoning up of goods in scripture, the manservant and the

maidservant are numbered among the possessions and substance of the owner, as other goods were... (Filmer, R. 1680, *Patriarcha or the Natural Power of Kings* Paragraph numbers from the web extracts at. <http://www.mdx.ac.uk/www/study/xFil.htm>)

Filmer thought that imagining political society as a contract between people is unrealistic, and that the family is a better model for understanding political society.

Thomas Hobbes argues that before men enter into civil society they have experienced life in the natural state. However, Hobbes maintains that there is neither liberty nor equality in that state. He adds that property right exists only when men enter a civil government whose head is an absolutist monarch capable of putting restraint on the various transgressions inherent in the natural state. It follows from this that, there is also no natural law that can limit the actions of the aggressors in the natural state. (cf. Hobbes, *Leviathan*)

John Locke in England and Jean-Jacques Rousseau in France, opposed these views. Locke proposed a regime of people of good will and a society in which natural law guarantees men the rights to **life**, **liberty**, and **property**. Rousseau, in his *Social Contract*, claimed that under government people had substituted **civic freedom** for **natural freedom**. Before the end of the 18th century, their ideas won significant victories. In what became the United States, Thomas Jefferson wove the principles of Lockean rights into *The Declaration of*

*Independence*, and in France, following the Revolution of 1789, the thought of Rousseau could be seen behind *The Declaration of the Rights of Man*.

What comes from the considerations above is that the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries in Europe, mainly in France and England, witnessed the emergence of social **contract theorists** in response to the old established order. Jean Jacques Rousseau expressed the idea in his Book I of *Du contrat social* which is translated as *Social Contract* when he writes in the first section entitled "Subject of the First Book" that "(l') homme est né libre, et partout il est dans les fers. Tel se croit maître des autres, qui ne laisse pas d'être esclave plus qu'eux" (Rousseau, 1992 :5)

The objective of the social contract theorists was to construct an ideal model of society and give it a legitimacy by defining the powers/duties and the freedom/limits of the contractors. They attempted to demonstrate the value and purposes of organized government by comparing the advantages of civil society with the disadvantages of the state of nature, a hypothetical condition characterized by a complete absence of governmental authority. The purpose of this comparison is to show why, and under what conditions, government is useful and ought therefore to be accepted by all reasonable people as a voluntary obligation.

John Locke built his in social contract theory against the background of Thomas Hobbes's conception and against the doctrine of the divine rights of king

advanced by Sir Robert Filmer. What is particularly new in Locke's theory is its liberal dimension. For Locke, civil governments have grown out of historical circumstances. They should be instituted among men, deriving their just powers from the consent of the governed. Locke developed the idea that certain natural rights known through the exercise of reason exist *a priori*. In this way he applied reason to politics and presumed a primary qualification for citizenship to be **rationality**, a requirement for participation in public life. But as male writers, liberal theorists have interpreted this principle as specific to men only since women were presupposed lacking in rationality. The latter were thus excluded from the role of citizens.

In formulating his thesis in defence of Man against the abuse of Authority, John Locke set himself a model of society different from Filmer's and Hobbes's. While Filmer and Hobbes have almost explicitly excluded women from their discourse, John Locke seems to take her defence by premising his arguments on sameness and equality. The extent to which Locke associates/excludes women in his social and political project will be discussed in detail later in chapter three of this dissertation.

John Locke is not the only spokesmen of the Enlightenment liberal thought in England. He only participated in the debate of the great issues of that Age. But his influence is felt particularly in the theoretical bases he provided for that movement. The paradigms he set for the Age of Reason were largely adopted.

But Lockean philosophies appealed more to the male who perpetuated them almost as holy writ. And it is in this respect that the Enlightenment project of emancipation has been questioned by the very arguments it sets forth.

Beside and with the male evolves the female subspecies. To the latter, Locke's intention to free mankind from the shackles of authoritarianism turns into **will to power**. Of the first seventeenth century feminists who dared to measure the extent to which Locke's liberal contractual theories were viable for women, was Mary Astell. In her *Some Reflections Upon Marriage* (1700), she explored the issue of marriage and the unlimited authority of husbands over wives in such a way as to undermine Locke's contractual theory and natural law.

It is in this perspective that we intend to discuss the thematic issue of emancipation of mankind and the construction of commonwealth as they arise from Thomas Hobbes's *Leviathan* (1651), Locke's *Second Treatise on Government* (1690) and Mary Astell's *Some Reflections Upon Marriage* (1700). Each of these writers receive the attention of a great number of critics separately, but so far no book-length study has been undertaken about the three of them together, especially in relation to **the gender issue**. This study is therefore meant as a triangular comparison of the most outstanding works of the three writers.

## Review of the literature

As far as Hobbes's *Leviathan* is concerned, John Locke remains perhaps the most outstanding critic. His *Second Treatise on Government* is no more than a repudiation of Hobbes's theory of absolutism. It is for this reason that we have felt the need to expound our review of the literature more on John Locke's *Second Treatise on Government* and Mary Astell's *Some Reflections upon Marriage*.

### John Locke's *Second Treatise on Government*

The majority of critics and reviewers argue that John Locke's *Second Treatise on Government* is written to justify the Glorious Revolution. Others, like Peter Laslett, argue that John Locke's work is essentially a response to Sir Robert Filmer's *patriarcha*, therefore allusions to Hobbes appear only accidentally. This point of view stands in its own right but we do not adhere to it.

Mark A. Plozay devotes an article on the early reception of John Locke's work and concludes that it raises little interest in scholars. His justification lies in that

Locke did not introduce any strikingly new ideas into political debate. The central framework of the Treatises' arguments was already to be found in James Tyrrell's *Patriarcha Non Monarcha* (London, 1680), Algernon Sidney's *Discourses Concerning Government* (London, 1698, but written prior to 1683) and Samuel Pufendorf's *De Iure Naturae et Gentium* (Lund, 1672) and *De Officio Hominis de Civis* (Lund, 1673).<sup>5</sup> It was more to these authorities, and not Locke, that appeals were made.

Thompson relates that "Locke was so far from occupying the front place among Whig authorities that Benjamin Hoadly could write a work substantially similar to Locke's — *The Original and Institution of Civil Government*, discuss'd (London, 1710) . ( Plozay

According to Plozay, the lack of interest in Locke is due to the fact that his work was written in the same tradition and dealing with the same themes as those of his predecessors. Yet he adds that Locke's work could not pass unnoticed, for years later it was held (by David Hume, mainly) as the philosophical foundation of the Whig Party.

In an article entitled "John Locke and the Intellectual Legacy of the Early Enlightenment", Jonathan Israel considers John Locke as "a 'Founding Father' of the Enlightenment, a figure of immense influence on eighteenth century Western." (cf. Heavens, E. and Buickerood, James G., 2004). He also shares Plozay's idea that John Locke has been ignored, even 'boycotted' by the 'Radical Enlightenment' wing headed by Spinoza, Bayle and Diderot. He ends by saying that "historians have been much more willing to stress Locke's appeal, and the ardor shown by Voltaire and others to promote his reputation, than to draw attention to the countervailing disdain for Locke shown by equally key figures such as Bayle and Diderot." (ibid.)

Writing "On MR. Locke", Voltaire pays homage to John Locke arguing that "(p)erhaps no man had a more judicious or a more methodical mind, or was a more acute logician than Mr. Locke, and yet he was not a great mathematician"

(in Kramnick, 1995: 190). More importantly, François-Marie Arouet de Voltaire meant to vindicate Locke. He wrote: "i()t was loudly exclaimed that Mr. Locke intended to destroy religion... Mr. locke's opponents needed but to examine, calmly and impartially, whether the declaring that matter can think implies a contraction..." (ibid., 193).

Another assessment of John Locke comes from Ian Harris. In his essay "The Legacy of '*Two Treatises of Government*'" he says that

the *Two Treatises* set out two sequences of explanation, one each about politics and society, in both of which efficient causes played a crucial role. Just as Locke had revised causal content in one central instance, by replacing Adam with God as the causal power in procreation, so more widely He was a major source of efficient causation in *Two Treatises*. What was the causal content He provided? He originated people's natural faculties, standing, duties and rights, which were the preconditions of Lockean political institutions (cf. Heavens, E. and Buickerood, James G., 2004).

He goes on to add that the "*Two Treatises* was an explanation of the existence and powers of government. The book had further bearings. Locke both made a contribution to historical thinking and identified criteria to judge social and political developments..." (ibid.) Harris's criticism suggests that John Locke *Treatises* have displaced older conceptions of government.

If the early reception of John Locke's work did not attract the interest of scholars, later reviewers and critics have given too much importance to his political theory. It is the case of Pierre Vitoux who says that the reputation and

influence of Locke have got far beyond the boundaries of England . Vitoux explains:

(L')Influence [de Locke] du reste ne se limita pas à son pays. Sur le plan de la pensée politique, sa théorie de l'équilibre constitutionnel est à la source de l'œuvre de Montesquieu, et Voltaire qui au retour de son voyage de 1726, proclamera que les deux grands hommes de l'Angleterre sont newton pour les sciences et Locke pour la philosophie. (Vitoux, 1969 : 58)

Even Sir Robert Filmer who resembles Hobbes in his defence of absolute monarchy has levelled a harsh criticism against *Leviathan*. In his 1652 "Observations Concerning the Original of Government upon Mr Hobbes *Leviathan*", he "wonder[s]how the right can be imagined by Mr Hobbes, which he saith, is a liberty for 'each man to use his own power as he will himself for preservation of his own life"; "a condition of war of everyone against everyone"; "a right of every man to everything, even to another's body" (<http://www.mdx.ac.uk/www/study/xFil.htm>).

### **Mary Astell's *Some Reflections Upon Marriage***

Lawrence Stone examined Mary Astell's *Some Reflexions Upon Marriage* from a sociological point of view. He believed that she had managed to put into evidence the incompatibility of domestic patriarchy with the political theory of contractual obligation. Nevertheless, women were still not involved in their families and in society at large as autonomous actors, but remained as silent subjects of their husbands and the ever lasting system of patriarchy.

However, he viewed this essay as a claim which was set in motion by the Glorious Revolution and the repudiation of patriarchal monarchy. This claim was articulated with an appeal to improve education for women that would be for the advantage and benefit of husbands. However, Stone esteemed that this appeal did not receive any echo in society. He actually expressed a doubt about whether it had had any effect on improving female education. In this regard, he argued that throughout the eighteenth century, women, in particular those belonging to the higher class, and who had the opportunity to be educated, were still concerned with the aesthetic and fashionable, rather than with the scholarly intellectual. More than this, despite the appearance of several girl-schools around London and other big cities, instruction in them was restricted to pastime tasks as embroidery and needlework.

Another scholar who undertook to work on the writings of Mary Astell is Catherine Sharrok. In 1992, she wrote a dissertation from the same standpoint as Lawrence Stone. Her analysis is related to the status of women as writers and their position in the ideological codes prevailing at the end of the seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries. Her perspective was to illustrate how Astell embarked on a process of de-ciphering the social codes that authorized the marginalization of female subjects. She argued that the essayist had opted first for the anonymity. The latter was intended to seek for non-partisan readers through a model of an impersonal text. Nonetheless, when writing *Some*

*Reflections Upon Marriage*, Astell shifted from this attitude and introduced herself as a writer in an attempt to get freed from the fetters of the dominant masculine ideology.

In this respect, Sharrok advocated that, as a writer, Mary Astell was a renegade to her time, since by deciding to be published, she transgressed the boundaries of patriarchal authority. Yet, Astell rejected the title of 'author' and adopted that of 'reflector' in order to circumvent this authority. In this domain, Sharrok says. '... she distances herself from 'Authority by being about to write against what is Authorize[d]. She believed that assuming the title of an 'author' meant being involved within 'Authority', and the latter was dominated by masculine ideology. She argued that being an author is linked to the concept of authority which commands with the power of prescription.

Besides, and at the level of textuality, Catherine Sharrok considered Astell as one who attempted to demote men to a secondary rank both as textual subjects and readers. In this sense, her essay *Some Reflexions Upon Marriage* is identified 'as one which is to counter parts of that (patriarchal) ideology'.

This task, asserted Sharrok, was done through the use of both parody and irony in terms of patriarchal discourse. The latter were meant by Astell to resist as well as to discredit masculine language authority.

Anne Laurence also counts among the most representative critics who have recently dealt with the works of Mary Astell. She realized a socio-historical

survey about women's conditions and status at different walks and with a variety of aspects: history, marriage, sex and family, literary and religion as well as property and law.

Among women's writings, she evoked Astell's *Some Reflections upon Marriage* and tackled it as a polemical work concerned with politics, education and marriage. In relation to political theories, Laurence admitted that the essay underlined the fact that the family provided an analogy for the state and vice-versa. Nonetheless, she asserted that Astell, like other women writers of her time, did not address the conditions of women in general terms, neither did she challenge the nature of marriage or the conduct of gender relations. Finally, she concluded that Mary Astell was interested in individual issues such as the need for better education. She had as well, considered women's conditions within the frame of the family and housewifery. This was reflected, in the fact that she did not contest class divisions nor called for the political rights of the female sex.

What comes out from the above review is that both Mary Astell and John Locke received wide acclaim during their time though they sank into oblivion for a period of time.

### **Methodology**

Throughout our dissertation, we make ours Mikhail Bakhtin's theoretical and critical procedures of dialogism as he expounds them in two of his major works: *La poétique de dostoïevski* (1970) and *The Dialogic Imagination: Four Essays*

(1992). In the latter work, Bakhtin sets forth the theoretical principles of dialogism. In the former, he applies these principles.

Our appeal to the Bakhtinian paradigm of dialogism can be justified by the fact that Thomas Hobbes, John Locke and Mary Astell formulated their views in the form of the essay. And what is an essay? Edward Hoagland defines it as 'mind speaking to mind' (Hoagland, 1988) wherein the author provokes thought. It follows from this that the dialogisation process is inherent in the essay form. Moreover, Bakhtin himself, according to John Docker (1994), considers the Enlightenment as a parody of the classical and early Renaissance thought. Bakhtin does not however hold, like later critics of the Enlightenment such as Adorno and Lyotard, a negative picture of the Age of Reason. This is so because Bakhtin considers that the Enlightenment contributed to the dialogisation process by refuting the paradigms of previous periods. Besides Bakhtin's theory of dialogism, we shall have recourse to feminist critical theory in the discussion of *Mary Astell's Some Reflections Upon Marriage*. Bakhtin's literary theory and feminist criticism will be outlined respectively in the second and the third chapters of this dissertation.

Our dissertation consists of three chapters including a general introduction and a general conclusion. The first chapter concerns the historical background of the Enlightenment ideas. Chapter two discusses John Locke's *Second Treatise on Government* as a discursive site with its intertextual relation with Thomas

Hobbes's *Leviathan*, while chapter three considers Mary Astell's *Some reflections Upon Marriage* as a response to male liberal thinkers in general and to John Locke's *Second Treatise on Government* in particular. The general conclusion will consist of a succinct re-statement of the ideas developed all throughout this dissertation.

**Chapter One:**

**Historical Background**

Before embarking on the study of the texts proper we think it appropriate to throw some light on the historical context of the Enlightenment period. We shall explore the salient aspects of the period which bear relation to the texts under discussion.

Like all historical trends and movements, the Enlightenment had its roots in the past. Three of the chief sources for Enlightenment thought were the ideas of the ancient Greek philosophers, the Renaissance, and the scientific revolution of the late Middle Ages. The ancient philosophers had noticed the regularity in the operation of the natural world and concluded that the reasoning mind could see and explain this regularity. Among these philosophers Aristotle was preeminent in discovering and explaining the natural world. The birth of Christianity interrupted philosophical attempts to analyze and explain the universe purely on the basis of reason.

The transformations brought about by the Renaissance thought, reformation ideology, and the scientific spirit impacted the different walls of the social life in Europe and particularly in England and France. Let us briefly outline the various social mutations.

As mentioned above, the hierarchical divine order was seriously challenged by the new wave of scientific and philosophical theories that started with Galileo's discovery of the movement of the Earth around the sun and around itself and Machiavelli's separation of political action from moral considerations.

This trend was later on reinforced in England with the findings of such scientists and theorists as Francis Bacon (1561-1625), Isaac Newton (1642-1727) and John Locke (1632-1704). Their theories were subsequently applied to many fields including politics and, in this respect one would assert that the Glorious Revolution (1688) would not have happened without them.

Seventeenth century England could not remain unaffected by this tide of change which is said to have no boundaries: François Marie Arouet de Voltaire (1694 -1778) admitted that enlightenment ideas even owed much of their advancement in the course of the eighteenth century to Sir Francis Bacon, Isaac Newton and John Locke from England (cf. Kramnick, 1995).

Between 1600 and 1700, the country went through unprecedented events ranging from the Civil War, which created several divisions among the English population, the execution of Charles I and the rule of Oliver Cromwell, the restoration of monarchy with Charles II to the Glorious Revolution in 1688. The latter put an end to monarchical absolutism during the reign of James II (1685 - 1688) and brought William III from Holland to the throne in England (1688-1702).

### **General Survey**

To most people, this "Glorious Revolution" which holds its qualification from its bloodless aspect was the outcome of the release of people's minds from the fetters of the imposed traditional chain of being. It was not influenced by so many "miraculous circumstances as the first Earl of Clarendon explained: "That men

might think that heaven and earth, and the stars designed it" but rather a victory of pragmatism and human reason responding to a clearly perceived threat to the laws and liberties of the kingdom.

John Locke (1632- 1704), the patron philosopher of liberalism, tried to justify this Glorious Revolution by the people's willingness to protect these liberties from the abuses of Monarchy under James II, who tried to rule without the consent of the governed through their representatives in Parliament. In his *Second Treatise on Civil Government* published in 1690, Locke advocated a political contract between the governor and the governed. The contract should rely on consent and trust, not on the absolute authority of the monarch who derives his power from the Divine Right doctrine.

Before the wind of change blew into the country, the English life was organized in an established hierarchy within a God-centered world. It was dominated by a blind absolutism of divinely mandated kings to rule over their subjects, an assumption defended by Sir Robert Filmer in his work *Patriarcha* published in (1680). According to the latter, kings are the fathers of their societies and derive their just power from the ancient Patriarch Noah who was the natural father of his people.

In *A social History of England*, Asa Briggs quotes Richard Hooker's *Law of Ecclesiastical Polity*. (1593) saying that: "Obedience of creatures to law of nature (was) the stay of the whole world" and that "all things do work after a sort

according to law." The laws of society, therefore, required that "every part do obey one head or governor." ( 1983:118).

These "ecclesiastical laws" of nature were implemented at all the social levels, including the management of the relationship between the governed and the governor. They were reinforced by paternal authority within the family and the preaching of the church in society at large. Each household, like society as a whole, had its head who in theory at least, expected obedience in his small realm. Wives, by law as well as by customs, were held to be subordinate to their husbands. So, also were children to parents. It is in this respect that William Perkins, the great puritan of the period wrote a *Domestic Conduct* book in 1590. According to him, the definition of a husband was: "He that hath authority over the wife", and of parents: "They which hath power and authority over children"(ibid., :118).

It is then for the purpose of maintaining this chain of being that the Bible was brandished as a shield to justify that "the order of nature" – God's dispensation – was directly linked with the order of man. Such a justification was preached every Sunday from the pulpit or the parish church. The latter was a social center where elections were held, poor relief distributed and announcements either private or public made. The pulpit was almost the sole source of ideas including those on economics and politics.

With the teaching of the clergymen, the English were indoctrinated by the theories of predestination, whereby man's fate was in God's hands, not in his own. They also believed in the eternity of the other life (the life to come) which seemed for them much more real than the brief and uncertain life on earth. The

same belief also reinforced the assumption that the relationship of a ruler to his subjects, of a Lord to his tenants, of a master to his servants and of a husband to his wife should all be governed by the same rules. So was then the hierarchical chain of being ranking from God at the top to women at the bottom.

However, the growth of education and the advancement of learning which started in Renaissance Italy were gradually stretching their influence to all the parts of Western Europe. Thanks to this growth also, 17<sup>th</sup> century England became the cradle for the emergence of a new spirit and a new vision of the world that were to give birth to a number of revolutions which, as we mentioned before, converged in their flow to the Glorious Revolution in 1688 and which are actually very difficult to be separated one from another. Though they apparently covered specific domains of social life such as science, religion and politics, they formed a network of correspondences and influences. The Glorious Revolution is then not to be dissociated from the scientific, the religious and the parliamentary revolutions which preceded it.

### **The Religious Revolution**

In the early years of the 1600s, the First Stuart King, James I (1603-1625) allowed the first Authorized English version of the Bible. The St James Bible, as it is referred to, could thus be at the reach of the English people who were not initiated to Latin. It follows that they could not only read the Bible themselves, but also had henceforth the opportunity to interpret it. The translated version offered

them the possibility for skepticism on what the pulpit was dictating them. Previously, questioning or even being dubious about the church's recommendations and instructions through the clergymen was not tolerated, and the laymen had no accurate knowledge of the content of the Bible to dare challenge the established mystical truth about a miraculous universe. In this respect, Immanuel Kant, the German philosopher, pointed out in an essay he wrote in 1748, the warning of both of the state and the church for the people so as not be skeptical and reluctant towards the received instructions. He says: "But I hear on all sides, "Do not argue!" the cleric (says): "Do not argue but believe." (quoted in Kramnik, 1995 :3) This explains that England, as a society of clergymen, would be justified in obligating itself by oath to a certain unchangeable order so as to enjoy an increasing guardianship on each of its members and thereby over the people as a whole.

However, a considerable proportion of the people gradually came to understand that humanity was not innately corrupt as the clergy taught, nor was the good life found only in a beatific state of other worldly salvation. Gradually also, the English people embarked on a self-construction process as regards religious faith. They could thus slowly throw off the yoke of superintendence and tutelage from their shoulders.

This slow release from tutelage, along with the individual reading and interpretation of the Bible, resulted in religious disputes which were an

undeniable feature of this period. It was the case of Puritanism viewed by a number of socio-historians as a movement of religious reformers prior to the Civil War. Lawrence Stone, for instance, defines Puritanism as: "A generalized conviction of the need for independent judgment based on conscience and Bible reading". ( in Kenyon, J.P., 1978: p. 28). For G.R. Elton, another eminent historian, the word 'puritan' is one which "those best learned in the field do not use without reluctance and apprehension." (ibid., : 28).

From these two definitions, one could hardly avoid concluding that the emergence of puritanism as a religious category, was not going on in the same direction as that of the reconstruction of the English religious landscape. A reconstruction that advocated the use of reason to understand the world through questioning rather than blindly believing in the suspiciously established "divine" code. But the puritans were not the only revolutionary group of the period. There was a variety of other sects claiming the authority of the Bible. Independents, Presbyterians, Baptists, Quakers and Millenarians played a preponderant part in the Civil War that broke out in 1642 between Parliament and King Charles I.

### **The Scientific Revolution**

Goethe Johan Wolfgang Von (1749-1832) says:

Of all discoveries and opinions, none may have exerted a greater effect on the human spirit than the doctrine of Copernicus. The world had scarcely become known as round and complete in itself when it was asked to waive the tremendous privileg e of being the center of the universe.

Never perhaps, was a greater demand made on mankind for by this admission so many things vanished in mist and smoke! [...] a doctrine which in its converts authorized and demanded freedom of view and greatness of thoughts so far unknown, indeed not even dreamed of (<http://www.blupete.com> Literature/Biographies/sciences/Copernicus.htm).

This quotation summarizes the great revolution that started in Renaissance Italy and that took root with Francis Bacon in the scientific domain at the end of the middle ages, attained its completion with Isaac Newton in the 17<sup>th</sup> century. Francis Bacon was one of the pioneers of the scientific spirit. He substantially contributed to the development of the scientific method that relies on observation and experimentation. He announced among many other things, the necessity of rationality in the quest for truth. According to him, the extraction of truth from nature and the inquisition of witches in courts were analogous. Therefore, many critics associated nature with women. Among them one could refer to Carolyn Merchant who assumed that it was during Bacon's period that women became identified with "resisting nature" that needed to be subdued and witches as "chaotic nature" that needed to be controlled.

Another fundamental paradigm of the Enlightenment, set by Sir Isaac Newton reinforced the change of the world view. His *Principia Mathematica*, published in 1687 laid down the theorem of the law of universal gravitation whereby the physical universe operates by simple rational laws (cf. Donovan, 1992). However, the Newtonian world view presumed that all which did not

operate according to reason was Other and insignificant. That's why it was postulated that the public world and the physical cosmos on the one hand, and the emotional, moral and the aesthetic matters on the other, were to be set apart, dissociated. (ibid.) The former is governed by reason while the latter is subjective, capricious and unreasonable. By means of extrapolation, male liberal thinkers held a presumption that women fell into the second category. Therefore, they were considered as being non-rational and had to be controlled and subdued by men, the presupposed superior and reasonable members of the species of mankind.

Before Bacon and Newton, Nicolai Copernicus (1473-1543) was considered as the founder of modern astronomy. The latter's investigations and celestial observations led him to give the world his great work *De Revolutionibus (On the Revolutions of the Heavenly Bodies)*, published in 1543. In this work, he asserted that the earth rotated on its axis once a year. Before that, people used to believe in Ptolemaic theory (of Claudius Ptolemy, an Egyptian living in Alexandria about 150 A.D) whereby the universe was a closed space bounded by a spherical envelope beyond which there was nothing. Earth was a fixed, inert, immovable mass, located at the center of the universe, and all celestial bodies, including the sun and the fixed stars revolved around it. Bruno (1548-1600) and Galileo (1564-1642), both of them Italian physicists, embraced the Copernican theory unreservedly and as a result suffered much personal injury at the hands of the

powerful church inquisitors. Giordano Bruno had the audacity to suggest that the sun and its planets, were but one of a larger number of similar systems. The implication of this was the probability of the existence of other inhabited worlds with rational beings equal or possibly superior to ourselves. For such 'blasphemy', Bruno was tried before the inquisition, condemned and burned in 1600.

This episode shows the extent of the grip that the church had on the established faith and beliefs in the miraculous world. It also shows that any attempt to challenge this traditional view was not tolerated. The most important aspect of Copernicus' work was that it changed the place of man in the cosmos forever. Thanks to these findings, some men in 17<sup>th</sup> century England were becoming conscious of these new possibilities of controlling the forces of both nature and society. The great geographical discoveries, scientific, technical and medical advance, the liberation of thought during the Reformation and after, offered quite new perspectives for fresh thought about the nature of man.

Central to the emergence of this tide of change in England, was the belief in objective truth, independent of the observer, expressible in vigorous human terms. Francis Bacon (1561- 1626) was among the English pioneer scientists who had appealed for a methodological procedure to search for this objective truth. In his *Novium Organum* published in 1620, he said: "I [...] assert that not much can be known in nature by the way which is now in use" (Kramnick, 1995:

41). Bacon's method was both inductive and experimental, amassing data on important subjects, classifying them and developing from them wider rules and hypotheses.

He started from the fact that: "Man, being servant and interpreter of nature, can do and understand so much only as he has observed in fact and in thought of the course of nature: beyond this, he neither knows anything nor can do anything". (ibid., : 31)

Bacon advocated the primacy of interpretation of natural phenomena relying on the instruments of the mind, over anticipations that have their foundations in commonly received notions. He said that "In sciences founded on opinion and dogmas, the use of anticipations and logic is good; for in them, the object is to command assent to the proposition, not to master the thing." (ibid., : 40)

With this experimental methodology, Bacon rejected the old Aristotelian and scholastic methods of learning implemented in universities. He affirmed that one could not "expect any great advancement in science from the super inducing and engrafting of new things upon old. We must begin a new from the very foundations, unless we would revolve forever in a while with mean and contemptible progress." (ibid., : 41)

The repudiation of the traditional curriculum set forth a new scientific approach which seemed to have had a large echo among the scientists that came after Bacon. Isaac Newton (1642- 1727), Robert Boyle and John Locke brought

about the assessment of natural laws and natural phenomena in a way that metamorphosed the human existence than ever before.

Experimental science spread quickly during and after the Civil War (1640-1660). Under the Commonwealth of Oliver Cromwell, there had been a group of remarkable resident scientists at the universities and in the city of London. Their work came into the limelight of fashion and favour at the court of the Restoration (1660). The Royal Society was founded under the patronage of King Charles II (1600- 1688) and his cousin Prince Rupert, himself a conductor of chemical experiments. Many subjects of daily importance were being studied in a Scientific Spirit that already had a great influence on educated thought in England.

Isaac Newton, Professor of Mathematics at Cambridge University immortalized this new science and its ideals for the coming century. The advances reached in 17th century England and even in the following centuries were greatly indebted to this man. He had a tremendous contribution in familiarizing the minds of his countrymen with the idea of natural law in the universe. With Newton, modern civilization did something that the ancient had not been able to do. According to him, the natural universe is governed not by the miraculous whimsy of supernatural forces, but ruled by rational scientific laws which are accessible to human being through the scientific method of experiment and observation. Newton's idea resulted in a coherent system of verifiable

predictions and set up the tone for much of what would follow the publication of his *Philosophiae Naturalis Principia Mathematica* in 1687.

### **The Political Revolution**

The period we are concerned with also went through a political revolution which was no less important than the scientific and the religious ones we have outlined before. It had its consequences, not only on the political system, legislative methods and the organization of the relationship between the governed and the governor, but also on the assessment of the natural rights of people. The European mind that had considerably improved in its scientific and philosophical view was then demanding a similar improvement in terms of political theories.

During his life time, Nicolai Machiavelli (1496- 1527), the Italian philosopher had been calling for a new political paradigm that separates between morality and politics. Half a century later, the French philosopher, Jean Bodin (1530- 1596) did the same with his appeal for the institution of a high legislative authority that symbolized the state in his book *Les six livres de la République* , published in 1576). It follows that, in the 17<sup>th</sup> century, Europe had reached such a political thought that new political theories were imposing themselves as a necessity. It is then in this context that the natural rights theory and the notion of the social contract appeared in the second half of the century with Thomas Hobbes and John Locke.

However, if the political ideas had reached a certain level of advance since the late sixteenth century in Europe as whole, it was in England that the political events of the mid seventeenth century urged a serious debate for their implementation in the system of government: the political situation culminated in a conflict between the King and Parliament during the 1630s and 1640s. This political and constitutional problem arose mainly from the controversial relationship between the executive and the supporters of the Divine Right doctrine on one side, and the parliamentarians of the House Commons on the other.

In reality, this conflict between Parliament and King is as ancient as the reign of King John I in the thirteenth century. The tradition of associating parliament to the king's rule had taken its root in the Magna Charta or the Great Charter that the king was obliged to sign in 1215. This document had limited the king's abuses in imposing taxes. It also stipulated that nobody should be executed or kept in prison without a fair trial. During this period, it was the Barons who had impelled the king to take their advice in ruling the country, but in the course of time, a parliament with two houses, the Lords and the Commons, was instituted. Yet the Magna Carta guaranteed only against arbitrary disregard for feudal right. The authors (the barons) neither intended to dismantle the royal government nor legitimate rebellion. Still the document was a forerunner of the rights of Man and the Bill of Rights of 1689.

In the seventeenth century, the relationship between the parliament and the king was raised to debate and conflict over the question which was to what extent parliament was to be involved in decision making. In James I's reign (1603-1625) parliament, composed mainly of the propertied men, was quite clearly arrogating more power to itself over taxation and asserting its liberties and independent status. James often retaliated by enunciating the theory of the Divine Right of the king and stretching the royal prerogative. But because of his urgent need for money, he usually resorted to compromise with parliament. His son Charles I (1625-1649) was less wise, however. When parliament tried to limit his power and oblige him to sign the Petition of Rights in 1628, he ignored it and continued to impose taxes without parliamentary consent. More than this, he proceeded to arbitrary arrest and imprisonment of those who refused to pay the taxes. In 1629, Charles I simply dissolved parliament and ruled the country for twelve years without it.

Yet, under the threat of the Scots' invasion of England, the King felt the need to summon Parliament in April 1640. But militant, and at the same time apprehensive, the Commons refused to vote the huge sum demanded unless their multitudinous grievances were settled. The result was that parliament was dissolved again after only three weeks.

Consequently, a civil war broke out between the military parliamentarians and the King's army. The war ended with the execution of Charles I at White Hall

in 1649, and Oliver Cromwell (1599- 1658), a Member of Parliament, was to rule the country with the military leaders of the civil war until he died in 1658. Cromwell's successors did not have his skills, but their harsh military rule led the English people to feel nostalgia towards the softer monarchical rule that was restored in 1660.

In his book *Oceana* (1656), James Harrington claimed that the war had broken out because of shifts in the ownership of land from the Crown and lords to the commons resulting in a transfer of power. But for Karl Marx (1818- 1883), the English struggle was that of Bourgeois against feudal England, and that the power followed property; it was a Bourgeois revolution led by progressive elements in the society. Many others, evoked reasons which ran in the same flow: it was the members of the nobility and gentry who drew England into the civil war.

Before the war, the Long Parliament had abolished the Court of Wards. Then after, Land lords were free, not only from the burdens of feudal service, but from monetary substitutes as well. Enormous areas of confiscated ecclesiastical and royalist land thus changed hands into the growing mercantile community, the yeomen and the artisans' classes where there was much personal and economic independence. The 1628 Bill of Rights, which we mentioned before, is another sigh of relief in the sphere of civic rights. The Bill was a catalogue of grievances

and demands to put an end to non approved parliamentary taxation, martial laws and unregulated powers of imprisonment.

The conclusion one can draw from the Cromwellian revolution is that it resulted from the new political and religious thought. The latter were only possible with the spread of a new scientific spirit. It was a war of ideas both in church and state. Men chose their sides on account of their religious and political opinions; there were more lords and gentlemen on the side of the King, as there were more yeomen and townsfolk on the side of Parliament. Above all, the extending city of London was on the side of Parliament.

England went then through the *Interregnum* when monarchy and the House of Lords were abolished. The state was governed by an elected debating assembly in the body of the House of Commons. Oliver Cromwell, originally a farmer, symbolizes the downfall of a whole system of traditions in which the king and the lords reigned under the aegis of the Divine Right doctrine.

The puritan aspect of the revolution needs also to be underlined. As already mentioned, the puritans had emerged as a revolutionary group before the outbreak of the war. Therefore it is almost systematic that they were to influence the way England was to be run during this period. The Major-Generals exercised their authority in the name of "godliness and virtue", and the puritan Richard Baxter hoped England to be "a land of saints and a pattern of holiness to the world". ( quoted in Traveyan, G.M., 1942:346)

The Stuart Dynasty resumed power with Charles II (1600-85) and James II (1685-88). Politically, it restored the office of the king, parliament and law in place of the military rule of the *interregnum*. Ecclesiastically, it restored the bishops to reinforce the religious inequalities in place of Puritanism. Socially, it restored the nobles and gentry to their hereditary place as the leaders of local and national life. Many of the Roundhead leaders disappeared into exile, and religious non-conformists suffered intermittent persecution. The victims of the restoration were thus members of the middle class who were the effective actors and promoters of the civil war, both among the puritans as religious a sect or as merchants as an economic class.

But the restored monarchy was no more absolute in character as it was before the parliamentary revolution. Apart from the last years of Charles II 's reign (1682-85) and James II 's short reign; its most important feature was the supremacy of the non-monarchical elements of the constitution, that is to say, the House of Commons in Parliament and the Common law. The seeds of a new system of government were already sown. The French Ambassador in Charles II's London wrote to Louis XIV about English monarchy describing it as one which "has a monarchical appearance, and there is a king, but it is very far from being a monarchy". (quoted in Hill Christopher, :36) This is indeed evidence for the birth of a new type of monarchy that has, though reluctantly and with much resistance, absorbed the liberal ideals of the revolutionary period. These ideals were held as

safeguards against any abuses from the monarch and the gentry. The legislative body through Parliament proved to be a necessary component of a germinating new English political system. People rejected absolutism and abandoned belief in divine monarchical patriarchy. When the Stuart king James II tried to revive these falling-apart dogmas, he was overthrown in the Glorious Revolution in 1688.

These changes that were brought by the different revolutions of the seventeenth century resulted in the enhancement of the importance of the natural rights and the reduction from the despotic authority of the monarch over his subjects. It was however, not the only face of facts. The citizens were in fact freed from the fetters of an absolute monarch and his abuses. John Locke advocated that no civil government could be effective without the agreement and the consent of the governed. But was this freedom enlarged to cover the rights of women in the seventeenth century family and society? Did their conditions improve? Did these changes also diminish their subjection to the male sex? We shall attempt to answer these questions in the following section which is devoted to the woman issue.

### **The Condition of Women**

In the seventeenth century women were generally acknowledged by all as the 'Weaker Vessel'. This phrase had originated with Tyndale's translation of the New Testament into English in 1526, and later was given further prominence in the King James Bible. In the latter Saint Peter advises wives to "be in subjection

to your own husbands" and urges these same husbands to give "honour unto the wife as unto the weaker vessel" (quoted in Fraser, 2002: 1). The nature of this weakness, however, may concern a variety of aspects: moral, spiritual, physical, and intellectual.

According to Antonia Fraser, seventeenth century people had accepted the legacy of the moral inferiority of women for Eve's behaviour in the Garden of Eden and thus, felt the duty to protect them from temptation and sin. Witchcraft and sorcery represented perhaps the extreme forms of the devils' attention to womankind. (Fraser, 2002: 2) In this regard, William Perkins wrote in 1608: "the woman being the weaker sex, is sooner entangled by the devil's illusions with this damnable art than the man." (quoted in *ibid.*, :3) Similarly Elizabeth Josceline, laying down precepts for her unborn child in 1622, hypothetically wrote to her: "thou art weaker and thy temptation to this vice [witchcraft] greater" (*ibid.*, : 3).

Women's spiritual inferiority was rooted in the notion that they were actually born without souls. Though it represented the extreme view, this notion had certainly influenced those who doubted in the equality of the male and female souls. It is the reason why the need to stress the sameness of the soul in the bodies of men and women was significantly felt by the friends of the female cause throughout the seventeenth century. In his 1637 book, William Austin pointed out that in the "soul there is neither hees nor shees" (*ibid.*, : 4). Richard

Allestree went a step further and declared that God "gave the feeblest woman as large and capacious a soul as that of the greatest hero". Ibid., : 5) In spite of the individual initiatives such as that of Austin and Allestree in the defence of women's equality, the assumptions concerning women's spiritual inferiority remained largely the dominant trend.

Lawrence Stone in *The family, Sex and Marriage in England 1500-1800* (1979), for example, underlined the reinforcement of the pre-existing patriarchal aspects of internal power relationships within the family in seventeenth century England. According to him, this occurred partly because "the nuclear family became more free from interference by the kin" and partly "because of the wider religious, legal and political changes which enhanced the powers of the head of the household" (Stone, 1979:94)

The shift to Protestantism meant that the family head was the inheritor of much of the authority and many of the powers of the priests. The family and its head thus filled the vacuum left by the decline of the church and its priests as the central institution for moral and religious instruction, and the word of God was to some degree removed from the parish church and transferred to the private home. Man now stood alone before his maker, with nothing but his conscience, the Bible and the preachers to guide him in the moral direction of his household.

Moreover, the rise of the nuclear family to replace the older one which used to include the relatives and all that was covered by the notion of kinship meant a

decline in the involvement of the latter in the family affairs and their interference to settle eventual conjugal conflicts. Wives maltreated by their husbands were less able to turn to their kin for support and defense. Therefore, this partial withdrawal of external support and intervention made family life more liable to explosive conflicts between husband and wife.

In such a situation, where women lost the church as a sacred place for the alleviation of their pains and the priest as a confessor, on the one hand, and of the relatives as mediators and supporters against the husband's abuses on the other, a pertinent question is worth asking. Where not the conditions of women after the Glorious Revolution worse than they were used to be under the hierarchical order?

Stone again believes that the growth of patriarchy was deliberately encouraged by the new Renaissance state on the grounds that the subordination of the family to its head is analogous to the subordination of subjects to the sovereign. There ensues that the theoretical and theological doctrines of the time were insistent upon the subordination of women to men in general, and to their husbands in particular. In 1609, James I informed his subjects that "the state of monarchy is the supremest thing upon earth", arguing that "kings are compared to fathers in families" (Stone, 1979:110, Marx, 1972: 111). Some twenty five years later, Sir Robert Filmer (1588-1653) argued the case for absolute monarchy using the same logic: "we find in the Decalogue that the law which

enjoys obedience to kings is delivered in the terms of: "honour thy father" (Robert Filmer, *Patriarcha*, 1642). Filmer wanted to model of the system of government in the state on the system of government in the family. He argued that the first family is that of Adam who was the divinely appointed monarch of the world over all his descendants. ([http/www.ask.com](http://www.ask.com)).

These facts conclusively prove that patriarchy was reinforced by the state in much the same way as that of the authoritarian dominance assumed by the husband and father over the woman and children within the nuclear family.

Similarly, all the magisterial Reformed churches stressed the subordination of wives to the husbands. In this respect, the shift to Protestantism meant the loss by the wife of the control over the domestic rituals of religious practices, as the husband and father became the spiritual as well as the secular head of the household. Among the Anglican theologians of that time, John Milton had very strong views about the subordinate function of women through his rhetorical question: "who can be ignorant that woman was created for man, and not man for woman?" (Quoted in Stone, 1977: 102). Stone drew the following conclusion from this quotation: "...he (Milton) demanded divorce only when the unfitness lay with the wife, not the husband....Milton thus carried the Protestant concept of holy matrimony about as far as it could go without abandoning the sexual superiority of the male" (ibid:103)

Besides all the prejudices which derived from customs and traditions, social assumptions and beliefs, the English law reinforced the status of women as inferior beings. Therefore, women suffered as much under social practice as under the resolutions brought by law. Of these was the so-called law of Coverture which referred to women's legal status after marriage. Legally, upon marriage, the husband and wife were one entity. The identification of husband and wife as one person had placed the former at an advantageous position which allowed him to have complete control over his spouse's property, a property he could sell or dispose of without her permission. The inequality/inferiority of women in marriage was captured by William Blackstone in one sentence: "the husband and wife are one, and the husband is that one" (qtd in Stone, 1979:222)

In his *Commentaries on the Laws of England* (1765) the same Blackstone expounds his arguments in the following terms:

By marriage, the husband and wife are one person in law: that is the very being or legal existence of the woman is suspended during marriage, or at least incorporated and consolidated in that of the husband under whose wing, protection and cover, she performs everything; and is therefore called ... a female-covert. (Blackstone, 1765. Html document release. Not paginated)

In the spirit of the Laws resolutions, all women were understood to be either married or to be married. But being married or not, women were always handicapped by law. This state seems to have continued for centuries after the

Glorious Revolution in the sense that a century later John Stuart Mill captured the situation of married women as follows:

I am far from pretending that wives are in general no better treated than slaves: but no slave is a slave to the same length, and in so full a sense of the word, as a wife is. Hardly any slave, except one immediately attached to the master's person, is a slave at all hours and all minutes; in general he has, like a soldier, his fixed task, and when it is done, or when he is off duty, he disposes, within certain limits, of his own time, and has a family life into which the master rarely intrudes...

Not so the wife: however brutal a tyrant she may unfortunately be chained to— though she may know that he hates her, though it may be the daily pleasure to torture her, and though she may feel it impossible not to loathe him— he can claim from her and enforce the lowest degradation of a human being, that of being made the instrument of an animal function contrary to her inclinations. While she is held in this worst description of slavery as to her own person, what is her position in regard to the children in whom she and her master have a joint interest? They are by law *his* children. He alone has any legal rights over them. No one act can she do towards or in relation to them, except by delegation from him. Even after he is dead she is not their legal guardian, unless he by will had made her so. He could even send them away from her, and deprive her of the means of seeing or corresponding with them, until this power was in some degree restricted by Serjeant Talfourd's Act. This is her legal state (Mill in Chalot et al., 1998: 46-47)

A wife in the seventeenth century was sought for possession, wealth and a means to reach material advancement. At marriage, a girl brought with her a dowry. But this 'portion' as it was termed at that time became her husband's property. In this concern the Laws of resolutions read: "that which the husband hath is his own, that which the wife hath is the husband's." (Fraser, 2002:13). It

follows that young heiresses were hunted as though they were animals. In spite of the young age of the bride, the contract of marriage was made though the consummation of marriage might be postponed. Moreover, as far as consent is concerned, it was not seriously taken into account. The girl might be forced into marriage against her will by parental pressure.

The marriage crisis in the seventeenth century was not limited only to the married women. It touched women out of the marriage bond. Even girls who reached the age of marriage were limited economically and socially. Therefore they found it difficult to realise the aims of economic individualism. Ian Watt documented this aspect in his book entitled *The Rise of the Novel* in which he drew examples from Defoe's character Roxana who as "she-merchant" [...] realises that the pursuit of money cannot be combined with marriage" since the very nature of the marriage contract was "... nothing but giving up liberty, estate, authority, and everything to the man, and the woman was indeed a mere woman even after- that is to say, a slave." (Quoted in Watt, Ian, 1957: 142). Watt went on to explain that

To those without Roxana's peculiar combination of qualities, however, the achievement of economic independence outside marriage was becoming increasingly difficult in the eighteenth century [...]. At the same time women found it much more difficult to find a husband unless they could bring a dowry. There is much evidence to suggest that marriage became a much more commercial matter in the eighteenth century than had previously been the case (ibid., :142)

One of the obvious remarks that can be drawn from the quotation above is that the women were bound to seek marriage even if they abhorred it. Their restrictions to the domestic sphere was the main cause of their economic destitution. In the words of Defoe's *Moll Flanders*, the marriage market had become "unfavourable to our [women's] sex". This disadvantage were particularly more acute in the case of very poor women who either lived as spinsters or fell prey to any man. Defoe's *Moll Flanders*, one of those unfortunate women, explained:

On the other hand, as the market ran all on the men's side, I found the women had lost the privilege of saying no; that it is a favour now for a woman to have the question asked, and if any young lady had so much arrogance as to counterfeit a negative, she never had the opportunity of denying twice, much less of recovering that false step, and accepting what she had seemed to decline. The men had such choice everywhere that the case of women was very unhappy; for they seemed to ply at every door, and if the man was by great chance refused at one house, he was sure to be received at the next (Defoe, 1965: 75)

This difficult situation for women helps us to understand why some women adopt celibacy and why men go on fortune hunting. On the other hand, the great number of women in nunneries indicates that women seek solace as religious devotees instead of accepting humiliation.

## **Emergence of Female/Feminist Voices**

Throughout the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, the assumption that women belonged to the home as wives and mothers was a deep rooted tradition. This assumption was reinforced by male liberal social theorists and philosophers. Though their theories lay claim to sameness and equality, their discussion of the various subjects overlooked, and in some cases eschewed, the issue of woman. Their neglect of the woman's condition was, however, only not explicit. Within the very line of their argument there transpired—implicitly—some timid plea in favour of the weaker sex. This plea on the part of man in favour of woman was just another way of saying that she could not defend herself and because man being good and just, had pity of her and brought her grievances on the public fore. Yet this was done in a male perspective.

This state of affairs had led to the emergence of bold enough women who have adhered to the motto of the Enlightenment, as Immanuel Kant had it in German, *Sapere Aude*, or "Have courage to use your own reason!". Exacerbated by male arrogance and chauvinism, some Liberal feminist writers broke male tutelage and sought to argue that the feminine class were persons entitled to the same basic rights as men. It is within this context, that Mary Astell (1666-1731) and Mary Wollstonecraft (1759-1797) are to be considered as defenders of women's cause in early modern England, one at the beginning of the eighteenth century and the other at the end of it. The former wrote an essay

entitled *Some Reflections Upon Marriage* while the latter published *A Vindication of the Rights of Woman*.

## CHAPTER TWO

**Thomas Hobbes's *Leviathan* and John Locke's *Second Treatise on Government*: Theoretical Foundations of the 'Myth of the State'**

We have stated in the general introduction that John Locke wrote his *Treatises on Government* in particular circumstances, that is, in response to absolutist advocates like Sir Robert Filmer who drew heavily on the Scriptures in support of a monarchy of the divine rights, and Thomas Hobbes whose *Leviathan* charts out an ideal government based on an absolutist sovereign. In this chapter of our dissertation we turn to the works of the authors to discuss the dialogical relation that they entertain.

Our interest in the comparison of Locke's and Hobbes's philosophical projects rests on the basis that their conceptions of models of society are contemporary to one another and respond to social circumstances, namely the political disturbances in the English society during the early Stuart Dynasty for Thomas Hobbes who wrote his *Leviathan* in 1651 and during the reign of William of Orange for Locke who published his *Two Treatises on Government* in 1690.

Another justification for our choice can be found in the very conditions under which the two works were produced. The authors, for example, made it known that all the insight that is poured into their respective work derive from a discussion they had had in private with their closest friends while they tried to cogitate on issues dear to them in a period of agitation and political unrest:

Hobbes himself related how he was in a gathering of learned men when the question was asked, "What is sense?" No one appeared to know the answer, but it occurred to Hobbes that, if material things and all of their parts were always at rest or in uniform motion, there could

be no distinction of anything and consequently no perception; thus, the cause of all things must lie in diversity of motion. He was therefore driven to geometry to gain insight into the principles of motion. (Britannica CD 1994-1999)

Locke's pronouncement on the genesis of his work is worded as follows:

Were it fit to trouble thee with the history of this Essay, I should tell thee, that five or six friends meeting at my chamber, and discoursing on a subject very remote from this, found themselves quickly at a stand, by the difficulties that rose on every side. After we had awhile puzzled ourselves, without coming any nearer a resolution of those doubts which perplexed us, it came into my thoughts that we took a wrong course; and that before we set ourselves upon inquiries of that nature, it was necessary to examine our own abilities, and see what objects our understandings were, or were not, fitted to deal with. This I proposed to the company, who all readily assented; and thereupon it was agreed that this should be our first inquiry. Some hasty and undigested thoughts, on a subject I had never before considered, which I set down against our next meeting, gave the first entrance into this Discourse; which having been thus begun by chance, was continued by intreaty; written by incoherent parcels; and after long intervals of neglect, resumed again, as my humour or occasions permitted; and at last, in a retirement where an attendance on my health gave me leisure, it was brought into that order thou now seest it.

In his "Essay on Man", Alexander Pope writes that "that the proper study of mankind is man" (cf. Kramnick, 1995: 255-56). Locke's and Hobbes's respective pronouncements indicate that before they ever built their social project, they began with the study of the human element. Hobbes studied human motivations,

desires and hate in the first Book of his *Leviathan* whereas Locke set limits to human understanding in his *An Essay Concerning Human Understanding*.

Both philosophers were adulated and hated at the same time; they were protected (Hobbes by the Cavendish family and Locke by Lord Ashley,) but also compelled to self-exile. These common features of theirs provide a good field of comparison on the dialogical level particularly when it is now established that Hobbes and Locke assumed unconventional postures at times in order to raise controversy or polemic. These postures remind us of those of Socrates. Socrates, it should be observed, were even the cultural model of the Renaissance and the Enlightenment educated men who were in quest of truth. Just like Socrates, Hobbes and Locke wanted to show that their works/ essays arose out of discussion/ dialogue with a circle of privileged friends. For them, the essay was the ideal replacement for the Platonic dialogue. Their philosophical vein allows debate and an on-going dialogue. We have titled this chapter "Theoretical Foundations of the 'Myth of State', a phrase used by Patricia Springborg in the introduction to her book entitled *Astell: Theorist of Freedom from Domination* (2006) because we think that Hobbes's *Leviathan* and Locke's *Second Treatise on Government* are foundational texts in political and social contract theory, just like Plato's *Republic* and as such they constitute models for a civilized society far from the supposed state of nature.

## Theoretical Basis

Our approach to Hobbes's and Locke's texts will, therefore be dialogic, and it is borrowed from Mikhail Bakhtin who provides his theory of dialogism for the novel and starts from the assumption (which he later verifies in his study of Dostoevsky) that the novel is dialogic. Bakhtin is quick, from the start, to inform the reader that the dialogic form of the novel applies to the other forms of expression as well. Therefore, Bakhtin excludes any form of monologia and maintains that each and every genre or medium has its own *contrepartie*:

It is our conviction that there never was a single strictly straightforward genre, no single type of direct discourse—artistic, rhetorical, philosophical, religious, ordinary everyday—that did not have its own parodying and travesty double, its own comic-ironic *contrepartie*. What is more, these parodic and laughing reflections of the direct word were, in some cases, just as sanctified by tradition and just as canonized as their elevated models (1984: 53).

Bakhtin's statement suggests that any original text (understood as sacred or conventional) is subject to criticism, that is, it is reliant on its *contrepartie*. This criticism may be carried out under the form of stylisation, parody, open or hidden polemic. In other words, the truth of this text should not be taken for granted because its worth is revealed only through the process of dialogisation. And parody, stylisation and hidden polemic can be understood as types of this dialogisation.

Bakhtin defines parody as an image of the original text, or “an object of representation or more precisely a representation that is parodied or stylised” (1981:44). Bakhtin goes on to explain that parody appropriates existing discourse and themes to introduce into them an orientation diametrically opposed to their own because the parodist clashes with the other’s voice over the referent or the way it is represented.

Parody and stylisation are integral parts of what Bakhtin calls the dialogic utterance. Bakhtin correlates the dialogic utterance directly with the extra verbal context of reality (situation, setting, history) and the **utterances** of other speakers. As a link in the chain of speech communication, the utterance has several distinguishing characteristics, the most important of them are: a referentially semantic element (**theme**), an expressive element (the speaker or the writer’s **attitude towards the theme**), and, most importantly an element of *responsiveness* or “addressivity” (its relation to other utterances).

Bakhtin defines dialogism/hetroglossia or double voiced discourse as “another’s speech in another’s language, serving authorial intentions but in a refracted way”. This language “serves two speakers at the same time and expresses simultaneously two different intentions: the direct intention of the character who is speaking, and the refracted intentions of the author” (quoted in Riche, 1998:44). According to Bakhtin, works are considered as discursive sites for the dialogic interplay of multiple voices, each of which is not merely a verbal

but a social phenomenon. Bakhtin explains that each utterance is implied in such a way as to bring a polemic. He writes:

In hidden polemic the author's discourse is oriented towards its referential object, as any other discourse, but at the same time each assertion about that object is construed in such a way that, besides its referential meaning, the author's discourse brings a polemical attack against another's speech act, another assertion, on the same topic. Here one utterance focused on its referential object clashes with another utterance on the ground of the referent itself. That other utterance is not reproduced; it is understood only in its import (qtd in Riche, B. 1998: 15).

Another aspect in Bakhtin's dialogism is built on the premise that there is not one possible utterance that is purely personal and even discourse is, in one way or another, based on someone else's. He explains:

[...] language, for the individual consciousness, lies on the borderline between oneself and the other. The word in language is half someone else's. It becomes "one's own" only when the speaker populates it with his own intentions, his own accent, when he appropriates the word, adapting it to his own semantic and expressive intention. Prior to this moment of appropriation, the word does not exist in a neutral and impersonal language (it is not, after all, out of a dictionary that the speaker gets his words!), but rather it exists in other people's contexts, serving other people's intentions: it is from there that one must take the word, and make it one's own" (quoted in Gates, 1988: 1).

What Bakhtin implies in the quotation above is the double voicedness of discourse and the importance of striking a polemical blow at another's discourse by inserting into that discourse a new semantic intention.

What comes out from our consideration of Bakhtin's dialogism is that Thomas Hobbes's, John Locke's, and Mary Astell's texts offer different world views on the same topic. The views clash over one another because, as Bakhtin says, "a potential dialogue is embedded in them, one as yet unfolded, a concentrated dialogue of two voices, two world views, two languages" (quoted in Riche, B. :27)). We intend, in the remaining part of our dissertation, to study Locke's and Hobbes's, and Astell's texts according to the criteria of dialogism set by Mikhail Bakhtin in order to highlight the contending world views.

### **The Hypotheses of "Commonwealth" or "Myth of State"**

#### **Thomas Hobbes's *Leviathan***

Thomas Hobbes's hypothesis for the "Commonwealth" is formulated in his *Leviathan* which is composed of four Books. In the first two parts, "Of Man" and "Of Commonwealth," he developed his philosophy of man; in the last two, "Of a Christian Commonwealth" and "Of the Kingdom of Darkness," he discussed the Scriptures and managed a vehement attack on the attempts of papists and Presbyterians to challenge the right of the sovereign. (Cf Britannica CD). His charge against papists and Presbyterians was seized by his opponents as an opportunity to qualify him as an atheist. Yet Hobbes's overlooking of religious considerations can be seen as a departure from earlier theologically-dominated

views of society. In other words, Hobbes's objective was to give a scientific dimension to his philosophical project on the notion of the social contract.

As mentioned above, Hobbes's reputation as a thinker rests mainly on his contributions to the philosophy of man, in which he advanced an influential egoistic psychology. In moral theory, he is generally regarded as a pioneer of the Utilitarian school. He justified obedience to moral rules on a purely secular basis, as the means to "peaceable, social, and comfortable living." Yet he also said that the laws of nature were God's commands. (cf. Britannica CD. 1994-1999)

In his *Leviathan*, Hobbes's version of the "social contract", delineates a society of self-interested individuals who have no notion of good apart from their own desires. For him, the natural condition of mankind, known as the state of nature, is fraught with fear and violence because people constantly seek to destroy one another. He argued that human beings are **desire-driven** and **self-interested**. Therefore this state becomes one of complete disorder because there are no enforceable criteria of right and wrong as every person takes for himself all that he can.

Starting with the premise that humans are self-interested and the world does not provide for all their needs, Hobbes maintained that in the state of nature, without authority, there would be competition between men for wealth, security, and glory. This would result in a state of war "where every man is

Enemy to every man" (Hobbes, T., 1953. I.13:64). Hobbes outlined the consequences as follows:

In such condition, there is no place for Industry; because the fruit thereof is uncertain: and consequently no Culture on Earth, no Navigation, nor use of the commodities that may be imported by Sea; no commodious Building; no Instruments of moving, and removing such things as require much force; no Knowledge of the face of the Earth; no account of Time; no Arts; no Letters; no Society; and which is worst of all, continual feare, and danger of violent death; And the life of man, solitary, poore, natsy, brutish, and short. (Ibid., :64-65)

However, on the other hand, it is also man's nature to seek peace. This peace can be obtained only if individuals agree mutually to surrender their liberty into the hands of an absolute sovereign power "which is a Common Power, to keep them in awe, and to direct their attention to the Common Benefit." (Ibid., II.17:89) The sovereign, in return of the citizens' surrender of whatever power and liberty they have, protects their lives. But a sovereign so established may survive even if all the subjects desire to depose him. The sovereign's right will be as absolute as its power; he is responsible only to God. He cannot be unjust to his subjects, since these have authorized his actions. Nor is he bound by any covenant with the people. Only in this way can the state of nature, which Hobbes equates with a state of war, be ended in favour of the "Leviathan".

For Hobbes, the construction of such a commonwealth is artificial, and all the individuals of the commonwealth identify themselves, and are identified, in

that huge corporate body the "Leviathan", hence our qualifying it, after Springborg, as 'the myth of state'. Hobbes detailed his "Leviathan" as follows:

The only way to erect such a Common Power, as may be able to defend them from the invasion of Forraigners, and the injuries of one another, and thereby to secure them in such sort, as that by their owne industrie, and by thr fruites of the Earth, they may nourish themselves and live contentedly; is to confer all their power and strength upon one Man, or upon an Assembly of men, that may reduce all their Wills, by plurality of voices, unto one Will: which is as much to say, to appoint one Man, or Assembly of men, to beare their Person; and every one to owne and acknowledge himselfe to be Author of whatsoever he that so beareth their Person, shall Act, or cause to be Acted, in those things which concern the Common Peace and Safetie; and therein to submit their Wills, every one to his Will, and their judgements, to his judgement. This is more than Consent or Concord; it is a reall Unitie of them all, in one and the same Person [...] This done, the multitude so united in one Person, is called a Common-wealth, in Latine Civitas. This is the Generation of that great Leviathan, or rather ... of that Mortall God, to which wee owe under the Immortal God, our peace and defence. (Hobbes, 1953. II.17:89)

Hobbes's conferring power and one and indivisible sovereignty to a single monarch reinforced King James I 1610 "Speech in Parliament" (cf. Marx Rolland, 1972: 111) and King Charles I's reiteration of the same authorial regal power. (ibid., : 113). With the execution of Charles I, the Royalist cause seemed hopelessly lost. Accordingly, at the end of *Leviathan*, Hobbes attempted to define the circumstances under which submission to a new sovereign becomes legitimate. He had always maintained that a subject had the right to abandon a ruler who could no longer protect him and to transfer his allegiance to one who

could; but the statement of this view in *Leviathan* gave serious offence to Prince Charles's advisers, who concluded that Hobbes was trying to curry favour with the new regime in England in order to facilitate his own return.

### **John Locke's *Second treatise on Government***

John Locke came to reputation with the publication of his *Essay on Human Understanding* which is hailed as the manifesto for reason after Descartes. But unlike Descartes, Locke posits that the human being was born to the world without any inborn knowledge. His *tabula Rasa* is, in fact, not new. The concept is originally Aristotelian. The difference between Aristotle was one in kind: Aristotle was looking for truth whereas Locke speculated on the truth that Aristotle seems to have reached.

The *Essay* is divided into four books; the first is a refutation of the doctrine of innate principles and ideas. The second deals with ideas, the third with words, and the fourth with knowledge. In the first book of the *Essay*, on the subject of innate ideas, Locke pointed to the variety of human experiences, and to the difficulty of forming general and abstract ideas, and he ridiculed the view that any such ideas could be antecedent to experience. All the parts of our knowledge, he insisted, have the same rank and the same history regarding their origin in experience.

While Locke's *Essay on Human Understanding* probes the limits of man capacities, the *Second Treatise on Government* offers a detailed account of the

origins, aims, and structure of civil government. Adopting a general method similar to that of Hobbes, but a different conception, Locke started with an original state of nature in which individuals rely upon their own strength, then described their escape from this primitive state by entering into a social contract under which the state provides protection to its citizens. Unlike Hobbes, Locke regarded this contract as <sup>withdrawing</sup> **revokable**. Any civil government depends on the consent of those who are governed, which may be withdrawn at any time. In Locke's view, all rights begin in the individual property which is created by an investment of **labor**. The social structure or commonwealth, then, depends for its formation and furtherance on the express consent of the governed. Majority rule thus becomes the cornerstone of all political order, and dissatisfied citizens reserve a lasting right to **revolution**.

From the outset, Locke openly declared his political theory: in order to preserve the public good, the central function of government must be the protection of private property. (2<sup>nd</sup> *Treatise*, §3) Human social life begins, in a hypothetical state of nature: Each individual is perfectly equal with every other, and all has the absolute liberty to act as he wills, (according to the law of nature) without interference from any other. (2<sup>nd</sup> *Treatise*, §4) What prevents this natural state from being a violent Hobbesian model, according to Locke, is that each individual is endowed with the faculty of reason, so that the actions of every

individual—even in the unreconstructed state of nature—are bound by the self-evident laws of nature.

Locke developed, in *Two treatises*, a theory of government based on the social contract not from *ex nihilo*; he formulated it in a polemical negotiation with two precursor texts. Besides the parallel with Hobbes's *Leviathan* which is suggested in the above paragraphs, Hobbes first treatise is a response to Sir Robert Filmer's *Patriarcha* written as early as 1648, but published in 1680. It sustains the tradition of the monarchy of divine rights, "that doctrine in defense of monarchical absolutism which asserts that kings derived their authority from God and could not therefore be held accountable for their actions by any earthly authority such as a parliament." (Cf. CIE, 1996) Filmer's argument is that the state was a **family** and that the king was a **father**. In his interpretation of the Scriptures, "he pronounces that Adam was the first king and that Charles I ruled England as Adam's eldest heir." (Cf. Britannica CD, 1994-1999) In other words, the king's person and authority are sacred and his power is absolute and governed by reason.

While Hobbes's *Leviathan* is inscribed within the regal reign of Charles I, the Cromwellian protectorate, and later the Restoration, Locke's *Second treatise on Government* addresses the post Restoration period and argues in favour/justification of a parliamentary government, giving up liberties in exchange of the right to revolt when the rights of the Enlightenment are abused. Locke's

argument clashes with that of his precursor, Thomas Hobbes, and this clash, over the organisation of a commonwealth for the benefit of all, is nourished by the difference in conceptions, causes, and ends of an ideal state. This will be our concern in the remaining part of this chapter.

### **Conception of Human nature**

It is perhaps important to point out that Hobbes and Locke proposed a theory for civilised society not basically for partisan (political or religious) purposes but rather for the common good of all, that is, a commonwealth wherein peace and property (persons and goods) are protected. But their material is drawn from the political experiences of their time. In this respect our emphasis, once more, on the particular context of their respective works would not be charged with redundancy. In fact the social and political turmoil for Hobbes bring about anarchy, an anarchy that is worst than any absolute government. This is the first postulate that Hobbes posited before he laid down the foundation and purposes of his ideal society which concretise in what he called the "Leviathan".

He wrote,

So that in the first place, I put for a general inclination of all mankind, a perpetual and relentless desire of Power after power that ceaseth only in death. And the cause of this, is not always that a man hopes for a more intensive delight, than he has already attained to; or that he cannot be content with a moderate power: but because he cannot assure the power and means to live well, which he hath present, without the acquisition of more. (Hobbes,1953 I.11:49-50)

Hobbes started from an assumption of basic human folly, competitiveness, and depravity, and contradicted Aristotle's assumption that man is by nature a "political animal." All society, according to Hobbes, is only for gain or glory, and the only true equality among men is their power to kill each other:

Nature hath made men so equal, in the faculties of body, and mind; as though there bee found one man sometimes manifestly stronger in body, or of quicker mind than another; yet when all is reckoned together, the difference between man, and man, is not so considerable, as that one man can thereupon claim to himselfe any benefit, to which another may not pretend, as well as he. For as to the strength of body, the weakest has strength enough to kill the strongest, either by secret machination, or by confederacy with others, that are in the same danger with himselfe. (ibid.,: 63)

Hobbes's conception of human nature suggests that human beings are primarily self-interested and desire-driven. As such they are all vulnerable and incapable of self-rule. This is so because Hobbes thinks that men in the 'mere state of nature' who enter in competition with one another to satisfy individual desires have a conception of limitless freedom, that is a freedom from all constraints and laws. For Hobbes a law of nature which cannot be enforced (because of the lack of authority) becomes an uncontrollable right to invade others' property. This uncontrollable right can be surrendered only if the aggressor is threatened in his life. Hence the right to self preservation (which is the basic law of nature for Hobbes) sets a limit to ambition, desire and lust.

Given these considerations liberty and freedom in Hobbes are situated outside of civilisation or civilly organised society:

Liberty, or FREEDOME, signifieth (properly) the absence of Opposition; (by Opposition, I mean externall Impediments of motion ;) and may be applyed no lesse to Irrational, and Inanimate creatures, than to Rationall. For whatsoever is so tyed, or environed, as it cannot move, but within a certain space, which space is determined by the opposition of some externall body, we say it hath not Liberty to go further. And so of all living creatures, whilst they are imprisoned, or restrained, with walls, or chayns; and of the water whilst it is kept in by banks, or vessels, that otherwise would spread it selfe into a larger space, we use to say, they are not at Liberty, to move in such manner, as without those externall impediments they would. But when the impediment of motion, is in the constitution of the thing it selfe, we use not to say, it wants the Liberty; but the Power to move; as when a stone lyeth still, or a man is fastned to his bed by sicknesse.

And according to this proper, and generally received meaning of the word, A FREE-MAN, is "he, that in those things, which by his strength and wit he is able to do, is no hindred to doe what he has a will to." [...] Lastly, from the use of the word Freewill, no liberty can be inferred to the will, desire, or inclination, but the liberty of the man; which consisteth in this, that he finds no stop, in doing what he has the will, desire, or inclination to doe. (ibid., : 110)

In short, Hobbes' conception of human nature follows two courses of events: it either enjoys freedom from society and its laws - resulting in chaos; or it gives up this freedom for an authoritarian regime - and enjoys a social order established by force. Hobbes favoured the latter course because he thought that an authoritarian monarch would put restraints on transgressions, by means of awe and fear, for the sake of achieving a measure of social order.

Hobbes believed that "Feare and Liberty are consistent; as when a man throweth his goods into the Sea for Feare the ship should sink, he doth it nevertheless very willingly, and may refuse to doe it if he will: It is therefore the action, of one that was Free; so a man sometimes pays his debt, only for Feare of Imprisonment, which because no body hindred him from detaining, was the action of a man at Liberty." (ibid., : 110)

Arguing with reference to and against Hobbes's view of human nature, Locke started from the assumption that human beings are driven by both emotions and reason, and they are both **self-interested** and **naturally social** or **altruistic**. Therefore, endowed as they are with reason, men are capable of self-rule. Locke argued that individuals can be trusted to manage their own affairs in ways that are consistent with the interests and well-being of others. He wrote:

To understand political power aright, and derive it from its original, we must consider what estate all men are naturally in, and that is, a state of perfect freedom to order their actions, and dispose of their possessions and persons as they think fit, within the bounds of the law of Nature, without asking leave or depending upon the will of any other man. A state also of equality, wherein all the power and jurisdiction is reciprocal, no one having more than another, there being nothing more evident than that creatures of the same species and rank, promiscuously born to all the same advantages of Nature, and the use of the same faculties, should also be equal one amongst another, without subordination or subjection, unless the lord and master of them all should, by any manifest declaration of his will, set one above another, and confer on him, by an evident and clear appointment, an undoubted right to dominion and sovereignty. (Hobbes, 1690:)

Such formulation of human nature contradicts Hobbes's. It follows also that Locke's notion of liberty and freedom is at variance with Hobbes's. Locke's Liberty and freedom are conceived as follows:

But though this be a state of liberty, yet it is not a state of **licence**; though man in that state have an uncontrollable liberty to dispose of his person or possessions, yet he has not liberty to **destroy himself, or so much as any creature in his possession**, but where some nobler use than its bare preservation calls for it. The state of Nature has a law of Nature to govern it, which obliges every one, and reason, which is that law, teaches all mankind who will but consult it, that being all equal and independent, **no one ought to harm another in his life, health, liberty or possessions**; for men being all the workmanship of one omnipotent and infinitely wise Maker; all the servants of one sovereign Master, sent into the world by His order and about His business; they are His property, whose workmanship they are made to last during His, not one another's pleasure. And, being furnished with like faculties, sharing all in one community of Nature, there cannot be supposed any such subordination among us that may authorise us to destroy one another, as if we were made for one another's uses, as the inferior ranks of creatures are for ours. Every one as he is bound to preserve himself, and not to quit his station wilfully, so by the like reason, when his own preservation comes not in competition, ought he as much as he can to preserve the rest of mankind, and not unless it be to do justice on an offender, take away or impair the life, or what tends to the preservation of the life, the liberty, health, limb, or goods of another. (Locke, 1690 II. 6. Emphasis ours)

It is clear that for Locke "tyranny is the exercise of power beyond right" and that government takes the form of trusteeship. As such it opposes the family/inheritance model: "For *liberty* is to be free from restraint and violence

from others which cannot be where there is no law: But freedom is not, as we are told [by Hobbes], 'A liberty for every man to do what he lists' ”.

### **State of Nature**

What is common to Hobbes and Locke in the building of their respective theories of state is their starting point. Both Hobbes and Locke began with the concept of nature to expound their conception concerning government. They both argued that the state of nature existed prior to the emergence of society and state, and that there was no law or any one that ruled over others in the state of nature. Moreover, there was no security of life, liberty, or property. This is why men enter into an agreement with each other, called the “social contract” to establish society, state, and law. The similarities between Hobbes and Locke end here because each of them had a conception of his own as to why men enter into an agreement to form a government. Each defined notions and set objectives differently from the other.

Apart from the philosophy on man within this state of nature, outlined above, there are other subjects which go consistently with this state of nature. Hobbes's *Leviathan* is an indictment of the Long Parliament whereas Locke's essay on civil government is an apologia for a parliamentary government. It follows from this that Hobbes's issue is to demonstrate how life would be without authority while Locke's placed emphasis on man's rights both outside of and under authorial or governmental control. For Locke an actual state of nature

exists between independent princes and rulers, and between any subjects of different states (or jurisdictions) who may meet in a place where there is no civilized government. To Hobbes's assertion, "Hereby it is manifest, that during the time men live without a common Power to keep them all in awe, they are in that condition which is called Warre; and such a warre, as is of every man, against every man", Locke responded as follows

It is often asked as a mighty objection, where are, or ever were, there any men in such a state of Nature? To which it may suffice as an answer at present, that since all princes and rulers of "independent" governments all through the world are in a state of Nature, it is plain the world never was, nor never will be, without numbers of men in that state. I have named all governors of "independent" communities, whether they are, or are not, in league with others; for it is not every compact that puts an end to the state of Nature between men, but only this one of agreeing together mutually to enter into one community, and make one body politic; other promises and compacts men may make one with another, and yet still be in the state of Nature. The promises and bargains for truck, etc., between the two men in Soldania, in or between a Swiss and an Indian, in the woods of America, are binding to them, though they are perfectly in a state of Nature in reference to one another for truth, and keeping of faith belongs to men as men, and not as members of society. (Locke, 1690. II.14)

Locke's historical evidence contradicts Hobbes contention that the state of nature is a savage as it is suggested in *Leviathan* and that worst of governments is always more tolerable than the state of nature. For him (Locke), in the state of nature, men mostly keep their promises and honour their obligations. Though insecure, it is peaceful, good, and pleasant. The American frontier and Soldania

are examples of people in the state of nature, where property rights and peace exist. Princes are in a state of nature with regard to each other. Rome and Venice were in a state of nature shortly before they were officially founded. In any place where it is socially acceptable to oneself, it is not objectionable to punish wrongdoings done against one's person. Though such places (on the American frontier, for example) and times are insecure, violent conflicts are often ended by the forcible imposition of a just peace on evil doers, and peace is normal.

### **State of war**

The concept of the state of war is used by both Hobbes and Locke. Yet there is no common point between the two conceptions except their appellations. The state of war as it is used by Hobbes is simply 'mere nature' in all its crudeness and raw instincts of its inhabitants. In *Leviathan* Hobbes used the term "mere nature" to define what he considered the state of his contemporary society to be. The term refers to "a condition of war of every man against every man." Hobbes went on to characterize the state of civil society under such a condition as being one wherein "there is no place for industry, because the fruit thereof is uncertain: and consequently no culture of the earth...; and which is worst of all, continual fear, and danger of violent death; and the life of man, solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short." This justifies, in Hobbes's view, the need for a

powerful, sovereign authority to put an end to the "continual fear, and danger of death" (cf. *Leviathan*).

Locke challenged Hobbes from the inception that the state of nature is idyllic and has never known a state of war. Locke charted out a plan for government as a preventive measure, that is, to avoid the state of war. Therefore it ensures that Locke situated the state of war not in the state of nature wherein everyone is sovereign of himself but within absolutist government. He wrote:

...he who attempts to get another man into his absolute power, does thereby put himself into a state of war with him; it being to be understood as a declaration of a design upon his life. For I have reasons to conclude that, he who would get me into his power without my consent, would use me as he pleased when he had got me there, and destroy me too when he had a fancy to it... (II. 2.17)

Locke further explained, addressing Hobbes obliquely, in the following words

And here we have the plain difference between the state of nature and the state of war, which, however some men have confounded, are as far distant as a state of peace, good will, mutual assistance and preservations, and a state of enmity, malice, violence and mutual destruction are one from another. Men living together according to reason, without a common superior on earth with authority to judge between them, is properly the state of nature. (II. 2.19)

If Hobbes premised the establishment of the social contract in order to put an end to the hostilities found in the state of nature (according to Hobbes) and to preserve the life of the people, Locke set another objective:

The reason why men enter into society is the preservation of their property; and the end while they choose and authorise a legislative is that there may be laws made, and rules set, as guards and fences to the properties of all the society, to limit the power and moderate the dominion of every part and member of the society. For since it can never be supposed to be the will of the society that the legislative should have a power to destroy that which every one designs to secure by entering into society, and for which the people submitted themselves to legislators of their own making: (II. XIX.22)

Hobbes claimed that once the compact is made between the sovereign and his subjects, there are consequences among which he listed: a) the Subjects cannot change the forme of government, b) Sovereigne Power cannot be forfeited, c) no man can without injustice protest against the Institution of the soveraigne declared by the major part, d) the Sovereigne Actions cannot be justly accused by the Subject (Hobbes, 1953: XXX).

Hobbes opened the eighteenth chapter of Book Two with two introductory paragraphs in which he stated the procedures of instituting a commonwealth. Then he lengthily detailed the consequences of what he called the "Covenant of everyone with everyone" to choose the sovereign. He formulated it in the following terms:

First, because they [the people assembled] Covenant, it is to be understood, they are not obliged by former Covenant to any thing repugnant hereunto. And Consequently they that have already Instituted a Common-wealth, being thereby bound by Covenant, to own the Actions, and Judgements of one, cannot lawfully make a new Covenant, amongst themselves, to be obedient to any other, in any

thing whatsoever, without his permission. And therefore, they that are subjects to a Monarch, cannot without his leave cast off Monarchy, and return to the confusion of a disunited Multitude; nor transferre their Person from him that beareth it, to another Man, or other Assembly of men: for they are bound, every man to every man, to Own, and be reputed Author of all, that he that already is their Sovereigne, shall do, and judge fit to be done: so that any one man dissenting, all the rest should break their Covenant made to that man, which is injustice: and they have also every man given the Sovereignty to him that beareth their Person; and therefore if they depose him, they take from him that which is his own, and so again it is injustice. (ibid., : 90)

Locke who conditioned the establishment of civil government on the consent of the governed provided that they retain the right to rebellion revocation, responded as follows:

whenever the legislators endeavour to take away and destroy the property of the people, or to reduce them to slavery under arbitrary power, they put themselves into a state of war with the people, who are thereupon absolved from any farther obedience, and are left to the common refuge which God hath provided for all men against force and violence. Whensoever, therefore, the legislative shall transgress this fundamental rule of society, and either by ambition, fear, folly, or corruption, endeavour to grasp themselves, or put into the hands of any other, an absolute power over the lives, liberties, and estates of the people, by this breach of trust they forfeit the power the people had put into their hands for quite contrary ends, and it devolves to the people, who have a right to resume their original liberty, and by the establishment of a new legislative (such as they shall think fit), provide for their own safety and security, which is the end for which they are in society (II.XIX.222)

Our consideration of the "state of war" and "state of nature" as they are used by Hobbes and Locke allows us to say they serve only rhetorically/metaphorically in the elaboration of two different political theories. What they have in common is only their appellations. This is also valid for "law of nature" which, for Hobbes, is transgression to satisfy appetites. In Locke, "law of nature" means wisdom and logical self-imposed restraint.

### **Property**

John Locke's version of the social contract owns him the title of philosopher of liberty. Linked with the natural right to property, this notion of liberty can be understood as a form of economic liberalism which rests on the accumulation of wealth. In chapter Five of his *Second Treatise on Government*, he discussed lengthily the origins of private property in the state of nature. Locke had recourse to what he called "Commands of god" to justify the inviolability of property:

God, when He gave the world in common to all mankind, commanded man also to labour [...] God and his reason commanded him to subdue the earth- i.e., improve it for the benefit of life and therein lay out something upon it that was his own, his labour. He that, in obedience to this command of God, subdued, tilled, and sowed any part of it, thereby annexed to it something that was his property, which another had no title to, nor could without injury take from him. (Locke, 1690. II.V.31)

Against Hobbes's idea that men fight because of the scarcity of resources in the state of nature, Locke claimed that "God has given us all things richly."

According to Locke, God commands us to use things to our advantage without any encroachment on others' property. This is possible because "the state of nature", Locke wrote, "has a law of Nature to govern it, which obliges every one, and reason, which is that law, teaches all mankind who will but consult it, that being all equal and independent, no one ought to harm another in his life, health, liberty or possessions..." (II.V.5)

What Locke had to say about the origin of civil society is also of interest in connection with the concept of property. It is clear that property is very important in Locke's political theory. He said that the law of nature commands one not to harm another's possessions; and added that men enter into society in order to preserve their liberty and property. Thus the right to property is protected both by the law of nature and the civil law. Property originates in the state of nature and extends into civil government. As property, according to Locke, is very closely linked with the individual bodily integrity, one of the reasons for the existence of civil society is the preservation of property. In Chapter Five of his *Second Treatise on Government*, Locke took up the question of property in detail. He concluded that it is labour which gives the labourer a right to, or property in, what he produces or adds his labour to. He summarized his view as follows:

Though the things of Nature are given in common, man (by being master of himself, and proprietor of his own person, and the actions or labour of it) had still in himself the great foundation of property... Thus labour, in the beginning, gave

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a right of property, wherever any one was pleased to employ it, upon what was common ... (II.V.44, 45)

Locke started with the inherent property of the individual, that is, body and strength to explain the acquisition of individual ownership in the state of nature. In this respect, it is convenient to remind the reader that Thomas Hobbes stated that people in the state of nature are equal only in the sense that they have the same power/desire and the same right to destroy one another in their several claims to one thing. Hobbes's statement suggests the impossibility of owning property in the state of nature. For him, men in the state of nature use their physical strength to wrest what other people claim as their own. In Locke, body and bodily strength constitute the postulate of individual property. These are invested into labour in accordance with God's Command to subdue nature and to enjoy its riches:

Though the earth and all inferior creatures be common to all men, yet every man has a "property" in his own "person." This nobody has any right to but himself. The "labour" of his body and the "work" of his hands, we may say, are properly his. Whatsoever, then, he removes out of the state that Nature hath provided and left it in, he hath mixed his labour with it, and joined to it something that is his own, and thereby makes it his property. It being by him removed from the common state Nature placed it in, it hath by this labour something annexed to it that excludes the common right of other men. For this "labour" being the unquestionable property of the labourer, no man but he can have a right to what that is once joined to, at least where there is enough, and as good left in common for others. (II.V.26)

Locke believed that property is common in the state of nature in the sense that everyone has a right to draw subsistence from whatever is offered in nature. He asserted that a man has a natural right to that with which he has mixed the labour of his body. Enclosing and tilling land, for example, entitle one to own the land that is made useful out of the common waste. His argument is that the right to private property arises because by labour a man extends his own personality into the objects produced. By exercising his internal energy upon them, he makes them a part of himself. Generally speaking, their utility depends upon the labour expended upon them. In this respect he wrote:

He that is nourished by the acorns he picked up under an oak, or the apples he gathered from the trees in the wood, has certainly appropriated them to himself. Nobody can deny but the nourishment is his. I ask, then, when did they begin to be his? When he digested? Or when he ate? Or when he boiled? Or when he brought them home? Or when he picked them up? And it is plain, if the first gathering made them not his, nothing else could. That labour put a distinction between them and common. That added something to them more than Nature, the common mother of all, had done, and so they became his private right. And will any one say he had no right to those acorns or apples he thus appropriated because he had not the consent of all mankind to make them his? Was it a robbery thus to assume to himself what belonged to all in common? If such a consent as that was necessary, man had starved, notwithstanding the plenty God had given him. We see in commons, which remain so by compact, that it is the taking any part of what is common, and removing it out of the state Nature leaves it in, which begins the property, without which the common is of no use. (II.V.27)

From his theory of the origin of private property, Locke concluded that the right to property is prior even to the primitive society which he described as the state of nature. This is a right which each individual brings to civil society in his own person. Therefore, since society does not create the right of property, it cannot regulate it. Nor can it take it for public use. Both society and civil government exist, according to Locke, to protect the prior right to private property.

What can be added here is that Locke erected safeguards and barriers as regards the "Eminent Domain" or the right of government to expropriate private property for public use. Locke expressed this idea in chapter XIX of his treatise in the following words: "... and the end while they choose and authorise a legislative is that there may be laws made, and rules set, as guards and fences to the properties of all the society, to limit the power and moderate the dominion of every part and member of the society". (II.XIX.22) But to better understand the import of Locke's theory on property, we turn again to Thomas Hobbes. From the outset Hobbes implicitly rejected the idea that property can be a permanent right of the individual in the state of nature because

if two men desire the same thing, which nevertheless they cannot boy enjoy, they become enemies; and in the way to their End, ... endeavour to destroy, or subdue one another... if one plant, sow, build, or possess a convenient Seat, others may be probably expected to come prepared with forces united, to dispossess, and deprive him, not only of

the fruit of his labour, but also of life, or liberty (Hobbes, 1965: 63)

John Locke has been singled out as a middle-class property owner and charges have been levelled against his *Second Treatise on Government* as a defence of the rights not of all men but “those who have estates to defend, the well-to-do, the upper half of the nation” (cf. Charlot, 1998); in other words, it is this oligarchy who have the right to elect its representatives. Therefore, we can assume that the actors in Locke's social contract belong to this class whose property is threatened. Locke's defence of private property traces its origins to the English Civil War when the property rights of both large landowners of a semi-feudal character as well as those of the proto capitalists of England had been under attack by organizations such as the Diggers and the Levellers (cf. Marx, 1972 : 135-39) In light of the claims that property disadvantaged the larger, non-propertied portion of the population, Locke established a workmanship standard as the foundation for legitimate property rights, where “honest” labour working on its own land would promote the interests of society in general.

According to Locke's social contract, society is to be composed of property and non-property owners. Property owners who are industrious and hard working are given the right of suffrage. In order to fulfill contracts within society and government, the society contracts an impartial third party to act as the government. This contract as mentioned earlier is sometimes known as the

trustee relationship because the government has no other right but to work for the good of the people. The government is given its power to act by the property owning portion of the population, and not by the society as a whole

The relation of what has been said above to Hobbes is that the latter conceived only of three possible forms of government, all with absolute power. Those who do not inscribe themselves in this perceptive, are dissenters who are dangerous to the "commonwealth". Against other forms of government and dissenters, Hobbes had this to say:

There be other names of Government, in the Histories, and books of Policy; as Tyranny, and Oligarchy: But they are not the names of other Formes of Government, but of the same Formes misliked. For they that are discontented under Monarchy, call it Tyranny; and they that are displeased with Aristocracy, called it Oligarchy: so also, they which find themselves grieved under a Democracy, call it Anarchy... And therefore as it is absurd to, to think that a sovereign Assembly, inviting the People of their Dominion, to send up their deputies, with power to make known their Advice, and Desires... so it is absurd also, to think the same in a Monarchy. (Hobbes, 1953.II:97)

It is clear from the quote above that Hobbes abhorred those who brandished the Magna Carta, and other petitions as a safeguard to their private rights. Sir Robert Filmer expressed his mind on the issue as follows: "It is the Magna Charta of this kingdom; all other shows or pretexts of liberty are but several degrees of slavery, and a liberty only to destroy liberty" (Filmer, Robert. *Patriarcha Or the Natural Power of Kings*. <http://www.constitution.org/eng/patriarcha.htm>)

If in Locke's social contract people surrender the power to punish transgressors of private property to a legislative assembly which is distinct from the executive, Hobbes subordinated all the rights of the people to one 'Leviathan' who assumes both legislative and executive powers, absolutely. The question of property in Hobbes therefore belongs to the commonwealth to dispose of it at will:

The Laws Of Transferring Property Belong Also To The Sovereign Further, seeing it is not enough to the Sustentation of a Common-wealth, that every man have a propriety in a portion of Land, or in some few commodities, or a naturall property in some usefull art, and there is no art in the world, but is necessary either for the being, or well being almost of every particular man; it is necessary, that men distribute that which they can spare, and transferre their propriety therein, mutuallly one to another, by exchange, and mutuall contract. And therefore it belongeth to the Common-wealth, (that is to say, to the Sovereign,) to appoint in what manner, all kinds of contract between Subjects, (as buying, selling, exchanging, borrowing, lending, letting, and taking to hire,) are to bee made; and by what words, and signes they shall be understood for valid. And for the Matter, and Distribution of the Nourishment, to the severall Members of the Common-wealth, thus much (considering the modell of the whole worke) is sufficient. (Hobbes, 1953: II.)

Hobbes's arguments against rebels and dissenters are then directed to those, like John Locke, who reserved the right to petition government, and ultimately to destitute them. According to Hobbes, the petitions are not meant to secure public good or commonwealth, but primarily to brandish them as barriers for their own interests. These arguments are expounded in chapter XXIX mainly

where he stated the various doctrines he called *Infirmities*. Among these doctrines, figure the fifth and sixth ones, and they concern directly John Locke postulates. Hobbes argued: "A fifth doctrine, that tendeth to the Dissolution of a Commonwealth, is, *That every private man has an absolute Propriet in his goods; such as excludeth the Right of the Sovereign*". Part of the sixth doctrine runs "... plainly, and directly against the essence of a Common-wealth; and 'tis this, *That the Sovereign Power may be dived*" (Hobbes, 1953. II. 173. Italics in the original).

Locke's difference from Hobbes's in terms of the notion of property arise obviously from the different definitions they each give to the key concepts that sustain their political philosophy of the state. If Hobbes's view of human nature is overly pessimistic, and conveys a bleak picture of an authoritative government, Locke's is rather optimistic. From Hobbes's picture of civilisation stripped down to its basics, he reconstructed a more viable world view of society which is composed of self-conscious individuals capable to govern themselves and discern good from evil. His response to Hobbes's defence of kingly government and indictment of dissenters is formulated in the following passage:

Those who say otherwise speak as if the prince had a distinct and separate interest from the good of the community, and was not made for it; the root and source from which spring almost all those evils and disorders which happen in kingly governments. And indeed, if that be so, the people under his government are not a society of rational creatures, entered into a community for their mutual good,

such as have set rulers over themselves, to guard and promote that good; but are to be looked on as a herd of inferior creatures under the dominion of a master, who keeps them and works them for his own pleasure or profit. (II.XIV.163)

The extent to which Locke's society may be viable for everybody will be discussed in the next chapter.

### **Conclusion**

In the foregoing chapter we have attempted to show, through a comparative study of Thomas Hobbes's *Leviathan* and John Locke's *Two Treatises on Government*, how the political, economic, religious contexts have contributed to the elaboration of political and social contract theories in England.

Hobbes's theory, an extension of pre-enlightenment vision of the state rests on the postulate that men in the state of nature behave egoistically and rely on coercion to claim more than their due from the commonwealth. In their greed, they encroach on other people's rights and harm them in their bodies. People behave so in the natural state because there is no enforceable punishment. This is why Hobbes constructed a "Leviathan" whose power and sovereignty are absolute. For Hobbes the end of the institution of the state is self-preservation through fear.

Like Hobbes, Locke found the material for the construction of his theory of government in the natural state. But he challenged Hobbes by pointing out that this state is an ideal one in the sense that people are born free and equal, and

entitled to property. Besides freedom, equality, and claim to property, people in the natural state are endowed with natural law, that is, reason. And people behave according to this law of nature. Consequently 'these ancestors' are capable of self-rule. This ability of theirs to govern themselves destroys Hobbes's argument of unrestrained freedom to do whatever one wills. Hence, the different aims for instituting civil government. For Locke, the function of the civil state is to protect property. Hobbes related it to a will to power.

In the first section we have brought to the fore the differences in the theoretical ground on which the respective 'myth of the state' of Hobbes and Locke are built. As Locke's conception of the commonwealth is meant to subvert Hobbes's version, we have focused on the on-going polemical dialogue that is established between them. In other words, we have tried to show how, in order to undermine his predecessor, Locke brought his texts close to that of Hobbes only to stress the difference and depart from its line of argument. Therefore, the relation between Hobbes and Locke is of the order of stylisation.

In the remaining parts of our discussion, we have explored the key concepts used by both Hobbes and Locke. Their terminology partakes of moral and political philosophy. Combined together they concretise their respective theory of the state or civil government.

We have also argued that all the insight that is poured into the respective works of Hobbes and Locke is derived from the context of English political and

social life of their time and is meant as an initiative to reform abuses. For Hobbes, abuses come from the multitude and diversity of opinions. Locke considered that transgressions result from the concentration of power in one sovereign. Therefore, Hobbes justified his "Leviathan" on the ground of the political turbulence of the 1640s and the reign of parliament under Oliver Cromwell. Locke, on the other hand, found justification for his *Second Treatise on Government* in the long train of abuses prevalent during the Restoration.

Being a contemporary of Thomas Hobbes, Locke appropriated all the concepts used in *Leviathan* but gives them his own intention. This is why the concepts such as "state of nature", "state of war", "freedom", "natural law" and "social contract" constitute, to use Bakhtin's words, a "parodic *contrepartie*" in John Locke. Stated otherwise, discourse in John Locke's *Second Treatise on Government* "is oriented towards its referential object, as any other discourse, but at the same time each assertion about that object is construed in such a way that, besides its referential meaning, the author's discourse brings a polemical attack against another's speech act, another assertion, on the same topic." (Bakhtin quoted in Riche, 1998:15)

Our concluding argument in this chapter is that the central theme in the political history of seventeenth-century England which consists in the defence of divine monarchy of kings and absolutism in general whether in a monarchy or an assembly has come to an end particularly with the inauguration of a new era, the

Enlightenment. In our opinion, John Locke has the better argument over Hobbes, not only because he has defended the basic rights of man but also because his work is based on historical evidence. Hobbes's thesis in *Leviathan* is imaginary, a-historical, and partakes more of utopia even if we understand that it responds to the historical events of his time. Besides, Locke as a seventeenth century precursor of classic liberalism, opened up new hopes for mankind while Hobbes who can be considered as the seventeenth century precursor of modern totalitarianism, pulled society backwards. His 'Leviathan' recalls George Orwell's Big Brother in artificiality as in totalitarianism.

We have reached this conclusion by bringing face to-face the documents mentioned above. As already mentioned, their study shows that they are at variance on several levels, mainly on definitional and theoretical grounds. The next chapter will discuss the feasibility of John Locke's project. For this purpose we are going to compare with Mary Astell's *Some Reflections Upon Marriage*.

## CHAPTER THREE

Mary Astell's *Some Reflections Upon Marriage*: A Feminist  
Reading of Locke's Hypothesis

In the previous chapter we have attempted to show that John Locke has won the argument over Thomas Hobbes because of the liberalism/individualism he vehicled in his *Second Treatise of Government*. This liberalism of the Enlightenment is supposed to open new vistas on human relations. Equality and freedom were redefined in a newly civilised society wherein a balance in powers is welcomed as a guarantee for the basic rights of the individuals. To the latter is added a right to rebellion in case of transgression.

In this chapter our discussion focuses on the dialogic relationship Mary Astell's text entertains with the male theorists of the social contract (political world of men and marriage governing the private world of women) in general and John Locke's *Second treatise on Government* in particular. We shall try to bring to the fore the controversial aspects of the texts and, at the same time, show how Astell cogently undermines the 'myth of state' described by Locke, a state where there is no place for women except for childbearing, attending to husbands' whims and will, and subjection. Our purpose is to revise partly, through the study of Astell's essay, the conclusion we have reached in the previous chapter, mainly Locke's winning argument against Hobbes. This revision is justified because the work of Locke will be conducted in another perspective, that is, it will be addressed in female/feminist terms. Our recourse, from time to time, to feminist criticism then, which is already announced in the introduction, does not conflict with the appropriation of Bakhtin's theory of dialogism as our paradigm. The

reason is that feminist theory and criticism— as Bakhtin's dialogism— subverts and undermines, degrades and lowers all male chauvinism and gender dichotomies as J.A Cuddon says:

Feminism questions the long-standing, dominant, male, phallogentric ideologies, patriarchal attitudes and male interpretations in literature. It attacks male notions of value in literature by offering critiques of male authors and representation... In addition it challenges traditional and accepted male ideas about the nature of women and about how women feel, act and think, or are *supposed* to feel, act and think (1989:315)

### **Male 'Territorial' legacy**

We shall open the discussion with the following passage excerpted from Patricia Springborg's *Mary Astell: Theorist of Freedom from Domination* (2006)

Commentators have noted the capacity of seventeenth-century women to live in the interstices of social institutions as novelists, dramatists and political pamphleteers. Astell is a curious case. On the one hand, she undertook a self-conscious critique of the very institutions at the root of female oppression: contemporary education and marriage practices. On the other, she was a High Church Tory pamphleteer, and probably a commissioned one, who in essential aspects defended the existing social order, church and queen. This gives some commentators pause in applying to her the epithet 'feminist'. But while caution against anachronism is prudent, the belief that Toryism disqualifies women as feminists is anachronism of a different kind. It makes Whiggish assumptions about progressivism as a qualification for feminism that could only be made with post-Enlightenment hindsight. (Springborg, P., 2006)

Springborg's quotation helps us understand the double stance Mary Astell assumed in *Some Reflections Upon Marriage*: political pamphleteer and proto feminist. As a political pamphleteer, she works under the double constraint of obedience to the established powers and the will to swift, anonymous, and necessary emergence into the world, the world as shared by men in order that she might participate in the debate of ideas that circulated in her age and which closely concerned the unstable situation of her country. As a proto feminist, Astell oriented her discourse in a subtle way to challenge the authority of man and redefine the morals and mores of marriage. Astell's message is two-fold: it highlights the usurpation of man and at the same time warns/teaches women how to respond to or do with the custom of marriage. All this, she managed through a philosophical and political pirouetting (like other essayists) while having in mind the male master works.

John Locke's *Second Treatise on Government* was Astell's first target. The latter opened with the refutations of the premises set by Sir Robert Filmer. This rejection seems to bear on major differences between Filmer and Locke by providing some place in his project for the 'weaker' sex whose defence he feigned to take. But in so doing he was but talking to himself because Locke needed woman only for the elaboration of his theory which would apply to society. And society is composed of men and women. Therefore Locke's unavoidable use of the term 'woman' has only a rhetorical significance because

the centrality in the association called the family helped Locke to displace the position of the father in the state. His affirmation that "the family is not a commonwealth" (II.7.86) confirms this intention of displacement.

To fully understand the male view on women in the seventeenth and early eighteenth century, one must always bear in mind the historical and cultural context of that period. Locke's views in his *Second Treatise on Government* are responses and reactions to that context. The issues of contract, marriage and family, for example, are the major concerns of controversy of that time because of the different conceptions people have of them. Both the household and the state were described as divinely ordained systems with the husband and monarch, respectively, at the top. At the same time, the language of contract was used to describe both marriage and the relationship between a monarch and his subjects.

A close reading of Locke's treatise will reveal that he did not break with the tradition. He only completed it by arguing for a) legitimacy of governments, b) the right of people to protection of life, liberty and estate, c) the right to revolt whenever these governments become abusive, and the exclusion of women from the political arena. Otherwise his intention was to displace two patriarchs (Filmer and Hobbes) by another, that is, himself. This is evidenced in his oblique and sometimes direct references to Filmer and Hobbes (cf. Locke Preface, chapters I, IV,V passim) and his discourse about the equality of **women only among**

**women** (cf. chapter II, section 4). Moreover he held women as weak creatures dependent on man, and lacking rationality. The latter "weaknesses" deny her access to the public sphere, mainly the field of politics since rationality, according to Locke, is a *sine qua non* condition for participation in public life.

It follows that the Enlightenment liberalism which is based on sameness and equality is subverted by the sort of liberalism practised by Locke. Locke's liberalism is inconsistent because it claims that people are by nature free and equal, and that inequalities result from agreements or contracts (marriage, for example) into which man and woman enter freely.

Similarly, Locke's liberalism assumes that some people are more equal than others. Locke believed that "husbands are to be allowed authority over their wives and children", and although this is not an absolute authority, he did not spell out its limits. He wrote: "[...] the husband and wife, though they have but one common concern, yet having different understandings, will unavoidably sometimes have different wills too; it therefore, being necessary that the last determination, i.e. the rule should be placed somewhere; it naturally falls to the man's share, as the abler and stronger." About Locke's argument that "every male is assumed to be sufficiently rational or 'naturally' to have the capacity to govern a family' Bennan writes, "in Locke's theory, it is women who are seen as naturally lacking in rationality and 'naturally' excluded from the status of "free and

equal individuals, and so unfit for participation in public life" (quoted Abdelfateh, Imam, 1995: 195)

Locke's conception of woman does not depart from the early Greek philosophers such as Pythagoras who believed that "there is a good principle, which has created order, light and man and a bad principle, which has created chaos, darkness and woman", or Aristotle who stated that "the female is a female by virtue of a certain lack of qualities: we should regard the female nature as afflicted with a natural defectiveness". Nor did Locke, who seemed to argue against Sir Robert Filmer, distance himself through scriptural convention in his several references to the Bible. Rather, his message partakes of the Scriptures and adheres to the now famous "Unto the woman he said, I will greatly multiply thy sorrow and thy conception; in sorrow thou shalt bring forth children; **and thy desire shall be to thy husband, and he shall rule over thee**" (Rez  M. and Bowen R., 1998:231. Emphasis ours).

The male legacy concerning women stereotypes is perhaps better deflated by the twentieth century French philosopher Simone de Beauvoir who sums up the hypocrisy of male paternalism and chauvinism throughout the ages when she writes:

Legislators, priests, philosophers, writers, and scientists have striven to show that subordinate position of woman is willed in heaven and advantageous on earth. The religions invented by men reflect this wish for domination. In the legends of Eve and Pandora men have taken up arms

against women. They have made use of philosophy and theology, as the quotations from Aristotle and St Thomas have shown. Since ancient times satirists and moralists have delighted in showing up the weaknesses of women (Beauvoir, 1949 at <http://marxists.org/reference/subject/philosophy/works/fr/debeauv.htm>)

And John Locke may as well be one of these philosophers who wanted to extend the male rule of the household to the higher sphere of government.

### **Exploring the Male Territory**

As most women of her time Mary Astell felt doubly 'enslaved' or submitted by man as the ruler of the household and the sovereign ruler in government. Given this double constraint and the objectives Astell set for herself (and for the English women in general), she singled out the inconsistencies in Locke and took him to task on different subjects he discussed in his treatise. For this purpose she appropriated his discourse and proceeded to defamiliarize it by having it displaced from the realm of politics to the sphere of the household or the domestic arena where he had proved himself mean. This displacement is meant to uncover man's subterfuges in keeping the woman in ignorance. Throughout her essay she made use of the key concepts dear to Locke only to instil them with an ironic/satiric dimension. This displacement which is at work in Astell's essay breaks the major arguments of Locke.

Indeed, Astell engaged in the Enlightenment arena of ideas against the so-called liberating conceptions of mankind through reason as they were defined by

male liberals, and social contract theorists for the benefit of the "commonwealth" or humanity. In other words, Astell challenged man in his own field, and with his own weapons, in order to ridicule his (ir)rational agenda for the proclaimed good of the "commonwealth". This intention on the part of Astell is to bring man, (man as represented by the Lockes and the Hobbes and the Filmers) from high to low.

Astell started her essay with a parody of title. *Some Reflections Upon Marriage* echoes John Locke's *Some Thoughts Concerning Education* (1693) in which he insisted that some minds have a greater intellectual potential than others. Locke also had "an apprehension should daughters be perceived to understand any learned language or be conversant in books, they might be in danger of not finding husband" because men "relish these accomplishments in a lady" (qted in Stone, 1979: 229). Astell responded in the same twisted logic as Locke arguing that

We are all of us sufficiently Vain, and without doubt the Celebrated Name of Author, which most are so fond of, had not been avoided but for very good Reasons: To name but one; *Who will care to pull upon themselves an Hornet's nest?* 'Tis a very great Fault to regard rather who it is that Speaks, than what is Spoken; and either to submit to Authority, when we should only yield to Reason; or if Reason press too hard, to think to ward it off by Personal Objections and Reflections. Bold Truths may pass while the Speaker is *Incognito*, but are not endur'd when he is known; few Minds being strong enough to bear what Contradicts their Principles and Practices without Recriminating when they can. And tho' to tell the Truth be the most Friendly Office, yet whosoever is so hardy as to venture as it, shall

be counted an Enemy for so doing. (Astell, 1700  
<http://www.pinn.net/~sunshine/main.html>. text not paginated)

From the start, though Astell made it clear that she did not want to compete with men. She showed that they (women) were as equal and as able, as skilful and as reasonable as men, if not better, in some respects. Astell set a polemical tone for her essay from the beginning. A passage in particular attracts our attention. It reads as follows:

And tho' one had not Piety enough to make a Religious Reflection, yet Civil Prudence would almost enforce them to say, that Man being in Honour has no Understanding, but is compar'd unto the Beasts that perish. He Blesseth his Soul, and thinks himself a happy Man, imagining his House will endure for ever, and that he has establish'd his Name and Family. But how wise soever he may be in other respects, in this he acts no better than the Ignorant and Foolish. For as he carries nothing away with him when he dies, so neither will his Pomp and Glory descend as he intended. Generous and Worthy Actions only can secure him from Oblivion, or what is worse, being remembered with Contempt; so little reason have we to Envy any Man's Wealth and Greatness, but much to Emulate his Wisdom and Vertue (ibid., text not paginated)

This aggressive stance partakes of polemic which strikes a blow at male self-complacency in his dominion over the household. The polemic shows at the level of the diametrically opposed intention on the same referent. This opposed intention dislodges the male's discourse.

## Questioning the Legacy

### Marriage

During the medieval and early modern times in England, the issue of marriage was a family affair. Lawrence Stone defines it as "a private contract between two families concerning property exchange." (Stone, 1979: 29). Custom has it that the choice of a spouse for women is very limited because Laws, social practices, and economic structures narrowed women's meaningful roles in society. The limit of choice for women is documented by many authors and writers. George Saville, Marquis of Halifax is one of them. Writing to his daughters, he warns that

It is one of the *disadvantages* belonging to your Sex, that young Women are seldom permitted to make their own *choice*; Friends Care and Experience are thought safer guides to them, than their own *Fancies*; and their Modesty often forbiddeth them to refuse when their Parents recommend, though their inward *Consent* may not entirely go along with it. (in Jones, V. 1990:18)

At the same time women badly need marriage because they are prepared for it from early age. Mores and customs are construed in such a way as to see in marriage the ultimate objective of women. Jones's warning to his daughter is of course construed as an advice, a way of educating and preparing her to this rite of passage. He went on to say,

In this case there remaineth nothing for them to do, but to endeavour to make that easie which falleth to their *Lot*, and by a wise use of everything they may dislike in a

*Husband*, turn that by degrees to be very supportable, which, if neglected, might in time beget an *Aversion* (ibid., : 18.)

What comes out from the quotation above is that the issue of marriage, the mores related to it, and the terms of the marriage contract were determined by men, leaving no avenue for women's opinion. The following examples illustrate well the male dominance over this question. For Milton, the essential object of marriage is "the apt and cheerful conversation of man with woman, to comfort him and refresh him against the solitary life" (qtd in Stone, 1979: 102). Milton's assumption of subordination of women is then very clear, mainly when he rhetorically asked, "Who can be ignorant that woman was created for man, and not man for woman? (Qtd in ibid., 102)

John Locke refuted the theological family model of Sir Robert Filmer and the absolutist form of government in favour of a social contract wherein the governor will be answerable for his action. Within this social contract, he inscribed marriage. Lawrence Stone says, "He [Locke] argued that conjugal society was formed by voluntary contract for the purpose of begetting and rearing children." (Stone, 1979: 178). These two illustrations, among many others, constitute a telling instance of male supremacist thought in marriage.

It is against this established tradition that Mary Astell decided to discuss marriage from a woman's perspective. Her discussion is at once a philosophical probe a) of human nature. b) of practical questions on women's education,

marriage, inferiority and c) the role assigned to her in society. The way she addressed these subjects catapults her into the status of a rights theorist of the downtrodden half of humanity.

In *Some reflections Upon Marriage*, Astell listed the grievances of woman. For her "The history of mankind is a history of repeated injuries and usurpations on the part of man toward woman, having in direct object the establishment of an absolute tyranny over her." (Stanton E.C., Anthony S.B., and Gage M.J. in Morris, 1969. Vol. I: 272-75) The injuries concern the infringement over basic rights as they are listed by the authors of the Seneca Falls Convention or the *Declaration of Sentiments*, a parody of the *American Declaration of Independence* which opens as follows:

When, in the course of human events, it becomes necessary for one portion of the family of man to assume among the people of the earth a position different from that which they have hitherto occupied, but one to which the laws of nature and of nature's God entitle them, a decent respect to the opinions of mankind requires that they should declare the causes that impel them to such a course.

We hold these truths to be self-evident: that all men and women are created equal; that they are endowed by their Creator with certain inalienable rights; that among these are life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness; that to secure these rights governments are instituted, deriving their just powers from the consent of the governed. Whenever any form of government becomes destructive of these ends, it is the right of those who suffer from it to refuse allegiance to it, and to insist upon the institution of a new government, laying its foundation on such principles, and organizing its powers in such form, as to them shall seem most likely to effect their safety and happiness. Prudence, indeed, will

dictate that governments long established should not be changed for light and transient causes; and accordingly all experience hath shown that mankind are more disposed to suffer, while evils are sufferable, than to right themselves by abolishing the forms to which they were accustomed. **But when a long train of abuses and usurpations, pursuing invariably the same object, evinces a design to reduce them under absolute despotism, it is their duty to throw off such government, and to provide new guards for their future security.** Such has been the patient sufferance of the women under this government, and such is now the necessity which constrains them to demand the equal station to which they are entitled. (ibid., emphasis ours)

Our recourse to quoting at length from the 1848 *Declaration of Sentiments* is doubly justified. First, the *Declaration* draws inspiration from the basic philosophical and political tenets enunciated by John Locke more than fifty years earlier; secondly, it purports to continue the fight initiated by Astell half a century before.

Astell's *Some Reflections Upon Marriage* negotiates Locke's theory of conjugal life. Against Locke's idea that marriage is natural and meant to preserve mankind and perpetuate at the same time man's hegemony through the right of entail by (male) primogeniture, Astell responded that marriage is more than "a contractual relationship giving common interest and property" (cf. Stone, 1999). She went on to argue that marriage is a sacred relationship which she described as "[...] an institution of Heaven and the only honourable way of continuing mankind". What Astell implied here is that men did not take marriage seriously

since their ultimate object was neither respect nor sanctity, but profit, prestige and power.

This male conception of marriage led Astell to refuse the master-slave relationship as it finds expression in the bonds that tie man and woman in the household. Locke's natural rights played him false; they were turned against him by Astell who wondered,

*If all Men are born free, how is it that all Women are born slaves? as they must be if the being subjected to the inconstant, uncertain, unknown, arbitrary Will of Men, be the perfect Condition of Slavery? and if the Essence of Freedom consists, as our Masters say it does, in having a standing Rule to live by? And why is Slavery so much condemn'd and strove against in one Case, and so highly applauded and held so necessary and so sacred in another?*

The idea of slavery in married life is expressed by Barbara Caine. According to her "marriage still carried the marks of barbaric origin, involving the sale and enslavement of women and the binding of them to a man for his personal use and for the procreation of his children" (Cain, 1997: 136). In Astell, the issue of marriage is discussed not in itself alone but in relation to other aspects of life. Among these she associated the political and the natural rights. One of these natural rights is equality

### **Equality**

Astell's rhetorical question, "If all men are born free, how is it that all women are born slaves?" in one the sections of her essay is a bold, daring, reply to

Robert Filmer, Thomas Hobbes, and particularly John Locke, her immediate predecessor. The allusion to Filmer is justified by the latter's argument that " [...] God gave to Adam not only the dominion over the **woman** and the children that should issue from them, but also over the whole earth to subdue it, and over all the Creatures on it, so that as long as Adam lived, no man could claim or enjoy anything but by donation" [...] (Filmer, R., *Patriarcha or the Natural Power of Kings* 1680 at <http://www.mdx.ac.uk/www/study/xFil.htm>) Against Hobbes, Astell retained that charge against woman that he had derived from the Scriptures:

The Divell to enflame the Ambition of the woman, to whom that fruit already seemed beautifull, told her that by tasting it, they should be as Gods, knowing Good and Evill. Whereupon having both eaten, they did indeed take upon them Gods office, which is Judicature of Good and Evill; but acquired no new ability to distinguish between them aright. (Hobbes, 1951: II, 4)

It follows from the quotation above that Hobbes, like other male social contract theorists, attributed the Original Sin to woman, a sin that consequently denied her access to competition in the various fields men claimed for themselves. Astell's questioning of male assumptions in her time transgressed the limits set on women, and by this very transgression, she made forays into a territory that had hitherto remained forbidden.

In an essay on Mary Astell's writing entitled "De-ciphering women and de-scribing authority" Catherine Sharrock argues that in Astell's time the women were seen as 'Cyphers in the World' but Astell did not endorse completely this

assumption because, she said, "(h)er texts embark upon the deciphering of the social codes that authorize the marginalization of the female subject. This deciphering moves towards a revision of the 'cyphered' female identity, by disrupting the patriarchal discourse through which it is articulated." (quoted in Grundy & Wiseman, 1992:109). In other words, Astell broke a long-established taboo, and started a profanation process that is otherwise justified because, as Raman Selden says in a chapter of his entitled "Class and Gender",

Literature as an institution has tended to be an elitist preserve for obvious reasons. The level of literacy, economic independence and access to culture needed for someone to become a 'great writer' have been beyond the scope of most individuals until relatively recently. Historically, the system of education and the structure of communication have privileged certain classes (Selden, 1996: 519)

The supposed class that is denied access to educational opportunities by men in this quotation is the class of women. This is, in Astell's words, nonsense of common sense" of the patriarchs.

If Astell's *Some Reflections Upon Marriage* does not spare all male chauvinism, it has a particularly aggressive stand towards John Locke. This aggressive stand partakes of the order of polemic. Her argument is formulated in the following words: "(f)or Covenants betwist Husband and Wife, like Laws in an Arbitrary Government. are of little Force, the Will of the Sovereign is all in all." (Astell, 1700:15 <http://www.pinn.net/~sunshine/main.html>). This quotation from

Astell's *Some Reflections Upon Marriage* undermines Locke's idea of social contract to achieve a commonwealth for the benefit of all, a commonwealth which, in Locke's wording, is but an extension of male household hegemony into the higher sphere of government. Locke who otherwise abhorred, and argued against arbitrary dominion in the state, seemed to contradict himself while maintaining it in the family.

In discussing equality Locke posited that the state of nature is

A state ... of equality, wherein all the power and jurisdiction is reciprocal, no one having more than another, there being nothing more evident than that creatures of the same species and rank, promiscuously born to all the same advantages of Nature, and the use of the same faculties, should also be equal one amongst another, without subordination or subjection... (Locke, 1690, II.II.4)

Locke's equality in the state of nature is partial: on the one hand his project which is premised of equality seems ideal for all beings. On the other hand, are equal only if they belong to the same category. Locke's idea here is that mankind is divided into subspecies: that of men and that of women. And while man is naturally 'the abler and strong' in Locke's rhetoric, it is also natural for man to be superior because a family is a natural institution based on the natural differences between the two sexes. Therefore, all that Locke said about equality in nature concerns men only. This is made clear in the following statement

A state also of equality, wherein all the power and jurisdiction is reciprocal, no one having more than another, there being nothing more evident than that creatures of the

same species and rank, promiscuously born to all the same advantages of Nature, and the use of the same faculties, should also be equal one amongst another, without subordination or subjection, unless the lord and master of them all should, by any manifest declaration of his will, set one above another, and confer on him, by an evident and clear appointment, an undoubted right to dominion and sovereignty. (II.II.6)

Though Locke believed that some women were, to a certain extent, able to govern their lives and properties by themselves, he thought that the majority of them were really under the sovereignty and government of men. Furthermore, all women, in Locke's view are put under the difficult conditions of submitting to the authority of men. In her essay, Astell argues that the so-called natural superiority is but a social construct. Therefore she reversed Locke's argument to demonstrate that his postulate needed reformulation. She writes:

But when a Woman Marrys unequally and beneath herself, there is almost demonstration that the Man is Sordid and Unfair, that instead of loving her he only loves himself, trepans and ruins her to serve his own ends. For if he had not a mighty opinion of himself, (which temper is like to make and admirable Husband,) he cou'd never imagine that their Person and good Qualities should make compensation for all the advantages she quits on his account.

Astell's statement suggests that women match, through the **contract of marriage**, with men who are weaker than women in many respects. In this situation, man emerges from his lower state thanks to what woman can provide him in terms of money (dowry, for example) or fortune. Yet man remains ungrateful. For Astell such men do not deserve the enjoyment of conjugal life. On

the other hand, Astell seems to argue that if the sanctity of marriage is subverted by man because he considers marriage in terms of interest one can gain egoistically at the expense of the other half, it is then better for women to lead a life in celibacy. Her argument is— as it is shown in the quote above— that man is so selfish and ungrateful that the women who venture into marriage embark themselves on a sacrificial enterprise.

Astell expressed the belief that women are inherently equal to men and that they deserve the same political, economic and social opportunities. She moved on to project on man all the stereotypical attributes which woman has inherited through the education she has received from male theorists whom she accuses of limiting women's access to education. The charge against man's deliberate will not to educate women is rendered as follows:

We never see or perhaps make sport with the ill Effects of a bad Education, till it comes to touch us home in the ill conduct [60] of a Sister, a Daughter, or Wife. Then the Women must be blam'd, their Folly is exclaim'd against, when all this while it was the wise Man's Fault, who did not set a better Guard on those who according to him stand in so much need of one.

Given Astell's reflections, the discourse John Locke wants to be dialogic is stripped of this dimension, and as such, its revolutionary spirit is because it excludes half of mankind —women— from participation in the articulation of their concerns on the ground that they lack rationality. Therefore Locke's discourse

retains and claims authorial, patriarchal, hegemony. It reads as a dialogue in disguise, that is one among men. For Astell, John Locke's endeavours in liberal thought remain monolithic and monologic to that other half of mankind."the

### **Education**

Education in Astell is given primary importance. She believed that all the nightmarish experiences of women derived from the lack of education. This is why she started her essay with this dimension of women's life. All her arguments in *Some Reflections Upon Marriage* derive from the experiences of one of her female neighbours in Chelsea, the Duchess of Mazarine. Her recourse to a woman's experience is meant as a rhetorical way of engaging in a polemic with male authors, husbands, in a word, the male species. From the start she set the tone of her essay as follows:

These are great Provocations, but nothing can justify the revenging the Injuries we receive from others, upon our selves: The Italian Proverb shews a much better way; If you would be reveng'd of your Enemies, live well. Had Madam Mazarine's Education made a right Improvement of her Wit and Sense, we should not have found her seeking Relief by such imprudent, not to say scandalous Methods, as the running away in Disguise with a spruce Cavalier, and rambling to so many Courts and Places, nor diverting her self with such Childish, Ridiculous, or Ill-natur'd Amusements, as the greatest part of the Adventures in her Memoirs are made up of. True Wit consists not meerly in doing [5] or saying what is out of the way, but in such surprizing things as are fit and becoming the person from whom they come. (Astell, 1700  
<http://www.pinn.net/~sunshine/main.html>. Document not paginated)

Though Astell's argument in the passage above does not spare the behaviour of her neighbour, it can be construed as a criticism of the sort of education men impart in women. At the same time, Astell's polemic serves as advice to her fellow women. She wrote,

We never see or perhaps make sport with the ill Effects of a bad Education, till it comes to touch us home in the ill conduct [60] of a Sister, a Daughter, or Wife. Then the Women must be blam'd, their Folly is exclaim'd against, when all this while it was the wise Man's Fault, who did not set a better Guard on those who according to him stand in so much need of one. (ibid. Document not paginated)

Astell was well aware of the handicaps of women in the field of education since there was little concern for improvement either in the home or state institutions. The reduction of women's education to a bare minimum widens the gap between men's and women's chances in the social roles. While the woman is victimised because she is not allowed access to education, she is also guilty of the consequences which arise from this lack of education. Astell explained the case: "Since her Reason is suppos'd to be less, and her Passions stronger than his, he chould not give occasion to call that supposition in Question by his pettish Carriage and needless Provocations" (ibid.)

The Renaissance humanists' "vigorous drive for female classical education" as it is expressed by Sir Thomas statement "I do not see why ... learning may not equally agree with both sexes" (cf. Stone, 1979: 142) is, by the seventeenth

century, "replaced by the traditional feminine accomplishments and graces needed to catch a husband, such as music, singing, dancing, needle work and embroidery, and no more than the basics of reading and writing" (ibid., : 143) so that only very few women can sign their contract of marriage.

This state of affairs is the consequence of man's supposed natural superiority over women, and the traditional role assigned to the latter. If woman's place is in the home, it follows that she does not need an academic education to place her on a par with man in the field of the professions or public life. This lack of interest in the education of women is justified (by man) on the ground that the latter lack rationality. John Locke who argued that the state of nature is one of equality and freedom reconsidered his position and reduced it to the following:

Though I have said above (chapter. 2) "That all men by nature are equal," I cannot be supposed to understand all sorts of "equality." Age or virtue may give men a just precedency: Excellency of parts and merit may place others above the common level. Birth may subject some, and alliance or benefits others, to pay an observance to those to whom Nature, gratitude, or other respects, may have made it due; and yet all this consists with the equality which all men are in respect of jurisdiction or dominion one over another. which was the equality I there spoke of as proper to the business in hand, being that equal right that every man hath to his natural freedom, without being subjected to the will or authority of any other man. (II. VI.54)

Granted that Locke's state of nature is governed by natural law, Astell's statement, "If God had not intended that Women shou'd use their Reason, He

would not have given them any, for he does nothing in vain", is a rational response against the alleged inferiority of women.

But whoever he be that thus happens to become our master, if he allows us to be reasonable Creatures, and does not merely Compliment us with that Title, since no man denies our Readiness to use our Tongues, it would tend, I should think, to our Master's Advantage, and therefore he may please to be advised to teach us to improve our Reason, but if Reason is only allowed us by way of Raillery, and the secret -Maxim is, that we have none, or little more than Brutes, 'tis the best way to confine us with Chain and Block to the Chimney-Cornet, which, probably, might save the Estates of some Families and the Honor of others.

### Property

In the previous chapter we have discussed Locke's theory of property in relation to Hobbes's *Leviathan* and said it is regarded as the cornerstone of classical liberalism. Locke's grounding the right to property in natural law is seen to be pivotal in asserting the rights of individuals against the state. From the inception, Locke placed the right to possessions on the same level as the right to life, health, and liberty. These considerations offer a large spectrum of interpretations as they relate to Hobbes's (man's) property but they are certainly not the same if we come to consider their impact and import on women). In other words, our discussion of property in Astell (in relation to Locke) will indicate another facet of private ownership.

We will argue in this chapter that Locke's theory of property is a defence of economic inequality. According to MacPherson, Locke's major achievement in his

theory of property was "to base the property right on natural rights and natural law, and then to remove all the natural law limits from the property right" He believes that Locke wanted to justify unlimited right to property in order to ground the primary feature of capitalist society, unequal ownership of property, in natural law. In other words, according to MacPherson, Locke envisioned a society divided into two classes with the capitalists on top and the downtrodden workers. (cf. Vaughn, 2004). MacPherson's argument is of course based on Locke's statement that

[I]t is plain, that Men have agreed to disproportionate and unequal Possession of the Earth, they having by a tacit and *voluntary consent* found out a way, how a man may *fairly* possess more land than he himself can use the product of, by receiving in exchange for the overplus, Gold and Silver, which may be hoarded up *without injury to any one*, these metalls not spoiling or decaying in the hands of the possessor. This partage of things, in an inequality of private possessions, men have made practicable out of the bounds of Societie, and without compact, only by putting a value on gold and silver and tacitly agreeing in the use of Money (II.

According to Locke, the most basic property is the most personal: every man has a property in his own person. This very basic assumption in Locke's theory of property constitutes the point of Astell's departure in her criticism of property.

Mary Astell did not use the term property. She rather mentions the word 'estate'. The reason is that the word property as it is used in Locke is given a political dimension. As proto feminists, Astell understood well enough that she

had not to challenge man openly where law and tradition proved him right. This does not mean, however, that Astell did not question the politico-economic theory of John Locke. She simply employed the political nature of husband-wife relationship to show its negative aspect on women. Since a wife is a citizen within the domestic sphere rather the public life, she cannot attack her exclusion from public life without first demolishing subjection to her husband.

Astell's contention in her essay is to claim title to the natural rights of the individual. In so doing she obliquely deflated the idea developed by Locke that "man is the abler and stronger" on whom authority is conferred. Astell believed that women have the ability to manage their own affairs. She wrote,

But there are few Women whose Understandings are worth the Management; their Estates are much more capable of Improvement. No Woman, much less a Woman of Fortune, is ever fit to be her own Mistress, and he who has not the Vanity to think what much finer things he could perform had he the Management of her Fortune; or so much Partiality and Self-love, as to fancy it can't be better bestow'd than in making his; will yet be so honest and humble as to think that 'tis fit she should take his Assistance, as Steward at least. For the Good Man aspires no further, he would only take the Trouble of her Affairs off her Hand; and the Sense of her Condescension and his great Obligation, will for ever secure him against acting like a Lord and Master! (Astell, 1700 <http://www.pinn.net/~sunshine/main.html>. document not paginated)

The downtrodden we have spoken of above relate more to women than the other category of male exploited. This is so because the woman is, from the start

believed to be subjected not only to her husband and master but to all men. She argued her point in the following way:

Only let me beg to be informed, to whom we poor Fatherless Maids, and Widows who have lost their Masters, owe Subjection? It can't be to all Men in general, unless all Men were agreed to give the same Commands; Do we then fall as Strays, to the first who finds us? By the Maxims of some Men, and the Conduct of some Women one would think so. (ibid.)

Here, in these rhetorical questions, Astell made more than one statement, but our purpose at hand is to show how husband and wife, man and woman relate to each other as far as property is concerned. John Locke premised his theory of property as an extension of the individual's, bodily strength (body is already understood by him as property). From these postulates, Locke explained the beginning of property in the state of nature as follows:

Though the earth and all inferior creatures be common to all men, yet every man has a "property" in his own "person." This nobody has any right to but himself. The "labour" of his body and the "work" of his hands, we may say, are properly his. Whatsoever, then, he removes out of the state that Nature hath provided and left it in, he hath mixed his labour with it, and joined to it something that is his own, and thereby makes it his property. It being by him removed from the common state Nature placed it in, it hath by this labour something annexed to it that excludes the common right of other men. For this "labour" being the unquestionable property of the labourer, no man but he can have a right to what that is once joined to, at least where there is enough, and as good left in common for others. (II.V.26).

At this point it is important to recall the Lockean condition that lies at the foundation of his defence of private property: the appropriation of property by some must not be at the expense of others. Private property is socially (and morally) acceptable only if it advances the social welfare of the whole community without harming or prejudicing any particular member. Yet we must not also lose sight of what Locke said of the conjugal family. For him a family is not a commonwealth. This implies that the wife loses the protection of positive laws and as such, she is not removed from the bonds that tie her to her husband/master. Therefore Locke's social contract maintains the hegemony of the husband in conjugal life while it rejects it in the government.

It follows that in the contract of marriage, men, according to Astell

look no further than the making of their Fortune, as they call it; who don't so much as propose to themselves any satisfaction in the Woman to whom they Plight their Faith, seeking only to be Masters of her Estate, that so they may have Money enough to indulge all their irregular Appetites; who think they are as good as can be expected, if they are but according to the fashionable Term, Civil Husbands; when we have taken the number of your giddy Lovers, who are not more violent in the Passion than they are certain to Repent of it; when to these you have added such as Marry without any Thought at all, further than that it is the Custom of the World, what others have done before them, that the Family must be kept up, the ancient Race preserv'd, and therefore their kind Parents and Guardians chuse as they think convenient, without ever consulting the Young ones Inclinations, who must be satisfied or pretend so at least, upon pain of their displeasure, and that heavy consequence of it, forfeiture of their Estate: These set aside, I fear there will be but a small remainder to Marry out of better

considerations, and even amongst the few that do, not one in a hundred takes care to deserve his Choice.

Evelyne Pisier and Eleni Varikas have studied the "invisibility of gender" in the political theory of John Locke and have reached the conclusion that "[Locke] définit le mariage comme une association contractuelle entre individus libres et égaux. Mais pour les femmes, cette liberté n'est qu'une liberté de s'assujettir une bonne fois pour toutes à la puissance conjugale qui revient à l'homme comme étant naturellement le plus capable et le plus fort. Fondé en nature le pouvoir conjugal devient le garant de la société civile du droit naturel d'accumulation de la propriété et de sa transmission aux héritiers légitimes, [mâles] (Pisier et Varikas, 2002)

Few Men have so much Goodness as to bring themselves to a liking of what they loath'd, meerly because it is their Duty to like; on the contrary, when they Marry with an indifferency, to please their Friends or encrease [sic] their Fortune, the indifferency proceeds to an aversion, and perhaps even the kindness and complaisance of the poor abus'd Wife shall only serve to encrease it. What follows then? There is no content at home, so it is sought elsewhere, and the Fortune so unjustly got, is as carelessly squander'd. The Man takes a loose, what shou'd hinder him? He has all in his hands, and Custom has almost taken off that small Restraint Reputation us'd to lay. The Wife finds too late what was the Idol the Man adored] which her Vanity perhaps, or it may be the Commands and importunities of Relations, wou'd not let her see before; and now he has got *that* into his possession, she must make court to him for a little sorry Alimony out of her own Estate.

This is what MacPherson calls "possessive individualism," the assumptions that people relate to each other primarily as owners, that individual freedom is the function of the possessions of individuals and that society is nothing but the sum of the "relations of exchange between proprietors." What is responsible for such interest-driven society according to MacPherson is the very concept of self-ownership wherein the individual himself is seen as a property and not as a whole.

While it is clear that Locke posited *political* equality, in the state of nature, he never assumed there would be equality of possessions. A wife is considered herself as property not to speak about the possessions she may have. Astell reading of the contract of marriage as seen by men is reduced to its tangible aspect. Astell made the point that upon marriage the wife loses liberty, wealth and the heritage of her own possession upon the death of her husband. The right of entail by primogeniture seriously handicaps daughters, wives and widows.

Finally, one may say that Astell is as a theorist of women's rights in the home as Locke is one in the state. Locke's abhorrence of political hegemony in the state and his insistence on its perpetuation in the home reduces his liberal enlightenment project to a male limited view of freedom, education and property. Astell's argument in favour of sameness and title to the natural rights sets limits to Locke's political theory.

## Conclusion

Our analysis of John Locke's *Second Treatise on Government* and Mary Astell's *Some reflections on Marriage* allows us to reassess John Locke's theory in terms of Enlightenment thought which is premised on equality and freedom. While John Locke's defence of individual rights has inaugurated a new conception of civil government which is answerable before the citizens who have erected it, it remains that the terms of the contract established between governors and governed are conducted in a male frame of reference. The latter frame of reference has instigated Mary Astell to negotiate the issue of marriage, equality, education, and property tradition in woman's terms.

We have said that laws, customs and mores have codified the female behaviour and choice in Astell's time. The narrowing down of women's education to the elementary skills of reading and writing widens the gap between men's and women's opportunities when it comes to enter the public life. This male reductionist policy finds its justification in the supposed natural superiority of man whose most (in)famous exponent is John Locke.

The legacy of men as it relates to marriage, equality, education and property is explored by Mary Astell. She questioned this legacy by arguing that the fairer sex has been victimized by society merely because of gender divisions, gender divisions which are socially constructed by men.

Astell reads Locke's political contract as one which is based on an unbridled accumulation of wealth. She argued that men marry, not for love, but for depriving women of whatever they possess.

Therefore, the dialogic relation between Astell and Locke is of the order of Polemics. Astell's discourse "clashes" with Locke over the issue of women's freedom.

## General Conclusion

We conclude our dissertation by summarising the main points that we have discussed. In the first chapter we have argued that Hobbes's and Locke's works bear a direct relevance to their immediate historical contexts. We have, accordingly, outlined the salient aspects which have presided over the overall transformation in the seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries. Hobbes's and Locke's contributions to this early modern era are attempts to redefine the civilisation of their country. It is important here to point out to the secular aspect of the authors' worldviews. This is possible because Hobbes and Locke have given scientific dimension to the field of politics which has been for a long time influenced by the church. Hobbes's and Locke's befriending of rationalist thinkers like Descartes, Galileo, and Newton, explains the scientific method of their approach in the building of their respective theories.

In the second chapter, we have attempted a comparison between Hobbes' *Leviathan* and John Locke's *Second Treatise on Government*. We have tried to demonstrate that the political philosophies of Hobbes and Locke are similar in some aspects but quite different in many others. Both Hobbes and Locke began their writings in the state of nature though they offer quite different representations of it. It is agreed on both parts that the state of nature consists of natural laws and equally propose that a government should be created through a "social contract".

From this common point there are many similarities and differences between their interpretations of Human Nature and Government. Both Hobbes and Locke viewed political philosophy from scientific standpoints; for Hobbes it was geometry and for Locke it was Empiricism. Neither Hobbes nor Locke wanted to rely on the divine right of kings in the justification of political authority. The published writings of both Hobbes and Locke results in their exile from England. Hobbes creates a very bleak picture of the state of nature, consisting of selfish egoistic individuals, as opposed to Locke's who are social and altruistic. While Hobbes aimed to create a government with an absolute sovereign government, Locke advocated government upon voluntarily consent.

The major difference between Hobbes and Locke, however, rests on the reasons why people in the natural state agree, by consent, to form a civil government. Hence arises the difference in the role of government. Our concluding argument in this chapter is that John Locke's proposition of social contract is more congenial to the Age of reason as Locke assumed the position of the philosopher of individual liberty and integrity.

The third chapter attempts to revise the argument we have reached in the previous one. This is so because the Enlightenment advocates of individualism and limited government have been dominantly male. While they abhorred tyranny in the state they maintain in the household. All their discourse is male-oriented

and aims to maintained and perpetuate, through law, mores and customs, man's supremacy in society.

The revision of our argument is made possible with the comparison of Mary Astell' *Some Reflections Upon Marriage* and John Locke's *Second Treatise on Government*. Our study of Astell's work shows the limits one can set to Locke's discourse mainly when this discourse is grounded in the Enlightenment thought of equality and freedom. Set against Astell's essay, Locke's treatise on government proves to be the extension of patriarchal paternalism. What Locke's social contract implicitly says about women is to quit celibacy and surrender self, property and liberty to enter in a contract with a "monarch for life." William Blackstone captures best our idea in his fifteenth chapter from *Commentary on the laws of England* when he stated that

By marriage, the husband and wife are one person in law: that is, the very being or legal existence of the woman is suspended during the marriage, or at least is incorporated and consolidated into that of the husband: under whose wing, protection, and cover, she performs every thing; and is therefore called in our law-french a feme-covert; is said to be covert-baron, or under the protection and influence of her husband, her baron, or lord; and her condition during her marriage is called her coverture. Upon this principle, of an union of person in husband and wife, depend almost all the legal rights, duties and disabilities, that either of them acquire by the marriage...

The husband also (by the old law) might give his wife moderate correction. For, as he is to answer for her misbehaviour, the law thought it reasonable to entrust him with this power of restraining her, by domestic chastisement, in the same moderation that a man is allowed

to correct his servants or children; for whom the master or parent is also liable in some cases to answer.

These are the chief legal effects of marriage during the coverture; upon which we may observe, that even the disabilities, which the wife lies under, are for the most part intended for her protection and benefit. So great a favourite is the female sex of the laws of England... (Blackstone, 1765. Html document. not paginated)

Mary Astell addressed Locke's writings through dialogisation. By 'dialogisation', we mean the bringing together of male and female texts, addressing one another, on the same referent, but differently. She singled out the flaw in Locke's discourse and striped it of its revolutionary spirit. In other words, Locke addresses male authority and pleads for the rights of man, not the generic man which means mankind, i.e., men and women, but the specific male species. (cf. Donovan, 1992)

In the light of the comparison we have drawn between Astell and John Locke we share the opinion of the Enlightenment critics who argue that Immanuel Kant, Adorno and Horkeimer considered the Enlightenment as a failure. Kant "regard[s] the Elightenment as a linear process" (Macey, 2000:111). In relation to John Locke's essay, the linearity shows itself in its disregard of women and its male monolgia. For Adorno and Horkeimer the Enlightenment can produce monsters of its own, with contradictory and sometimes dangerous effects (ibid.. :111).

Thus we are of the opinion that the Enlightenment (as its essence is captured in Locke) has failed to achieve its objective because it excludes women from full participation in life right from the beginning. It is a "grand narrative", an expression used by François Lyotard to refer to "narratives which make forms of knowledge legitimate by supplying them with a validating philosophy" (ibid., 167). Locke's "grand narrative" is not only an oppressive one but also a failure in some respects because it has fallen victim of its own principles. Yet Locke's efforts are not vain because "the high optimism that marked much of Enlightenment thought survived as one of the movement's most enduring legacies: the belief that human history is a record of general progress." (Britannica CD.1994-1999). And this optimism is revived in Astell's *Some Reflections Upon Marriage*.

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الطبيعية. أما الفصل الثالث فهو يمثل امتداد النقاش في مطلع القرن الثامن عشر ، ومن اجل التأكد من عالمية نظرية لوك، ارتأينا مقارنة وثيقته بكتاب ماري استال Mary Astell المسمى " بعض الأفكار عن الزواج " Some Reflections upon Mariage ( 1700 ) فيتحويل النقاش من ساحة الحكم السياسي إلي ساحة البيت و الأسرة، ظهرت لنا نقائص في كتاب جون لوك و منه فقد راجعنا الاستنتاج الذي كنا قد وصلنا إليه في نهاية الفصل الثاني.

في خلال هذا البحث، اعتمدنا أساسا على منهجية النقاش و المحاوره التي جاء بها ميخائيل باختين ( Mikhail Bakhtin ) في كتابين (1970) The Dialogic Imagination و (1970) la Poetique de Dostoievski (1992). و كان اختيارنا لهذه المنهجية مبررا بكون كتب هوبز، لوك و أستال جاءت كلها في شكل بحوث فكرية ( Essays ) وقد أوضح "باختين" أن ما ميز عصر النهضة الأوروبية هو النضال ضد السلطة المطلقة.

بالنسبة للوك، كانت هذه السلطة متمثلة في نظام الملك جيمس الثاني Jamse II أما بالنسبة لاستال كانت هذه السلطة المطلقة في نظام الأسرة " الابوية" التي دافع عليها لوك نفسه .

## ملخص

كانت الفلسفة السياسية القائمة في إنجلترا أثناء القرن السابع عشر موجهة نحو تبرير النظام الملكي المطلق المستند على أساس الحق اللاهوتي للملوك في تسيير الدولة.

فرغم صدور الميثاق الأعظم Magna carta في عهد الملك جون في 1215 و كذلك عريضة الحقوق في 1628 للتحديد من سلطة الملك ، ظل تأييد الحكم المطلق متواصلا خاصة من طرف روبرت فيلمر

Robert Filmer و توماس هوبز Thomas Hobbes

استند فيلمر في كتابه Patriarcha ( 1680 ) على الكتب الدينية لكي يبرر الحق اللاهوتي للملوك

و هذا بالتناضر مع قصة سيدنا نوح عليه السلام و أحفاده.

أما هوبز وفي كتابه Léviathan ( 1651 ) اقترح نظاما سياسيا يعتمد على وضع كل الحقوق و الحريات الفردية للمواطنين في شخص الملك أو في مجلس و هذا مقابل ضمان حياتهم . وقد اعتقد هوبز أنها الطريقة المثلى لوضع حد للنزاعات البرلمانية و الحروب الأهلية التي كانت تتخبط فيها إنجلترا في تلك الفترة.

هاتين النظرتين كانتا محل نقد شديد من طرف جون لوك John Locke الذي أصدر عام 1690 كتابه " رسالتان في الحكومة المدنية " Two Treatises on Government أين اعتبر حالة الطبيعية حالة مثالية لكون الرجال فيها أحرارا و متساويين. و لما أن لديهم تفكيرا و عقلا طبيعيين فهم قادرون، عكس ما جاء به هوبز، على تنظيم شؤونهم بأنفسهم دون أن يتعدي أحدا على الحقوق الطبيعية للآخر.

لهذا ، اقترح لوك نظرية سياسية جديدة في شكل عقدا اجتماعيا يقوم على نظام حكم مدني و يستند على رضا و اتفاق بين الحاكم و المحكوم و ضمان كل الحقوق الطبيعية للمواطنين : حق الحياة الأمانة، حق الحرية و حق الملكية الخاصة. هذا مع حق الشعب للإطاحة بالحاكم أن لم يكن عادلا و تعويضه بحاكم آخر.

غير أن فلسفة لوك بدت مدرجة في إطار مقاييس مجتمع " ذكوري " أو " ابوي " ولم تعطي للمرأة الاعتبار الذي أعطته للرجل و من ثم بقية مهمشة و مقصات من العقد الاجتماعي .

وفي هذا البحث المتكون من ثلاثة فصول ، نقترح مقارنة للنظريتين السياسييتين كما جاء بهما

كتابا Leviathan لهوبز و The Second Teatise للوك.

يكون منطلقنا من الفرضية أن هاذين الكتابين جاءا لتدعيم نظام الحكم القائم بالنسبة للأول و اصلاحه بالنسبة للثاني.

الفصل الأول عبارة عن وصف أهم الأحداث التاريخية، الثقافية و السياسية الانجلترا أثناء القرن السابع عشر، كونها تمثل روح العصر لهاتين الوثيقتين. أما الفصل الثاني فهو مقارنة للكتابين من اجل أبرار النقاش القائم و مناقرة أفكار الفيلسوفين حول بناء مجتمع مثالي، و يكون هدفنا في هذا الفصل إظهار تفوق نظرية لوك على هوبز بسبب إن الأول كان يدافع على الحقوق الفردية من جهة، و من جهة أخرى، استعماله للمراجع التاريخية جعلته في وضعية أفضل من هوبز الذي اعتمد فحسب على تخيل حالة